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The crucial demarcation of John Dewey’s ethical theory was to advocate a shift from 
promoting particular moral views to emphasising a process of reflective moral enquiry 
that is equipped to incorporate plurality and difference. I have attempted to revisit 
Dewey’s relevance to the present by setting his ideas within a broader historical context 
than he is normally located in Pragmatist literature. Hence, an important 
methodological aspect of the thesis is deriving the conceptual framework through a 
historical analysis of David Hume’s particular brand of sentimentalism, Immanuel 
Kant’s unification of sentimentalism and rationalism in the third Critique and John 
Stuart Mill’s notion of community under the rubrics of two terms, namely Dewey’s 
‘experience’ and ‘inquiry’. I demonstrate that understanding each philosopher as 
building on the ideas of the previous philosopher’s ethical theory provides a 
background to Dewey’s pragmatist ethics. This allows me to reconfigure the tendency of 
standard contemporary analyses of Dewey that continue to evaluate his work in terms 
of the very alternatives that Dewey sought to overcome, for example, objective and 
subjective, cognitive and non-cognitive, plural and monist. Finally, I show how Dewey’s 
pragmatist ethics bear upon the value of disagreement as illustrated in three case 
studies from the present day. This reveals Dewey’s theory in practice. Dewey’s 
particular conceptions of experience and enquiry, rather than any particular set of 
norms or principles, are employed to define his conception of the ethical. Dewey’s 
pragmatic proceduralism is neither normative nor meta-theoretical. Rather it describes 
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Moral judgments involve identifying whether an act or a failure to act, a motive, 
character, reason or intention is good or bad, right or wrong. A moral judgment 
must demonstrate fairness and perspicacity, a weighing of what someone may or 
may not do, against what their intention was, along with what kind of a person 
they are. This description of moral judgments suggests not only that they are 
demanding in terms of the incorporation and weighing of relevant information, 
but that sound moral judgments are difficult to make when there is conflict and 
division, particularly in cases of deep persistent moral disagreement.  
Consider an example of a moral issue with a long history, namely, the 
issue of slavery. Most of us think of slavery in terms of the Trans-Atlantic Slavery 
Trade that was abolished in the 19th century. However, according to the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) there are 20.9 million men, women and 
children in slavery today.1 Modern slavery takes many forms: bonded labour 
where people are tricked into taking a loan that they will never be able to pay off; 
child slavery such as child labour and trafficking; early and forced marriage; 
forced labour where threats of violence keep labourers in line; descent based 
slavery where people are born into a ‘slave’ class and even inherit their parents’ 
debts; and trafficking for labour or sex. In the 21st century people are still sold 
like objects, forced to work for little or no pay and are at the complete mercy of 
their 'employers', even though it is illegal under international human rights 
conventions and declarations in all the countries where this slavery is practiced.2 
Of course, the undeniable persistence of slavery in practice does not mean 
that slavery is a contentious moral issue about which there is disagreement. The 
fact that there are international laws against slavery demonstrates that 
humanity in general views the deprivation of basic rights such as freedom, 
equality and safety from harm as morally wrong and practitioners of such acts as 
culpable. The acknowledgment that slavery is wrong, and the instantiation of 
punishment as a fitting response to it, demonstrates that there is agreement 
                                                          
 
1 http://www.antislavery.org/english/slavery_today/what_is_modern_slavery.aspx See also US 
Department of State website: http://www.state.gov/j/tip/what/. Accessed 23/05/2014. 
2 Ibid. 
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about the moral reprehensibility of slavery. Yet this agreement in principle does 
not necessarily motivate the kind of behaviour at a personal level, which would 
stamp slavery out.  
While we can confidently assert that slavery is wrong, does this mean that 
buying the products of slavery is wrong? Various consumables such as clothing, 
shoes, coffee, chocolate, diamonds and many of the components of the 
technology that much of the world relies on are highly consumed products of the 
slave trade. It is at this level, the level of consumerism, that a difference between 
principle and motivation can be seen. Are we, as users of its products, morally 
accountable for the slave trade’s continuance and flourishing? Should we boycott 
products? Attend rallies? Campaign against particular producers? Sign petitions? 
The persistence of slavery and modern society’s dependence on its products 
highlights the general point that agreement on principle is not sufficient for 
motivating action, which would serve the relevant principle. It also demonstrates 
that agreement about objectives may not be sufficient to secure agreement on 
how to achieve those objectives. 
My own experience of living in a community mourning an environmental 
tragedy sparked my interest in considering the complexity and seemingly 
intractable nature of disagreement on means when there is agreement on ends. 
There is also the added fact that in some cases, agreement on ends was not 
sufficient to motivate behaviour, which would secure those ends. The River 
Murray and its various tributaries that make up the Murray Darling Basin, is 
Australia’s largest water resource. The combination of a prolonged drought 
(2002-2008) and overuse for irrigation, industrial and domestic supply, depleted 
the health of the Murray. In 2008, the Australian government responded to this 
environmental crisis with the establishment of the Murray-Darling Basin 
Authority, a single body responsible for overseeing water resource planning 
through comprehensive scientific research and community consultation. The 
multiplicity of uses and interest groups compounded the complexity of the 
problem: how should the River Murray’s reduction in water supply and water 
quality be addressed?  
Through participation in consultations between various local, state and 
federal government bodies with local Lower Murray communities, I began to 
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recognise that the process of consultation was akin to what I have called John 
Dewey’s proceduralist moral theory. I understood that if outlined in the relevant 
way, Dewey’s theory shows that substantial progress of various kinds emerges 
when a community engages in the kind of debates that he would consider 
constitutes a ‘community of inquiry’. I realised that taking this path marked 
Dewey’s proceduralism as distinctively different to other ethical theories. As we 
will see, while other ethical theories show on what basis one can decide which 
ethical conclusion is right, Dewey shows instead the basis on which one can 
show that one is a part of a community of ethical progress.  
Two lessons emerge. Firstly, one can only be a part of ethical progress if 
participating in community. Importantly, the way participation is construed by 
Dewey avoids the principle and motivation dichotomy, replacing them with his 
conception of experience and enquiry, which, while distinguishable in theory, 
cannot be separated in practice. Without first person involvement and subjective 
commitment, there is no participation in enquiry. Secondly, genuine scope for 
disagreement on all aspects of an issue is a necessary part of ethical progress. 
When these first person involvement and subjective commitment conditions are 
met, the very terms of the debate that one’s enquiry involves, may evolve and 
change. The River Murray situation, while complex and stressful, nicely 
illustrates Dewey’s proceduralism in practice. 
Traditionally, Deweyan studies focus on the classical American 
Pragmatists, Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. However, an important 
methodological feature of this thesis is detecting a thread of understanding from 
those who arguably underpin contemporary analytic ethical theory, Hume, Kant 
and Mill. Given the magnitude of writing and thinking surrounding each of these 
canonical philosophers, this thesis has been an exercise in creative restraint with 
a precise outcome in focus – to extract and elucidate relevant key concepts 
through primary source analysis in order to reconstruct an arguably more robust 
and well-rounded Dewey. This enables the development of a proceduralist 
account of Dewey’s ethical thought. Whilst Dewey’s pragmatist heritage is clear, 
my alternative approach highlights aspects of his ethics, which draw attention to 
its relevance to contemporary philosophical debates in analytic philosophy, both 
theoretical and practical. 
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The thesis starts with an overview of Peirce and James in order to 
demonstrate the limits of the traditional historical approach. I argue that that 
Dewey inherits Peirce’s instrumentalism, adapting it further to bring out its 
latent proceduralism and that James’s radical empiricism provides the starting 
point for Dewey’s notion of experience, which circumvents the 
empiricist/rationalist divide altogether. I then derive the conceptual framework 
through a historical analysis of pertinent key concepts in Hume, Kant and Mill 
under the rubrics of two terms, Dewey’s ‘experience’ and ‘inquiry’. I argue that 
this historical tracing of Dewey’s conception of experience as a crucial aspect of 
enquiry can be understood as incorporating Hume’s specific brand of 
sentimentalism, Kant’s conception of aesthetic reflective judgment and aspects of 
Mill’s notion of community. An approach indirectly supported by Dewey: 
In view of the part played by actual conflict of forces in moral situations and the genuine 
uncertainty which results as to what should be done, I am inclined to think that one 
cause for the inefficacy of moral philosophies has been that in their zeal for a unitary 
view they have oversimplified the moral life. The outcome is a gap between the tangled 
realities of practice and the abstract forms of theory. A moral philosophy which should 
frankly recognize that each human being has to make the best adjustment he can among 
forces which are genuinely disparate, would throw light upon actual predicaments of 
conduct and help individuals in making a juster estimate of the force of each competing 
factor. All that would be lost would be the idea that theoretically there is a correct 
solution for every difficulty with which each and every individual is confronted.3 
 
I demonstrate that aspects of Hume, Kant & Mill can be seen in Dewey’s account 
of experience and enquiry as the basis of moral judgment. Keeping this in mind, I 
am able to avoid the misunderstanding of Dewey that results from failing to fully 
appreciate his indebtedness to the history of analytic ethical theory. In effect this 
enables me to proffer a hermeneutics of the sentimentalism-rationalism 
structure grounded in pragmatist assumptions concerning the two-way 
exchange between conceptual development and perception. 
The overall aim of this thesis is to highlight the ways that Dewey’s ethics 
is significant and informative to contemporary ethical theory and practice. 
Placing Dewey in a lineage of analytic ethical theorists, Hume, Kant and Mill, 
reinforces and strengthens the significance of his extensive contribution to 
ethical theory. Through the very same historical figures other philosophers in 
                                                          
 
3 John Dewey, 1966 (1930), “Three Independent Factors in Morals” in Educational Theory Jo Ann 
Boydston (Trans.), 16, pp. 198-209, p. 208-9. Hereafter Independent. 
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the analytic tradition have ended up in debates that dichotomise, for example, 
cognitivism and noncognitivism, monism and pluralism. This is not to deny that 
such debates are relevant and informative, it is rather to suggest that by placing 
him firmly within the analytic theoretical timeline in which such disputes were 
arguably cemented, we are able to fully realise Dewey’s conception of experience 
and enquiry and so avoid losing sight of his significant contribution to ethics in 
practice. The essential benefit of Dewey’s proceduralist account is that it 
transcends traditional metaphysical problems and suggests that we turn instead 
to how to cope with moral disagreement, with clashes of judgment and value. 
This leaves me in a position to demonstrate how Dewey’s ethical practice has 
lessons for us in regards to contemporary debates.  
I represent Kant in response to Hume then forge a path through Mill to 
Dewey. This allows me to contribute to existing work that, as Sandra Rosenthal 
describes it, assimilates various features of pragmatic philosophy into the 
framework of analytic philosophy.4 Setting out this history of relevant ideas led 
me to the realisation that Dewey’s contribution to this debate is to show that the 
state of uncertainty and tension between competing sides, while it may not be 
comfortable, is the very state required for progress and change.  
The more conscientious the agent is and the more care he expends on the moral quality 
of his acts, The more he is aware of the complexity of this problem of discovering what is 
good, he hesitates among ends, all of which are good in some measure, among duties 
which obligate him for some reason. Only after the event…does one of the alternatives 
seem simply good morally or bad morally.5 
 
Dewey’s implicit notion of communication implies in turn, a proceduralist ethics 
– a focus on process rather than conclusions – which is not inconsistent with the 
fact that our desired ends initially draw us to the table. I argue that a particular 
way of communicating, rather than any particular conclusions, defines the 
ethical.  That is, unless the argumentation involves unwinding the terms of 
reference so that no view is privileged, there is no communication of the kind 
                                                          
 
4 Sandra B. Rosenthal, 2002, “A Pragmatic Appropriation of Kant: Lewis and Peirce” in 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 38: 1/2, Essays in Honor of Richard S. Robin, Indiana 
University Press, pp.253-256, p. 253. See also John Kaag, 2005, “Continuity and Inheritance: 
Kant’s “Critique of Judgment” and the Work of C. S. Peirce” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society, 41: 3 pp. 515-540. 
5 Dewey, Independent, p. 198. 
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that defines a community. This is my contribution to the field of Deweyan 
Studies.  
Chapter two focuses on the standard view of classical American 
Pragmatism, which places Dewey as a successor of Charles Sanders Peirce and 
William James. I offer a brief exposition of Peirce’s The Fixation of Belief6 and 
How to Make Our Ideas Clear7 with a particular focus on his system of enquiry 
based on the scientific method. I then turn my attention to James’s Pragmatism8 
in order to clarify his empirically grounded conceptualisation of ‘experience’. 
Dewey’s inheritance is indisputable. Traditional American Pragmatism 
emboldens experience turning it into a dipping pool for thoughts and guidance 
under the strict rubrics of moral enquiry based on the scientific method. This 
pragmatist inheritance became the foundations for Dewey’s account of the 
metaphysical reality of our experience of relations, where the relations are just 
as real as the properties that they relate: subject and object; individual and 
society; self and other; theory and practice. The chapter demonstrates that 
whilst Dewey certainly inherited much from his pragmatist forebears, limiting 
our analysis to these precursors alone, limits our account of Dewey.  
In chapter three, an exegesis of David Hume’s sentimentalism, focuses 
particularly on his empiricist explanation for moral motivation, that is, the 
natural human desire to feel positive, not negative, sensations evidenced by how 
humans act. For Hume, what counts as morally right or wrong depends on 
motivation (which engages feeling), as opposed to abiding by rules or the 
outcomes achieved. Humans are born with a moral sense, a fluttering in the 
breast of approbation or disapprobation, which is felt, not judged. Thus the 
motivation to act morally is embedded in the natural human desire to feel 
positive, not negative, sensations. Hume’s defense of the role of feeling in moral 
judgment is informative in so far as it allocates morality a place in our 
experiential reality. This paves the way for Dewey’s conception of experience, 
                                                          
 
6 Charles Sanders Peirce, 1877, “The Fixation of Belief” in Popular Science Monthly, 12, pp. 1-15 
http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html Accessed 24 Oct. 2017 
7 Charles Sanders Peirce, 1878, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” Popular Science Monthly, 12, pp. 
286-302. http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html Accessed 24 Oct. 2017 
8 William James, 1975, (1907), “Pragmatism” in Burkhardt F. H. (Ed.) The Works of William James: 
Pragmatism, Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA and London. 
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which acknowledges the two-way transactional relation between human nature 
and the social life, self and society. Hume saw that our common nature plays a 
part in shaping our social life. Dewey saw that our social life plays an equally 
important role in shaping our plastic human nature.  
In chapter four I represent Kant as responding to Hume’s awarding 
‘feeling’ primary place in terms of our motivation to act morally. I argue that 
Kant’s analysis of a rational moral agent involves both identifying the basic 
principle of the moral system through the application of the categorical 
imperative (rationalism) and an account of how we are motivated to act in 
accord with it. The standard view of Kant sets out a metaphysically robust 
deontic theory that focuses on the role of reason in discovering the universal 
moral law. On this view, moral rightness lies in the willing, in acting from duty, 
that is, in accord with universal moral laws, not in what is willed. Kant thus shifts 
the idea of morality away from Humean reasons (and causes) for action (feeling), 
to obligation (duty). He concludes that this must be the only criterion for 
morality as any other proposed criteria are inappropriate or inadequate since 
they are volatile matters of fortuitousness or character. According to the 
interpretation offered here, which draws upon his third Critique, Kant’s analysis 
of rationality extends to rationally grounded feeling and thus is an account of 
how we can be held responsible for acting as we do (principled motivation).  
My analysis is tailored specifically to my endeavour. I am interpreting 
Kant within a specific historical timeline in a way that shows progression from 
Hume and highlights the shortcomings that Mill responds to. By acknowledging 
the third Critique as Kant’s unification of theory and practice, I am able to 
highlight the pragmatist leanings in Kant that this implies. Following Paul Guyer9 
I argue that this pragmatist interpretation of Kant is evidenced in Dewey’s 
acceptance of the interdependence between moral goodness (practice) and what 
constitutes the realm of ends (theory) in order for moral considerations to be 
morally motivating. This in turn is reflected in Dewey’s non-dichotomous 
                                                          
 
9 Paul Guyer, 2011, “Kantian Communities: The Realm of Ends, the Ethical Community and the 
Highest Good” in Charlton Payne & Lucas Thorpe (Ed.), Kant and the Concept of Community, 
Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, pp. 88-120. 
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treatment of feeling and reason (or sentimentalism and rationalism) as part of 
the self’s expressive impulses and passions, which, when embedded in the good 
of humanity (Mill), offers a pluralistic informed process of enquiry into ethical 
problems. 
Chapter five interprets John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism10 in light of his 
political theory as outlined in On Liberty.11 Reading these two influential works 
together enables the presentation of a more liberal and munificent reading of 
Mill’s utilitarian theory. The Millsian utilitarian assesses the morality of an act by 
its propensity to produce happiness, specifically higher intellectual, as opposed 
to sensational, pleasures. On Liberty provides insight into what constitutes 
higher pleasure, particularly at the level of community. The combination of both 
theories embeds the rational decision maker in the social and political realm in 
which they participate. As an individual cannot be happy living in a dysfunctional 
community, utilitarian happiness must include this social feature. Interpreting 
Utilitarianism in light of On Liberty strengthens the cultivational aspect of the 
higher pleasures when developed within an individual’s obligation to society. 
Mill’s ideas on the ‘higher pleasures’ and ‘experiments in living’ are 
demonstrably reflected in Dewey’s ‘enquiry into experience’ which facilitates or 
indirectly creates the conditions by which the private experience is converted 
into a form compatible with communication – the private impression evolves 
into the publicly communicable experience.  
The historical analysis of ideas continues onto Dewey, who is presented 
as offering a radical departure from both the empiricism and rationalism of these 
analytic ethical theorists. Application of his pragmatist heritage to his conception 
of experience (chapter six) and enquiry (chapter seven) situates Dewey to 
transcend traditional dichotomies: feeling/reason, (Hume), 
sentimentalism/rationalism (Kant), and private/public (Mill). ‘Experience’ 
provides Dewey with the grounds from which to build a proceduralist method of 
reflection, or reflection on our experiences in a critical way. This process, as 
                                                          
 
10 John Stuart Mill, 2001, (1861), Utilitarianism, 2nd Edition, Edited with an Introduction by 
George Sher, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Hereafter Utilitarianism. 
11 John Stuart Mill, 1991, (1859), “On Liberty” in John Gray & G. W. Smith (Eds.), J. S. Mill On 
Liberty in Focus, London & New York: Routledge, pp. 21-130. Hereafter On Liberty. 
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opposed to object-centred ontological naturalism,12 recognises that physical and 
social existence are best understood in terms of processes rather than things; 
change rather than stability; a quest for certainty rather than actual certainty. 
This is a view, which recognises that the perceiver is always a part of what is 
perceived, as the knower never stands outside of that which is known. Thus, 
when we talk about justification of moral beliefs, we must construe it as 
warrantability within the context of particular experience through ‘communities 
of inquiry’.  
Chapter seven outlines Dewey’s process of social enquiry and its impact 
on moral judgments in terms of what we are warranted to assert. Proceduralism 
is represented as a method of adjudication for tackling disagreements between 
those holding opposing values. For example, the scientific problem-solution 
metaphor is guided by the idea of identifying one right answer. In contrast, 
Dewey’s social enquiry qualifies or revises this problem-solution model with an 
adjudicatory model based on ‘communities of inquiry’. This changes the 
emphasis from finding solutions – a solve-all correct answer – to finding 
common ground. Putnam discusses this idea at length: ethical problems are not 
like scientific problems they do not have ‘solutions’ in the same way that 
scientific problems do.13 The general intention of ‘inquiry’ is to engage 
participants in communication that aims at identifying shared interests, or 
guiding goals. “Goods…have to do with deliberation upon desires and purposes; 
the right and obligatory with demands that are socially authorized and backed; 
virtues with widespread approbation.”14 While a broad aim of amelioration, or 
bettering the problem is of course instantiated, there is no expectation that the 
                                                          
 
12 Talisse & Aikin offer a useful analysis of pragmatic naturalism in chapter four “Pragmatism and 
Metaphysics” of their Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (2008) Pragmatism: A Guide For The 
Perplexed, Continuum International Publishing: London, pp. 85-90. According to them 
pragmatists take the methodological commitment as to how enquiry should proceed and the 
ontological view of naturalism and adding a third component, a form of “Humanism, one which 
requires that philosophical and scientific work be extensions of and relevant to the values and 
purposes of human lives.” p. 85-86. 
13 A theme explored by Hilary Putnam, 1990, “How Not to Solve Ethical Problems” in Realism 
With a Human Face, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Discussed at length at 
8.2. 
14 Dewey, Independent, p. 208. 
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problem will be solved or dissolved once and for all. Possibilities will be 
investigated, resolutions will be made, and actions will be taken.  
I argue that Dewey’s idea of moral (as opposed to political) democracy 
‘falls out of’ inductive reasoning exercised within a ‘community of inquiry’ – that 
is, under the constraints of communicability – in the same way as Kant’s idea of 
the moral law ‘falls out of’ reasoning. For Kant, the idea of a kingdom of ends is 
not always explicit in one’s moral judgments, rather the way we judge what is 
right implies such an end implicitly.15 So too for Dewey’s notion of democracy: it 
is not an explicit end, rather it is the outcome of the process of ‘communities of 
inquiry’. By the end of chapter seven we have established that Dewey’s 
proceduralist method of reflective morality aims to replace the goal of 
identifying an ultimate end (telos - Mill) or supreme principle that serves as THE 
ethical criteria (categorical imperative - Kant) with a goal of identifying a method 
for improving social judgment making. His conception of experience as 
constituted by subjectivity (Hume) reveals a rejection of the reductionist 
tendencies of traditional moral theories according to which moral judgments are 
argued to be either rational or alternatively sentimental. In contrast, by equating 
ethical enquiry with empirical enquiry, Dewey’s reflective intelligence is used to 
revise judgments in light of actions (means) and their consequences (ends) 
within ‘communities of inquiry’. The focus moves away from finding solutions to 
problems and toward mediating disagreements.  
Chapter eight moves the thesis into contemporary debates on the relevant 
features of moral judgments and the value of disagreement. Traditional 
responses argue on the one side that the relevant features of moral judgments 
must be objective, authoritative, universal and impartial, on the other that in the 
absence of moral facts, moral judgments are subjective, with only the possibility 
of well-informed feelings. Drawing on neo-pragmatist philosophy I argue that 
both views suffer from the mistaken reductionist tendency of dichotomising the 
rationalism-sentimentalism structure.16 This conclusion is applied to the 
                                                          
 
15 Guyer, 2011, p. 88. See also fn. 3 p. 119 of John Rawls, 2000, Lectures on the History of Ethics, 
Barbara Herman (Ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp. 313-317. 
16 Arguably due to a failure to read Kant in light of his third Critique and a dismissal of the 
pragmatist inheritance. 
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cognitivist vs. non-cognitivist (chapter eight) and the monist vs. pluralist 
(chapter nine) debates. Chapter ten situates Dewey in relation to Axel Honneth 
and Benjamin Gregg’s contemporary proceduralist accounts of ethics. I argue 
that both capture essential aspects of Dewey’s theory, but draw short in terms of 
the democratic moral life that Dewey had in mind.  
In chapter eleven, I bring the thesis full circle and apply Dewey’s 
proceduralism to contemporary case studies in order to demonstrate what 
constitutes a Deweyan ‘community of inquiry’ in action and establish the 
explanatory power of Dewey’s proceduralist theory. The case studies are a 
demonstration of what does and does not constitute a Deweyan ‘community of 
inquiry’. The first case study scrutinises the Westboro Baptist Church, a 
fundamentalist multigenerational church based in Topeka, Kansas. The 
discussion focuses on Megan and Grace Phelps-Roper, two prominent family 
members who left the church after years of frustrated attempts to have concerns 
heard about how the scriptures were being interpreted and acted upon. The 
dogmatism of the church is demonstrated by the refusal of church elders to 
engage with disagreement and their insistence that members toe the church’s 
line, or leave. The case highlights the significance of engagement with 
disagreement in terms of airing concerns and instituting change. It represents a 
case where objectives are not deliberated on but instead are forced upon 
‘members’. Coercion, rather than rational deliberation, is the defining process. 
Principles stand isolated from experience and thus enquiry.  
The second case study examines a public debate about racism that 
erupted over the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s television series Jonah 
From Tonga. The central character, Jonah Takulua, is an unmanageable and 
rebellious 14-year-old boy of Tongan descent played by comedian and series 
writer Chris Lilley, who is not of Tongan descent. On one side of the debate, 
Lilley’s work is applauded for being cutting edge comedic genius that challenges 
racist stereotyping that exists in Australia. The other side dismisses Lilley’s work 
for perpetuating racist agendas and reinforcing stereotypes. They accuse Lilley 
of ‘brownfacing’, of presenting a stereotyped caricature of persons of colour. This 
case demonstrates shared objectives but widely differing ideas on what 
exemplifies those objectives. Nonetheless, according to Dewey’s ethics, it 
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represents a significant advance on the Westboro case. This is because individual 
subjective criteria jostle to find some equilibrium within a community through 
rational debate. Experience is given a chance to be informed through enquiry. 
The third and final case study returns us to where we started by taking a 
closer look at the response of local communities of the Lower Lakes and Murray 
Mouth to widespread water supply problems of the Murray Darling Basin. The 
vastness of the area combined with its multiple and diverse value at both a local 
and national level means that the health of the Basin is one of Australia’s biggest 
environmental, economic and social problems. While everyone agrees that 
current usage must change in order to make the waterway more 
environmentally sustainable and commercially viable, conflicts between 
individuals, communities, government bodies and commercial interests about 
how best to respond to the crisis, persist. The complexity of the problem makes 
reconciliation and consensus between conflicting interests difficult, however 
through a process of debate and negotiation between all stakeholders, much 
progress has been made over an eight-year period. This marks a vivid example of 
proceduralism. It is, in effect, Dewey’s ‘community of inquiry’ in action.  
While other ethical theories show on what basis one can decide which 
ethical conclusion is right; Dewey shows the basis on which one can show that 
one is a part of a community of ethical progress as marked by participating in a 
morally democratic life. Dewey’s incorporation of the physical and social into his 
notion of experience enables him to transcend traditional dichotomies. We are 
left with a theoretically robust account of tackling moral disagreements that 
accommodates “all the whirl of an organism”17 – the internal and external, 
subjective and objective, cognitive and non-cognitive, plural and monist, 
properties and qualities of experience. This aligning of the facts of being human 
with the facts of nature enables Dewey to align ethics with physics and biology, 
so that we are able “to state problems in such forms that action could be 
                                                          
 
17 Stanley Cavell, 2002, (1976), Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays: Updated Edition, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 52. 
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courageously and intelligently directed to their solution.”18 Given the contingent 
nature of inductive conclusions and in particular the nature of social problems, 
Dewey’s emphasis is on adjudication, on the process of communication. My 
alternative historical approach enables this thesis to clearly articulate Dewey as 
a responder to what was found wanting in predecessors of analytic ethical 
theory. Doing so allows us to highlight the significance of Dewey’s pragmatic 
proceduralism for contemporary ethical theory and practice.  
                                                          
 
18 John Dewey, 1922, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology, 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, p. 12. Hereafter HNC. This does not contradict my claim that 
for Dewey, adjudication rather than problem solving is the more apt paradigm (p. vii) as it refers 
to the direction taken, rather than the end point per se. 
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2. The Classical American Pragmatists 
 
This chapter focuses on the classical American Pragmatists that preceded John 
Dewey, namely, Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. I offer a brief 
exposition of Peirce’s key essays The Fixation of Belief1 & How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear2, with a particular focus on his system of enquiry based on the scientific 
method. I then turn my attention to James’s Pragmatism3 in order to elucidate his 
empirically grounded conceptualisation of ‘experience’. I conclude that treating 
Pierce and James alone as his precursors, does not do justice to Dewey’s rich and 
vibrant reconstruction of philosophy. This positions me to then map previously 
unchartered tracings of ideas from Hume to Kant through Mill to Dewey and in 
doing so build upon the standard view of Dewey. Reconstructing Dewey in light 
of these precursors of contemporary analytic ethical thought, as opposed to 
classical American Pragmatism, allows me to revisit Dewey’s relevance to the 
present by setting his ideas within a broader historical context than he is 
normally located in Pragmatist literature.  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The standard view in literature on pragmatism identifies Charles Sanders Peirce, 
William James and John Dewey as the classical American Pragmatists. They 
represent a particular school of thought that sits somewhat uncomfortably on 
the edges of both Analytic and Continental philosophy. Where ‘Analytic’ 
philosophers rely on logical analysis to solve or perhaps dissolve metaphysical 
problems and ‘Continental’ philosophers turn to phenomenology, hermeneutics 
and existentialism, classical American Pragmatists posited that practical 
consequences are fundamental components of meaning and truth. This resulted 
in both a method and a maxim that arguably represent an alternative 
philosophical approach to both analytic and continental approaches. The 
following most famous iteration of Peirce’s maxim, perhaps encapsulates the 
                                                          
 
1 Peirce, 1877. 
2 Peirce, 1878.  
3 James, 1975. 
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classical pragmatist approach best: “Consider what effects, that might 
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to 
have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the 
object.”4 This is a rule for clarifying the contents of hypotheses by tracing their 
practical consequences and as such a method for analysing experience.  
The traditional view of the classical American Pragmatists treads a path 
from Peirce to James to Dewey, where Dewey is understood to unite, temper and 
reconstruct his forebears’ work. In this chapter I demonstrate that the pragmatic 
approach identifies a process of enquiry based on the scientific method that 
actively tests and theorises experience. This pragmatist reconception of 
experience transforms it from passive to active – we have experiences and we 
analyse them, actively transforming them by testing out hypotheses, selecting 
elements and converting them into a meaningful configuration. To paraphrase 
John Smith, this is a broad conception of experience that is based not on what 
experience must be for us to have knowledge, but what actual experience shows 
its self to be.5 Perhaps the most important theoretical ramification of the 
Pragmatist reconceptualisation of enquiry and experience is the undermining 
and sidestepping of many traditional epistemological and metaphysical 
problems of the analytic tradition.  
It is generally accepted that whilst Peirce, James and Dewey differed in 
their individual views in some crucial respects, as will be explored shortly, they 
nonetheless agreed that traditional empiricism and rationalism, of those that 
came before them, fell short. In particular, they held that the empiricist and 
rationalist division between sense and reason resulted from a narrow 
conception of experience, according to which sense and reason operated within 
separate metaphysical domains and set reason in contrast to the understanding. 
For both the empiricist and rationalist, experience is limited to that which our 
sense organs have access to, where all we experience is our experience of 
                                                          
 
4 Peirce, 1878, pp. 292. 
5 John E. Smith, 1985, “The Reconception of Experience in Peirce, James and Dewey” in The 
Monist, 68: 4, pp. 538-554, p. 538.  
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“experience”. We are but spectators,6 faced with unanswerable questions about 
our access to reality, concepts and, of course, what and how we know. The 
pragmatist response was to acknowledge that experience includes not just what 
we ostensibly perceive through our senses, but also the traceable aspects of our 
actions, the ‘practical consequences’. The focus of pragmatic enquiry turns away 
from questions of how we can possess absolute certainty and turns instead to 
how we can use the method to make fallible progress. The pragmatist asked: 
‘what concrete practical difference would it make if my theory were true?’ It is a 
method of identifying problems in terms of the difference they make: if there is 
no practical difference, there is no genuine problem. 
One concern of both Peirce’s instrumentalism and James’s Radical 
Empiricism is to demonstrate that pure concepts emerge out of and are informed 
by empirical observations. I argue that neither completely renounces the 
empiricist/rationalist divide. There is a sense in which Dewey, on the other hand, 
transforms his pragmatist methodological inheritance and sets to reconstructing 
and reconfiguring reason in relation to the understanding. He thereby dissolves 
the distinctions between concepts such as appearance and reality, theory and 
practice, subject and object, knowledge and action, fact and value, self and other, 
individual and society7 and redeploys them as useful concepts that will help to 
address “the problems of men.”8 This indicates a shift of focus from absolutes 
and universals to simply what works, in terms of different outcome oriented 
considerations, such as consequences, self and societal progress and 
ameliorating discordant situations, to name but a few.  
The standard view of classical American Pragmatism is based on Peirce 
and James’ work. Section 2.2 outlines Peirce’s logical method of enquiry founded 
on the scientific method, as it is employed to settle epistemological disputes in 
                                                          
 
6 Mentioned by Smith, 1985, p. 539, however the ‘Spectator View’ is arguably attributable to 18th 
Century Scottish Philosophers, in particular Adam Smith’s influential 1759 work The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. Adam Smith, 2002, (1759), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Knud Haakonssen 
(Ed.), Boston University: Cambridge University Press. 
http://assets.cambridge.org/97805215/91508/sample/9780521591508ws.pdf. Accessed 
04/02/2018. 
7 This is by no means an exhaustive list; they are simply the distinctions most important to this 
thesis. 
8 John Dewey, 1946, Problems of Men, New York: Greenwood Press.  
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terms of fixing beliefs and clarifying ideas. The focus will be on Peirce’s 
understanding of the role of consensus as a precursor to Dewey’s conception of 
the “community of inquiry”. In Section 2.3, I focus on James’s notion of 
experience, where the meaning of a concept is contained in the conduct it 
produces. This is the forerunner to what I argue became the central concept in 
Dewey’s ethics, namely his particular conception of “experience”. The concluding 
section, 2.4, argues that whilst Dewey’s connection to his pragmatist heritage is 
undeniable, isolating him in this tradition leaves his rich and productive ethical 
theory, particularly of the later Dewey, somewhat emaciated. I argue that 
locating Dewey in the very lineage from which these metaphysical disputes in 
analytic ethics emerged facilitates a robust reconstruction of his theory that can 
in turn be applied to contemporary problems, concerning the relations between 
sense and reason, in analytic philosophy.  
 
2.2 Charles Sanders Peirce 
 
The aim of this section is to offer a short overview of the aspect of Peirce’s 
pragmatist theory most relevant to this thesis, namely, his instrumentalist 
conception of ‘inquiry’. I focus on his works pertinent to this task: “The Fixation 
of Belief”9 and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”.10 It is in “The Fixation of Belief” 
that Peirce outlines his view of reasoning and its role in working out what we 
know and believe. Grounded firmly in formal logic, Peirce argues for the 
independence between the truth of a situation and our thoughts on it. 
“Reasoning is good if it be such as to give a true conclusion from true premises, 
and not otherwise. Thus, the question of its validity is purely one of fact and not 
of thinking.”11 Peirce is emphasising that while there is an objective reality, facts, 
our only access to it is through thinking. This is a form of induction under the 
constraints of enquiry that he associates with science. This is particularly 
important when the method is used to assess our beliefs (our thinking). Just as 
scientific facts remain fallible and contingent, so too, according to Peirce, do our 
                                                          
 
9 Peirce, 1877, pp. 1-15. 
10 Peirce, 1878, pp. 286-302.  
11 Peirce, 1877, p. 2. 
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beliefs. The “true conclusion would remain true if we had no impulse to accept it; 
and the false one would remain false, though we could not resist the tendency to 
believe in it.”12 This forces us to acknowledge that beliefs may need to change in 
light of new information. With this realisation in mind, we see the need to visit 
and revisit our beliefs by testing them out and assessing them, reviewing them in 
line with new understandings. As Peirce recognises, this is important work, as 
our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions13 – they form the bedrock of 
our moral lives. 
Peirce is drawing a methodological parallel between science and belief 
formation regarding both facts and moral norms. The process of revision of a 
belief is triggered by doubt, which Peirce describes as “…an uneasy and 
dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state 
of belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to 
avoid, or to change to a belief in anything else.”14 The irritation of doubt puts 
beliefs into a state of jeopardy and forces us to review and revise them in light of 
new experiences and so restore calm and ease of mind. This is what Peirce 
identifies as the “struggle of inquiry”15 – enquiry helps us to arrive at beliefs that 
settle opinions and in turn, our minds. Peirce’s emphasis on the fallibility of the 
premises and on convergence among reasoners and their capacity to reason 
implicates induction as the model of enquiry.  
According to Peirce, tenaciously holding onto poorly substantiated beliefs 
or arbitrarily and authoritatively demanding that others conform to your beliefs, 
indicates a dislike of doubt and the instability of not having fixed beliefs.16 Both 
methods of fixing belief – tenacity or authority – have attractive features, 
particularly in terms of eliciting moral norms that act as social controls. The a 
priori character of tenacity promotes comfortable and comforting conclusions 
whilst the method of authority offers us a path of peace, as it will appear that 
                                                          
 
12 Peirce, 1877, p. 3. 
13 Peirce, 1877, p. 4. 
14 Peirce, 1877, p. 4-5. 
15 Peirce, 1877, p. 5. 
16 Peirce, 1877, p. 6. 
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some things are permitted and some are forbidden.17  However, these benefits 
do not outweigh the potential of each to lead to dogma and pernicious dictatorial 
moral values that reflect fear and an unwillingness to re-visit and re-vise moral 
life.18 Therefore, Peirce insists, we must give these up and instead adopt a new 
method of belief formation and settling opinions. This new method, will not only 
produce an impulse to believe, but will “also decide what proposition it is which 
is to be believed…let men, conversing together and regarding matters in 
different lights, gradually develop beliefs in harmony with natural causes.”19 
What method is able to harbour such enquiries? What method can fix beliefs that 
remain fallible, context sensitive and tolerant of different opinions? Answer: The 
method of science.  
 The Peircean project of moral enquiry is more unstable and uncertain 
than the tenacious and authoritative methods to which he is responding. Peirce 
takes the fundamental hypothesis of science and applies it to moral life enabling 
our moral beliefs to move away from both tenaciousness and authority.  
[The fundamental hypothesis of science is based upon the understanding that] there are 
real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those 
realities affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as 
different as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of 
perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are; and any man, if he have 
sufficient experience and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true conclusion.  
20  
 
From this we can extrapolate a rough outline of Peirce’s fundamental hypothesis 
of morality where social norms are akin to scientific facts in terms of being 
observable and evaluable aspects of experience that are accessible through 
perception. So, to re-configure his statement above:  
Morality consists of real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our 
opinions about them. Our moral decisions, behaviour and their outcomes affect our 
senses according to regular laws and though our sensations (individual experiences) are 
as different as are our relations to the objects (individual perspectives), yet by taking 
advantage of the laws of perception we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are; 
and any person, if they have sufficient experience (such as a background in moral 
theory) and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true conclusion (social norm).  
 
                                                          
 
17 Peirce, 1877, p. 11. 
18 An example of authoritative belief formation will be discussed at some length in reference to 
the Westboro Baptist Church (see 11.2).   
19 Peirce, 1877, p. 8. 
20 Peirce, 1877, p. 10. 
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The fallibility of our conclusions entails that social norms, like scientific facts, 
remain open to revision in light of new understandings.  
The method of moral enquiry, according to Peirce, is based on a trigger 
and response pattern. Experience is interrupted by doubt, which in turn begins a 
process of enquiry informed by our own perceptions, sensations and thoughts in 
conjunction with those around us. This highlights the social aspect of enquiry, 
where the community, rather than an individual or authority, informs the 
meaning and significance ascribed to experience. As Peirce puts it, enquiry aims 
to be “agreed to by all those who investigate.”21 Moral enquiry based on the 
scientific method leads belief-fixation away from authority and tenacity toward 
community in this respect. Once a particular doubt is settled, the 
action/response becomes habitual, until it is unsettled once more by doubt. 
Beliefs are formed and reformed in light of new enquiries, actions and their 
outcomes. The 2017 change to marriage laws in Australia provides an excellent 
example of the evolution of social norms.   
This is an instrumentalist view of ideas and beliefs based on a method of 
induction from experience. As stated in the pragmatic maxim, the value of any 
idea is determined by its usefulness, where both scientific and moral knowledge 
remain fallible in light of the insufficiency and ever changing availability of 
empirical evidence. Like scientific knowledge, moral beliefs whilst fixed, remain 
open to revision and reconstruction in light of new understandings. Just as 
scientific research has the potential to uncover new facts and so change existing 
theories, moral beliefs have the potential to be transformed as new social norms 
are discovered, interpreted and incorporated. This leaves open the possibility 
that an alternate explanation and accompanying theory will surface as new 
evidence comes to light. Peirce’s moral enquiry based on the scientific method 
marks the beginning of this pragmatic treatment of theory making.  
Peirce further articulates what he means by a belief in “How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear”.22 It is worth quoting Peirce at length, as it clearly shows the 
foundations of his instrumentalist account: 
                                                          
 
21 Peirce, 1878, p. 299. 
22 Peirce, 1878, pp. 286-302. 
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And what, then, is belief?...it has just three properties: First, it is something that we are 
aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the 
establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit. As it appeases 
the irritation of doubt, which is the motive for thinking, thought relaxes, and comes to 
rest for a moment when belief is reached. But, since belief is a rule for action, the 
application of which involves further doubt and further thought, at the same time that it 
is a stopping-place, it is also a new starting-place for thought…The final upshot of 
thinking is the exercise of volition, and of this thought no longer forms a part; but belief 
is only a stadium of mental action, an effect upon our nature due to thought, which will 
influence future thinking.23  
 
Consider again Peirce’s pragmatic maxim.24 What does Peirce mean by “practical 
bearings”? Which contexts and consequences count? Peirce’s example of 
‘hardness’ is helpful.25 As Peirce explains, hardness is a property that can only be 
judged by touching or feeling. Unless we are facing a situation where something’s 
hardness makes a difference, the concept is empty. For example, it is by feeling 
hardness in the wood of a baseball bat, as opposed to, say, the softness of an 
inflatable one picked up at the funfair, that we settle on which bat will 
conceivably have the desired effect of hitting a home run. As Peirce states, “…our 
idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects.”26 In other words, I use the 
concept hard in the context of considering what to do. This is a verificationist 
account of the practical import of concepts.  
 How does this type of contextual analysis play out in moral life? Peirce 
explains in terms of how we tell a true belief from a false one. According to 
Peirce:  
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we 
mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I 
would explain reality…reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but 
only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it; and that, on the 
other hand, though the object of the final opinion depends on what that opinion is, yet 
what that opinion is does not depend on what you or I or any man thinks.27  
 
There is a tension here between reality and opinions. Whilst the truth of a 
proposition is independent from our individual opinions, it is at the same time 
accessible through our enquiries, which in turn rely on convergence of opinion, 
                                                          
 
23 Peirce, 1878, p. 291. 
24 “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object 
of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of 
the object.” Peirce, 1878, p. 292. 
25 Peirce, 1878, p. 292. 
26 Peirce, 1878, p. 292. 
27 Peirce, 1878, p. 299. 
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on agreement between communities of enquirers. This reflects the inductive 
base of the scientific method. Building on the model, Peirce argues that truth 
emerges out of moral enquiries in the same way that it emerges out of scientific 
enquiries. Just as science makes discoveries through the testing of a hypothesis, 
so pragmatism empirically tests moral beliefs by carrying out philosophical 
‘experiments’ through enquiries. Peirce thinks that with enough information and 
thought, and under similar circumstances, any mind will reach the same 
conclusion. He concludes that whilst truth and reality have a role to play in moral 
enquiries, the real test is agreement. Just like hypothesis testing in science, the 
more agreement there is, the more likely the conclusion will be true.  
Peirce also contends that conceptual analysis provides the grounds for 
truth, as in the quote above when Peirce writes: “The opinion which is fated to be 
ultimately agreed upon by all who investigate, is what is meant by truth.”28 
Where is the real? Where do we find that which is independent of how we think 
about it? Peirce explains that the real is something that influences our thoughts, 
and is not created by them.29 Even though we only have our thoughts to work 
with, they have been caused by sensations, which in turn are constrained by 
something out of the mind, an objective reality. David Wiggins captures the form 
of this process of enquiry:  
…the idea of inquiry, seen always as a process that gathers rational strength as it gathers 
force and gathers force as it gathers rational strength, a process at once communal and 
personal, in which participants receive benefits that are indefinitely divisible among 
them and reciprocate, in the light of their own experiences and reflections, however they 
can or are permitted to do.”30 
 
Peirce theorises the struggle between doubt and belief. Whilst difference of 
opinion may hinder agreement, likewise, an individual’s obstinacy may hinder 
and derail a search for truth.31 The struggle, between doubt and beliefs, unfolds 
in the form of enquiry, of testing ideas in thought, the sole object of which, is the 
fixation of belief. When all who have carried out an investigation agree, then 
                                                          
 
28 Peirce, 1878, p. 299. 
29 Peirce, 1878, p. 299. 
30 David Wiggins, 2004, “Reflections on Inquiry and Truth” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Peirce, Cheryl Misak (Ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 87-126, p. 90. 
31 An excellent outline of a pragmatist theory of truth is provided in chapter three “Pragmatism 
and Truth” of Talisse & Aikin, 2008, pp. 54-83. 
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doubt is fallibly settled and a true belief is identified. Agreement is, according to 
Peirce, based on a method of abduction, which will now be further explicated.  
The final aspect of Peirce’s contribution is his work on the logic of science. 
Peirce used ‘abduction’ to talk about inferences that are different to both 
inductive and deductive reasoning.32 Peirce’s logical abduction is the point of 
enquiry where we are discovering and generating theories that will then later be 
assessed. It is the hypothesis forming stage of moral enquiry: “Abduction is the 
process of forming explanatory hypotheses. It is the only logical operation which 
introduces any new idea.”33 Abduction is reasoning to the best explanation, and 
it recognises the role of forming possible explanations for the purposes of 
directing enquiry.34 How then do we know when abduction is the best 
explanation? For Peirce, we form explanations and test them by a series of 
criteria including their explanatory power, falsifiability, economy, elegance, 
mechanism and so on. Peirce’s abduction, or reasoning to the best explanation, is 
not subject to formal or universal proof in the same way as deductive reasoning 
is, as feelings or sensations have a role to play. The triad, (induction, abduction 
and deduction), “…has not for its principal element merely a certain 
unanalyzable quality sui generis. It makes [to be sure] a certain feeling in us.”35 
Whilst feeling maintains the possibility of being communicated and evaluated by 
a community of enquirers, it is able to avoid charges of subjectivity.36 We can 
only trust the feeling or sensation by checking with others.  
                                                          
 
32 Analyses of Peirce’s theory of abduction and it’s role in contemporary debate can be found in: 
Campos, D. 2011, “On the Distinction Between Peirce’s Abduction and Lipton’s Inference to the 
Best Explanation” in Synthese, 180, pp. 419–442; Fann, K. T. 1970, Peirce’s Theory of Abduction, 
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; McAuliffe, W. 2015, “How Did Abduction Get Confused with 
Inference to the Best Explanation?” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 51, pp. 300–
319. 
33 Charles S. Peirce, 1958, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, A. Burks (Ed.), 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Hereafter referred to by volume number as CP 5, p. 
172.  
34 Peirce describes abduction as being “…the boundary between the black and the white, is 
neither black, nor white, nor neither, nor both. It is the pairedness of the two. It is for the white, 
the active secondness of the black, for the black, the active secondness of the white.” CP 6, p. 203. 
35 CP 1, p. 473. 
36 John Kaag (2005, p. 533) notes that Peirce’s abduction is not subject to formal or universal 
proof in the same way as deductive reasoning is. Rather, it is reasoning to the best explanation, 
which he argues is demonstrated in the third Critique in the form of the sensus communis. A 
conclusion I reach through different means in Chapter Five, where I draw a link from Kant 
through Mill to Dewey.  
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Peirce’s scientific method of deduction, induction and abduction is more 
than a systematic logic; it is his instrumental account of seeking truth. The 
method starts with hypothesising, or abduction, a process that is triggered by 
doubt that arises out of a surprising situation. Deductive inference is then used 
to attempt to identify conclusions about the hypothesis and what it entails. 
Experiments (inductive reasoning) are then carried out to test whether the 
deducted conclusions really do obtain. The results either prove or disprove the 
original hypothesis. If proven, it is true, if falsified further processes of 
abduction, deduction and induction are needed. And so the method turns, 
formulation of hypothesis, deducing its possible conclusions and testing whether 
or not they actually do obtain. The results remain fallible and falsifiable, able to 
be usurped by more dependable hypotheses in the future. 
Peirce’s instrumentalist contribution to what I call Dewey’s proceduralist 
account of enquiry, is evident here. Peirce posits that moral enquiries are 
socialised through the process of moving from doubt to fixed beliefs. This is an 
attempt to align moral enquiry and its aims with the method of scientific enquiry 
where truth remains fallible. As Hildebrand states, “Peirce’s inquirer operates 
within a social world where the need to answer each other’s questions is felt as 
real. Peirce’s problem, then, concerns how a variety of individuals can fix their 
beliefs.”37 Hildebrand goes on to argue that a Peircean community of 
investigators carries out a moral enquiry and their conclusion is referred to as 
truth and its object is reality. “Truth…does not transcend experience and enquiry 
altogether: it has a fixed limit, an ideal, towards which a properly functioning 
community converges.”38  
As will become evident in later chapters, on cognitivism and non-
cognitivism, monism and pluralism, there are some troubling consequences for 
positing that the main criterion for evaluating theories should be based on how 
well they perform in practice, particularly in terms of truth. As will be 
demonstrated throughout the thesis, I argue that Dewey’s expansion of Peirce’s 
                                                          
 
37 David L. Hildebrand, 1996, “Genuine Doubt and the Community in Peirce’s Theory of Inquiry” 
in Southwest Philosophy Review, 12: 1, pp.33-43. p. 33. 
38 Hildebrand, 1996, p. 33-34. 
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enquiry takes him beyond instrumentalism to proceduralism. On this view, 
scientific and moral theories can only be judged in terms of their capacity to 
address scientific or moral problems, where success is not measured in terms of 
outcomes or solutions, but rather in terms of engagement in processes of 
negotiation and communication. It is clear that Peirce’s instrumentalist method 
of moral enquiry based on the scientific method provides a foundation for 
Dewey’s approach, however, I argue that Peirce’s emphasis on truth finding and 
agreement marks a point of difference to Dewey, whose proceduralism turns the 
focus of enquiry away from agreement and outcomes and toward processes. 
Dewey’s proceduralism outlines a process of two-way exchange between 
conceptual development and perception that enables him to transcend 
traditional metaphysical problems in regards to the relationship between the 
rational and empirical. As will be explicated in coming chapters, we are then able 
to avoid many inherent problems that instrumentalism has struggled to address, 
such as the seemingly intractable nature of some disagreements and the inability 
to hold a common conception of desirable consequences. This will become 
clearer in the next section through an analysis of James’ notion of experience, 
developed through his Radical Empiricism.  
 
2.3 William James  
 
William James wrote Pragmatism in 1907. James also articulates his 
understanding of pragmatism as a philosophical method arguing for its 
usefulness primarily in terms of settling metaphysical disputes that may 
otherwise be interminable.39  
…to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What 
difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were 
true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives meant 
practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we 
ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the 
other’s being right.40 
 
                                                          
 
39 James, 1975, p. 28. 
40 James, 1975, p. 28. 
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James credits his method to the Principal of Pragmatism as set out by Peirce, 
arguing that Peirce demonstrates that our beliefs are really rules for action. 
Thus, in order to develop a concept’s meaning, we need only determine what 
conduct it is fitted to produce.41 “There can be no difference anywhere that 
doesn’t make a difference elsewhere.”42 In other words, our ideas become clear 
when we consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind are involved—
what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare.43  
 James’ instrumentalist account of truth is a reconstruction of Peirce’s 
pragmatic maxim with a focus on consequences, on outcomes of action.   
A pragmatist…turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, 
from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended 
absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, 
towards action, and toward power. It means the empiricist temper regnant, and the 
rationalist temper sincerely given up. It means the open air and possibilities of nature, as 
against dogma, artificiality and the pretence of finality in truth. At the same time it does 
not stand for any special results. It is a method only.44 
 
According to James, we experience our theories as programs, as instruments for 
understanding the world. “Theories thus become instruments, not answers to 
enigmas, in which we can rest.”45 The pragmatic method is an attitude of 
orientation. “The attitude of looking away from first things, principles, ‘categories,’ 
supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, 
facts.”46 This indicates a change of focus, a movement away from finding fixed 
answers and toward a more consequentially grounded, outcome oriented 
method of decision making and settling of social norms. 
 As we began to see in the previous section, instrumentalism is the 
pragmatists’ answer to conceptual analysis in general and truth in particular. On 
this view, ideas are true in so far as they help us to dispel doubt.  
Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously 
from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, 
working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, 
true instrumentally.47 
  
                                                          
 
41 James, 1975, p. 28. 
42 James, 1975, p. 30. 
43 James, 1975, p. 28-29. 
44 James, 1975, p. 31. 
45 James, 1975, p. 32. His italics. 
46 James, 1975, p. 32. His italics. 
47 James, 1975, p. 34. His italics. 
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James describes the process in terms of settling a new opinion. Truth in our ideas 
and beliefs means the same thing that it means in science, it means: “THAT 
IDEAS (WHICH THEMSELVES ARE BUT PARTS OF OUR EXPERIENCE) BECOME 
TRUE IN SO FAR AS THEY HELP US TO GET INTO SATISFACTORY RELATION 
WITH OTHER PARTS OF OUR EXPEREINCE”.48 The truth of ideas is in their 
power to work, to settle opinions by assessing new evidence as it comes to light 
in experience. Whilst social norms may be established and proved, they remain 
falsifiable, just like empirical facts. This sets the grounds for James’s Radical 
Empiricism, where experience is the testing ground for reassessing social norms. 
Mirroring Peirce, James’s method circumnavigates the dogmatism of 
closed groups, avoiding methods that encourage tenacious holding of beliefs and 
appeals to authority (to use Peircean terms). Like Peirce, James explains this in 
terms of doubt, which is experienced as a feeling of inward trouble that must be 
settled in order to be relieved. Consideration of evidence, reason, hypothesising 
and testing are the basis of thought, reflection and enquiry into adjustments of 
such social norms. Out of this method, a new idea emerges that successfully 
mediates between the old stock of held opinions and the new experience, 
running them “into one another most felicitously and expediently. This idea is 
then adopted as the true one.”49 This contextual (not relative) instrumentalist 
method of assessing truth, where truth’s function is to harmonise beliefs and 
action, is a key inheritance from Peirce and James to Dewey.50 As Mark Uffelman 
points out, this is a fallibilistic empirical ethics that entails contingency and 
experimentalism: “The proper balance between inherited wisdom and social 
custom, on the one hand, and the emergence of new meanings, new values, and 
new forms of embodied experience, on the other, must continually be 
                                                          
 
48 James, 1975, p.35. His emphasis. 
49 James, 1975, p. 35. 
50 Whilst there is not the time or space for a detailed analysis of correspondence and coherence, 
it is worth noting that Susan Haack acknowledges that one major strength of the pragmatist 
theory of truth is that: “The theory is a cosmopolitan one, in that it includes substantial 
coherence and correspondence elements; and it thereby acquires some of the strengths of the 
coherence and correspondence theories while avoiding some of the weaknesses.” Susan Haack, 
1976, “The Pragmatist Theory of Truth” in British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 27, pp. 231-
249, p. 247.  
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reestablished.”51 This indicates the social dynamics found in James and Peirce 
that is extended by Dewey into a process of self and community realisation.  
The classical American Pragmatists treat empirical facts and social norms 
as acquired through the same method and under the same kinds of restraints. 
Like empirical facts, social norms remain necessarily fallible and open to revision 
in light of new facts without being culturally or socially relative.52 Pragmatist 
truth is neither untouchable, remote, exalted, what we ought to think 
unconditionally, nor is it free from utility and perspective.   
The pragmatist clings to facts and concreteness, observes truth at its work in particular 
cases, and generalizes. Truth, for him, becomes a class-name for all sorts of definite 
working-values in experience…When the pragmatist undertakes to show in detail just 
why we must defer, the rationalist is unable to recognize the concretes from which his 
own abstraction is taken. He accuses us of denying truth; whereas we have only sought 
to trace exactly why people follow it and always ought to follow it.53  
 
This is important as it highlights how the pragmatists ground rational 
abstraction in empirical standards, such as their utility and satisfactoriness. This 
is a regulatory notion of truth. Experience corrects our beliefs and formulas by 
triggering the process of thinking. “‘The true’…is only the expedient in the way of 
our thinking, just ‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.”54 
Facts and norms simply are. They are identifiable, testable aspects of experience. 
Just as the laws of science are tested, verified and re-tested, lawful ways of 
behaving, right and wrong, good and bad, emerge from the interactions between 
people. Truth grafts itself on previous truth. So too with laws and idioms, these 
things make themselves as we go, as history proceeds, so our rights, wrongs, 
prohibitions, laws, penalties, words, idioms, beliefs get revised.55 Truth is the 
function of the beliefs that start and terminate them.56 Again, the recent revision 
of same sex marriage laws in Australia is a practical demonstration of such a 
revision of social norms in line with evolution of belief. 
                                                          
 
51 Mark Uffelman, 2011, “Forging the Self in the Stream of Experience: Classical Currents of Self-
cultivation in James and Dewey” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 47: 3, pp. 319-
339, p. 330. 
52 Haack & Kolenda provide an interesting discussion of pragmatist fallibilism, truth and science 
in Susan Haack and Konstantin Kolenda, 1977, “Two Fallibilists in Search of the Truth” in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 51, pp. 63-104, p. 81 & p. 101. 
53 James, 1975, p. 38. 
54 James, 1975, p. 106. His italics. 
55 James, 1975, p. 116. 
56 James, 1975, p. 108. 
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  In Pragmatism, James argues that Kant’s denkmittel that is, the means by 
which we identify facts by thinking them, form the foundations for an empirically 
grounded idealism – or Radical Empiricism, as he calls it. According to James’s 
version of Kant, knowledge, logic, repetition, sameness of kind and so on, are 
useful denkmittel for finding our way among the many, for labeling experience.57 
James is treating ideals as “live possibilities, for we are their live champions and 
pledges, and if the complementary conditions come and add themselves, our 
ideals will become actual things.”58 The rationalist posits an ideal, an absolute 
finished edition of the world that orients us toward the future. James employs 
these ideals as a means of identifying moral truth.59 For James, empiricism is 
directly related to psychology: in so far as the mind enables us to construct a 
worldview, it is an active participant in experience. This common sense 
conceptual process, denkmittel, is made clearer when situated within his 
empiricist approach.60   
Perhaps the clearest iteration of James’s Radical Empiricism is found in 
the preface of his later work, The Meaning of Truth where he states that it…  
…consists first of a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized 
conclusion. The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among 
philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience…The statement 
of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as 
much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things 
themselves. The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold 
together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience.61 
 
He goes on to argue that the greatest obstacle to his view is rooted in the 
rationalist belief that experience as immediately given necessitates the presence 
of an absolute, higher, unifying agency, some kind of “all-witness which 'relates' 
things together by throwing 'categories' over them like a net.”62 The outcome is 
that the relationship between the knower and the thing known is empty. On this 
view, the truth relation, is “…contentless experientially, neither describable, 
explicable, nor reduceable to lower terms, and denotable only by uttering the 
                                                          
 
57 James, 1975, p. 88. 
58 James, 1975, p. 137. His italics. 
59 James, 1975, p. 128. 
60 James, 1975, p. 84. 
61 William James, 1979, (1909) The Meaning of Truth, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard 
University Press, pp. 6-7.  
62 James, 1979, p. 7. 
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name 'truth.'”63 In contrast, James’s radical empiricism identifies that the truth 
relation has definite content, which is experienceable and as such is knowable. 
He is arguing that relations are just as directly experienced as the things that 
they relate – ideas are true insofar as they help us to get into satisfactory 
relations with other parts of our experience, as quoted earlier. This is the 
‘radical’ aspect of his empiricism. 
This is an instrumentalist account of ideas, where their ‘workableness’ 
makes them knowable parts of concrete experience. In contrast, the “…relation 
between an object and the idea that truly knows it, is held by rationalists to be 
nothing of this describable sort, but to stand outside of all possible temporal 
experience.”64 James’s thesis is developed further in his posthumously published 
Essays in Radical Empiricism and a Pluralistic Universe65 where he identifies one 
fundamental quarrel between Empiricism and Absolutism (as he labels them).  
This is “…the repudiation by Absolutism of the personal and aesthetic factor in 
the construction of philosophy.”66 James notes that the empiricist emphasis on 
the usefulness of feelings in terms of prophesising moral beliefs is equally 
anticipatory of truth as anything else we have.67  
Now pragmatism, devoted tho she be to facts, has no such materialistic bias as ordinary 
empiricism labors under. Moreover, she has no objection whatever to the realizing of 
abstractions, so long as you get about among particulars with their aid and they actually 
carry you somewhere. Interested in no conclusions but those which our minds and our 
experiences work out together, she has no a priori prejudices against theology. IF 
THEOLOGICAL IDEAS PROVE TO HAVE A VALUE FOR CONCRETE LIFE, THEY WILL BE 
TRUE, FOR PRAGMATISM, IN THE SENSE OF BEING GOOD FOR SO MUCH. FOR HOW 
MUCH MORE THEY ARE TRUE, WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THEIR RELATIONS TO THE 
OTHER TRUTHS THAT ALSO HAVE TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED.68 
 
It is at this point that we can see James’s Radical Empiricism as representing a 
development and expansion of Peirce’s work. Peirce was hesitant to fully break 
from the tradition that set experience in contrast to the understanding (as 
argued shortly in the conclusion of this chapter), whereas James embraced their 
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interdependence by synthesising the conceptual with the material aspects of 
experience. As Dewey affirms: 
We begin by noting that ‘experience’ is what James called a double-barrelled word. Like 
its congeners, life and history, it includes what men do and suffer, what they strive for, 
love, believe and endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in which 
they do suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine – in short, processes of 
experiencing…It is ‘double-barrelled’ in that it recognizes in its primary integrity no 
division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an 
unanalyzed totality.69 
  
On this view, qualities, such as values, beauty and indeterminacy are experienced 
as part of the relations between the self and the environment. James Gouinlock 
argues that they “…are traits of the situation, of nature: it is the inclusive 
situation which determines the nature of the subject as experiencer and the 
object as experienced.”70 James’s richly empirical conception of experience 
provides Dewey with the tools needed for his non-dualistic treatment of the 
empiricist/rationalist divide.  
The importance of James’s Radical Empiricism’ for this thesis is his 
grounding of abstracts and universals in sensible experience: “Only in so far as 
they lead us, successfully or unsuccessfully, back into sensible experience again, 
are our abstracts and universals true or false at all.”71 James’s Radical 
Empiricism brings the real and ideal together in his relationally rich experience. 
However, I argue that James falls short of Dewey in terms of his reification of 
consequences as the relevant accessible and assessable parts of experience, this 
in turn provides the grounds for my reconstruction of Dewey in light of the 




Dewey inherited much from James and Peirce. Most relevant to our discussion 
are two aspects. Firstly, Peirce’s method of enquiry based on the scientific 
method, including his triadic logic, can be understood as a description of a 
method of responding to anomalies in experience. As we will see in Chapter 
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Seven, the footprint of Dewey’s theory set out in Logic: the Theory of Inquiry 
(1938) mirrors the structure of the scientific method found in Peirce’s work and 
relies on abduction for his proceduralist account of concept use and formation. 
Peirce argues that anomalous situations trigger the process of applying the 
scientific methodology, of hypothesis testing. The similarities between the two 
are clear: an indeterminate situation forces an ongoing process of formulating 
hypotheses and testing them. Most significantly, Peirce treats true beliefs as 
independent of opinions but nonetheless accessed through convergence of 
opinions under the constraints of the triad of reasoning. This lays the 
groundwork for Dewey’s ‘community of inquiry’. 
 Secondly, James’s Radical Empiricism, which acknowledged the 
overwhelming rationalising power of experience,72 can be seen as a first attempt 
to employ outcomes of action as accessible grounds for reconciling the real with 
the ideal. James describes his life’s work as being an attempt to “be the happy 
harmonizer of empiricist ways of thinking with the more religious demands of 
human beings.”73 Like Peirce, James uses the pragmatic method as a way of 
testing ideas, of verifying moral beliefs by their impact or usefulness to us. 
Embedded in this view is the notion that until we encounter a situation that 
leads us to doubt, our beliefs remain fixed. We only feel the need to provide 
reasons for our beliefs, our established set of social norms, views and opinions 
and issues about what we believe to be right and wrong, good and bad when they 
are being challenged, when new experiences put them under strain.74  
 The classical American Pragmatists subvert the traditional distinction 
between knowledge and opinion, the rational and empirical, a priori and a 
posteriori. Whilst traditional views posit that rational a priori knowledge is 
certain, pure and untainted by experience, the pragmatist reconstruction of 
experience brings the view into question. As will be detailed in Chapter Four, this 
is a direct response to the Kant of the first Critique, who upheld that there are 
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dualisms and that their components are radically different and distinct: 
phenomena/noumena, empirical observation/pure concepts, real/ideal. Peirce’s 
triad of reasoning (deduction, induction and abduction) marks the beginning of 
the pragmatist endeavour to overcome these divides. Peirce’s account falls short, 
however. Whilst he endeavours to demonstrate that pure concepts emerge out of 
and are informed by empirical observations, he becomes frustrated with the 
contradictions apparent in the Critique of Pure Reason leading him to, as some 
theorists argue, abandon Kant.75 As will become evident in the ensuing chapters, 
if we focus on the third Critique, where Kant develops his conception of aesthetic 
reflective judgment, which brings the real and ideal together, we can address 
these problems. By not engaging with Kant’s later work, Peirce missed this 
important aspect.76 Peirce’s failure to take Kant’s third Critique into account 
limits his instrumentalism and indicates a point of departure for James. Whereas 
Peirce stops short of unifying experience with the understanding, James tackles 
the divide by unifying sense with reason from an empiricist position. I argue that 
Dewey offers a radical departure from empiricism and rationalism that goes 
beyond both Peirce and James’s positions. This point can only be articulated by 
situating Dewey as responding to the theories of the analytic tradition that 
maintained such dichotomies and preceded classical American Pragmatism. I 
effectively take a historical step back, in order to move forward. 
For the classical American Pragmatists, the empirical informs the rational, 
however both Peirce and James’s accounts fall short. Neither quite manages to 
straddle the gap between the tangled realities of practice and the abstract forms 
of theory. In contrast, Dewey accepts that plurality and disparate forces are 
integral factors of moral life. His proceduralist account acknowledges that 
theoretically, there is no correct solution for every difficulty with which each and 
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every individual is confronted.77 Seemingly interminable moral disagreements 
provide evidence for these tensions in our moral lives. I argue that Dewey 
transforms Peirce and James’s pragmatic method into a process focused theory, 
which demands engagement in genuine communication. It is only through such a 
process that there is any chance of mediating seemingly intractable 
disagreements about values, laws and consequences.  
It is clear that Dewey amalgamates and builds on the work of his 
pragmatist predecessors; his project is, at its core, a scientific approach to moral 
problems. This is, James Campbell notes, a kind of logic of practical activity, of 
testing and reassessing our morals as a means to foster social reconstruction.78 
Whilst Dewey is methodologically a pragmatist, I argue that positioning him 
within the historical trajectory of ideas found in earlier analytic ethical theory 
enables me to emphasise distinctive aspects of his theory and so present him in a 
new light. Hume’s sentimentalism offers us an empiricist explanation for moral 
motivation based on the idea that humans naturally prefer to experience 
positive, not negative, sensations. Kant refutes this view, arguing that feelings 
are fickle and volatile matters of fortuitousness and character and as such cannot 
be grounds for morality. We must act according to the moral laws made 
accessible by human capacity for rational thought. Mill stresses the importance 
of consequences, in terms of being held accountable for actions and in regards to 
the formative effect of actions on self and society. In response, Dewey argues that 
their focus on attempting to find a unitary view, a single theory that can capture 
all aspects of moral decision making, oversimplifies the moral life.79 
Hume’s specific brand of sentimentalism acts as the starting point for 
tracing a way to Kant’s aesthetic reflective judgment, where the divide between 
sense and the understanding, the real and ideal is first addressed in his notion of 
the sensus communis, or the common sense. Kant posits that our capacity to 
communicate and share aesthetic reflective judgments leaves room for debate 
and therefore disagreement. By looking at Kant in response to Hume, I am able to 
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trace the historical development of the idea and so emphasise its impact on 
Dewey. Reading Mill’s Utilitarianism alongside his On Liberty supports the 
presentation of a more liberal and munificent reading of Mill’s theory, 
highlighting his notion of community and so forging a strong association to 
Dewey that posits a reciprocal relationship between the self and community. 
This is an information loop, a process of enquiry and experience that includes the 
ongoing relationships between perceiving, sensing, thinking, acting and 
outcomes.  
I render Dewey as engaged in a process of absorbing and responding to 
these different aspects of traditional ethical theories, facilitating me to present a 
richer and more well rounded reading of Dewey’s ethical project. This allows us 
to see the origins of Dewey’s ideas in contrast to what he found wanting in Peirce 
and James as well as in the ethical theories that preceded them. Whilst Peirce 
and James initiate the pragmatist endeavour to unite theory and practice, both 
accounts fall short of surmounting the rationalist/empiricist divide. By situating 
Dewey within the Hume-Kant-Mill historical trajectory, I am able to trace key 
relevant concepts that contribute to the maintenance of this divide. I am then in a 
position to proffer a hermeneutics of the sentimentalism-rationalism structure 
grounded in pragmatist assumptions concerning the two-way exchange between 
conceptual development and perception. The outcome is a proceduralist and 
pluralist account of Dewey, where morality emerges and develops through 
diversity, unfinished and progressing wherever thinking beings are at work. This 
in turn allows us to address more immediate problems, such as how to cope with 
moral disagreement, with clashes of judgment and value through a process of 
communication. Dewey’s pragmatist inheritance became the foundations for his 
account of the metaphysical reality of our experience of relations, where the 
relations are just as real as the properties that they relate: subject and object; 
individual and society; self and other; theory and practice. This chapter 
demonstrates that whilst Dewey certainly inherited much from his pragmatist 


















3. Making Connections: David Hume & John Dewey 
 
 
David Hume was a methodological and conceptual empiricist. He aimed to 
develop a science of man through the experimental empirical method of careful 
observation of human life: of how people behave in company, in daily affairs and 
in pleasure. The result is a virtue theory of ethics that offers a sentimentalist 
explanation for why we are motivated to act morally. This is a description of 
what people’s moral judgments are like and how, psychologically speaking, 
people go about making moral judgments and living moral lives. Through an 
exegesis of relevant Humean concepts, this chapter argues that traces of his 
explanation of moral motivation can be seen in John Dewey’s proceduralist 
theory of morality. This marks the first step of locating Dewey within established 




Hume’s task was to describe, as opposed to prescribe, morality. According to 
Hume, the foundations of moral judgments stem from the human capacity to feel, 
to internally experience passions of approval and disapproval in response to 
actions. These affective aspects of morality form the bedrock of our moral selves 
and are an essential aspect of what it is to be human. By embedding morality in 
feelings, Hume assigns reason a secondary role, as the discoverer of means to 
ends. It is reason’s job to work out how to achieve the moral ends that feelings 
identify, tempered by the human desire to live harmoniously with others.  
Hume’s concern for the effects of moral actions in terms of character is 
evidence of a broader theory of virtue. Traits that elicit approval are useful or 
agreeable to oneself or others and those that elicit disapproval are harmful or 
unpleasant for oneself or others. Virtuous acts demonstrate that a person is 
being courageous or kind or generous and in turn, the act stimulates a feeling 
sensation of pleasure in the chest, a feeling of approval. A virtuous character and 
the virtues themselves, arise both naturally and through social exposure. In 
terms of the former, it is natural for humans to pursue feelings of pleasure, as 
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humans, we have desires and these desires drive us to act. We are also 
fundamentally social creatures. The combination of the two enables Hume to 
extend the power of individual desire to a humanitarian sentiment of sympathy 
for other humans: we are motivated to act morally, to do what is morally right 
because it causes pleasant sensations, which are accentuated by being 
recognised and condoned by the greater community.  
My account of Hume’s particular brand of sentimentalism focuses on the 
interaction between what he calls ‘the passions’ and ‘reason’. Section 3.2 offers 
an overview of Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas in order to 
clarify the connection between morality, the passions and reason in section 3.3 
and an overview of the role of utility in terms of motivation to make moral 
judgments in section 3.4. Section 3.5, traces connections between Hume and 
Dewey and the final section, 3.6, concludes the chapter by arguing that Dewey’s 
focus on the development of a method of reflective evaluation was a way of 
employing Hume’s feelings of approval and disapproval as rational tools that 
make people more conscientious of their moral responsibilities within 
communities of enquiry.  
 
3.2 Impressions & Ideas 
 
Hume offers a thoroughly naturalistic description of humans that captures both 
sides of the nature/nurture debate. His account treats natural virtues as 
universal human dispositions that can then be nurtured and moulded through 
acculturation. For example, the natural virtue, ‘sympathy’1 enables us to 
communicate our pains and pleasures and understand the pain and pleasures of 
others. Our social selves desire to live in functioning societies, which are 
maintained by artificial virtues, such as justice. Natural feelings of empathy are 
the bedrock out of which broader artificial concepts such as justice emerge. 
While the latter emerge out of social conventions, the former are a precondition 
for the kind of social arrangements, which allow us to realise our humanity. The 
job of reason is to deliberate on actions in order to achieve our desired ends. 
                                                          
 
1 Hume’s ‘sympathy’ is more like what we call empathy today. 
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Thus Humean morality is both felt and judged. The initial feeling of pleasure or 
pain gives rise to the judgment of praise or blame.  
This view stems out of Hume’s epistemology, which posits that there are 
two routes to knowledge, via impressions or ideas. Impressions are primary, 
immediately perceived, direct sensory inputs. Interestingly, Hume does not 
restrict this category of immediate sensory input to the information garnered 
from the five senses. Impressions are any immediate perceptions and/or 
sensations; "all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or 
love, or hate, or desire, or will."2 The knowledge accessible from impressions 
includes immediate perceptions such as the colour of a leaf as well as any 
immediate sensations, such as the feeling of happiness. So, in the case of moral 
motivation, our natural virtues arise from these primary impressions, which are 
immediate pre-cognitive sensed and felt responses to the environment. Ideas, on 
the other hand, are secondary because they involve reflection upon our 
impressions. So, for example, when you think about ‘greenness’ or remember a 
moment when you felt anger, you are reflecting on impressions and are thus 
toying with ideas. Moral knowledge reflects our capacity to reason, to formulate 
impressions into complex ideas that the form the basis of moral systems and 
rules for behaviour.  
In A Treatise of Human Nature,3 Hume explains his notion of complex 
ideas through an analysis of the concept ‘causation’. This discussion helps to 
illustrate the process involved in the development of ideas through reflection on 
impressions. According to Hume’s epistemic picture, we perceive impressions 
and from these we derive or conceive ideas. His analysis of causation begins by 
asking us to think about the causative link between a cause and its effect.4 The 
argument starts with the claim that we must be able to perceive a direct 
connection between a cause and its effect if we are to have any certainty about 
the process of causation. But, the problem is that we have no direct impression 
                                                          
 
2 David Hume, 1932, (1777), Hume: Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning 
the Principle of Morals by David Hume, L.A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), 2nd Edition, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. Hereafter Enquiry and Enquiry Morals respectively. Enquiry, II:12, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p.18. 
3 David Hume, 1973, (1739), Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge, (Ed.), Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. Hereafter referred to as Treatise. 
4 Hume, Treatise, I:III:VI, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), pp. 89-90. 
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or sensation of the connection. For example, we see heat under a kettle and we 
see steam rise and water bubble, but we do not actually see or perceive the 
connection between the heat and the bubbles or the heat and the steam. We 
infer a connection, between the heat and the water boiling, the ‘causation’, 
without any direct perception of it. We are not witnesses to causation itself.5  
In Book I, Part III, section VI of the Treatise Hume identifies his concern 
about inferences concerning causal connections, “which can lead us beyond the 
immediate impressions of our memory and senses.”6 Causal connections are 
neither directly perceived nor deductively derived. This leads to the 
epistemological problem that if lots of our complex ideas are not experienced 
directly as impressions, then how do we formulate our idea of the concept? As 
the boiling water example demonstrates, we perceive a constant conjunction 
between two objects and through the imagination we conceive a relation 
between them of causality. This is a form of inductive knowledge as the product 
of the imagination, of conceiving rather than perceiving connections. He 
concludes that the problem of empiricism is that the objects of inductive 
reasoning are neither self-evident nor capable of logical demonstration.7  
This is Hume’s skeptical contribution to epistemology and its importance 
to our discussion is apparent when thought about in terms of the role that Hume 
awards inductive reason in moral judgments. Propositions such as mathematical 
axioms and formal logic are true because of their logical relations. This is an 
example of deductive reasoning where the truth of the proposition is accessible 
through the examination of the ideas themselves. In contrast, propositions 
derived from inductive reasoning are contingent. Such propositions are typically 
products of our ability to draw conclusions from experience through the 
combining of impressions (from memory and senses) with formerly conceived 
ideas. They are reasonably held judgments that hold true insofar as they are 
supported by our experience of them: “…there be something present to the mind, 
either seen or remember’d; and…from this we infer something connected with it, 
                                                          
 
5 This became known as Hume’s problem of induction and it forms the cornerstone of his overall 
problem of knowledge, a detailed account of which is not necessary to this thesis. 
6 Hume, Treatise, I:III:VI, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 89. 
7 Hume, Enquiry, IV, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), pp. 25-39. 
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which is not seen or remember’d.”8 As products of our experience, they are a 
contingent form of knowledge.  
Morality, for Hume, is based upon one’s own emotional reaction of 
approval or disapproval, which are generalised into rules, which necessarily 
remain contingent, given that they are the result of inductive reasoning. Hume’s 
example of willful murder helps to clarify his point.9 Even though we judge 
willful murder to be a vicious act, we cannot examine it and find the vice itself. 
Just as we do not directly perceive causation, it is not self-evident, so too is there 
no directly perceivable ‘viciousness’ in murder:  
The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, 
till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, 
which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but ‘tis the object of 
feeling, not of reason. It lies in your self, not in the object.10 
 
This leads Hume to conclude that when we make moral judgments, we are 
projecting onto the world. Like our concept of causation, moral responses are 
not qualities in objects, they are not perceived. Rather they are the result of 
induction, they are conceived by formulating ideas about our impressions, our 
experience of emotions in response to situations. When “such particular objects, 
in all past instances, have been constantly conjoin’d with each other”11 we have 
the basis for knowledge. So, according to Hume, moral knowledge is inferred 
from the constant conjunction between our emotional responses to experiences. 
We feel an unsettling sense of disapproval when we witness willful murder. 
Through inference, we establish rules about justice.  
Hume offers a naturalistic justification for this picture of how moral 
considerations affect us and why they succeed in governing our actions.12 While 
morality is first and foremost a felt response for Hume, he does have a helpful 
account of two types of passions, which aids us in terms of connecting us back to 
his epistemic distinction between impressions and ideas.13 Direct passions such 
as desire, aversion, hope, fear, grief and joy are impressions that “arise 
                                                          
 
8 Hume, Treatise, I:III:VI, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 89. 
9 Hume, Treatise, III:I:I, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 468. 
10 Hume, Treatise, III:I:I, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), pp. 468-9. 
11 Hume, Treatise, I:III:VI, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 90. 
12 Hume, Treatise, II:I:III, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 280. 
13 Hume, Treatise, II:I:II, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 277-279. 
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immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure.”14 They are the immediate 
felt response, the fluttering in the breast of approval or disapproval, which make 
us feel pleasure (good) or pain (bad). Indirect passions, such as justice, on the 
other hand, are not immediately experienced. They are ideas that are generated 
via more complex amalgamations of the experiences of the self in all forms of 
relations.15 Take the idea of the self, for example. Akin to the idea of ‘causation’, 
the idea of the ‘self’ is, for Hume, a product of inference, of our ability to connect 
successive perceptions. The self is evidenced by the affections we feel toward 
ourselves.16 Different events trigger an array of association, which have over 
time become linked with pride and humility. For example, wit, good-sense, 
learning, courage, integrity, skills, beauty, and so on are virtues or qualities that 
evoke pride. So, the self will be elated by pride and dejected by humility.17 
For Hume, there is a conceived causal link between motives, character, 
and action. So, for example, in order to hold someone morally responsible for 
their action, they must not only have acted abhorrently, but also have done so 
intentionally, as opposed to accidentally. Hume is embedding the causal chain in 
the character of the individual, so that responsibility and blame can only be 
administered if an individual has an enduringly bad character that causes their 
action. This evokes experience and in this case, the indirect passion of blame. 
Epistemically, this mirrors Hume’s sceptical leanings. In the same way that 
observation of causal connections between objects, gives rise to the idea of 
causation, the causal connections between our sensations and another’s 
motivation, character traits and actions in relation to human behaviour, gives 
rise to moral judgments. Like other kinds of inductive knowledge, moral 
knowledge results from our experience of acts upon the self. Perceiving blame 
and merit when in fact there are none to perceive. There are only passions we 
experience in response to some object or event.  
 
                                                          
 
14 Hume, Treatise, II:I:I, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 276. 
15 As we will soon see, indirect passions are thus akin to inferred concepts such as causation: they 
are neither directly perceived (matters of fact), nor deductively derived (relations of ideas). 
16 Hume, Treatise, II:I:II, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 277. 
17 Hume, Treatise, II:I:II, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 278. 
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3.3 The Passions & Reason 
 
Hume’s overall aim is to articulate a common sense of morality, for if we 
understand the basis of human morality then we will be better equipped to 
reflectively improve our moral evaluations. This is a significant aspect of Hume’s 
account as it marks the point of contact between the passions and reason. There 
is a great difference between pronouncing an action vicious and therefore 
morally wrong, and anything we can discover by simply perceiving an action.18 
So, to return to our earlier example, in the case of willful murder, reasoning 
allows us to infer that a person deliberately and unnecessarily took another’s life 
and that this act caused suffering, pain, harm and so on. While Hume granted 
that when we observe and infer these characteristics in an act we could conclude 
that the action is vicious, from perception alone. However, such a perceptually 
based belief does not motivate us to act, or not act. Moral judgments differ from 
perceptions, as they are motivating. Otherwise we will never act on our 
inferences, or, in the case of murder, refrain from acting. This leads us to Hume’s 
theory on the will. 
Morality is something that makes you do something – it necessarily 
involves reference to the will. This is a relation of sorts, namely, a mental 
stance toward external objects, a relation between “internal action and external 
objects”19 but it is more than a knowledge relation. This relates back to Hume’s 
theory of mind and the necessary relation between motives, character, and 
action (3.2). Hume’s empowerment of the passions as the director of the will 
disempowers reason. In doing so, he is able to account for someone who, whilst 
they reason their way to knowing what their moral obligations are and have the 
capacity to differentiate the virtuous from the vicious, still fails to act on their 
reasonings. As Hume puts it, “’tis one thing to know virtue, and another to 
conform the will to it.”20  
Hume treats the will as a faculty of consciousness, where the will has the 
power of control over the mind and as such is the director of actions. It is the will 
                                                          
 
18 Barry Stroud, 1977, Hume, London: Routledge, p. 178. Commas are insertions by me. 
19 Hume, Treatise, III:I:I, Selby-Bigge, (Ed.), pp. 464. 
20 Hume, Treatise, III:I:I, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 465. 
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that causes action, not reason. Hume argued that intentional actions are the 
product of the passions, for “reason alone can never be a motive to any action of 
the will.” Moreover, “reason can never oppose passion in the direction of the 
will.”21 Our passions, our immediate felt responses of pleasure or pain trigger the 
will to act. Reason steps in as a secondary arbitrator, weighing feelings of pain 
and pleasure against broader aims of what is good for us. The only way we are 
moved to do anything is through the will being stimulated by the passions to 
act.22 Insofar as actions are directed at passion grounded ends, reason is enlisted 
to work out appropriate actions to achieve them.  
Morally speaking, reason works out the actions that will cause us 
gratification if we engage in them, or that will at least be helpful or useful to 
ourselves and others. Reason helps agents see which actions and qualities are 
beneficial or efficacious but does not itself set the standard of morality or set the 
ends to be promoted. While reason determines which actions are conducive to 
calculating the utility of actions in terms of self and society, it can never motivate 
action on its own. We must first anticipate pleasure or pain from obtaining that 
end. The anticipation of pain or pleasure gives rise to feelings of desire or 
aversion for the object in question. As morality is felt, rather than judged, it is the 
passions, not reason that motivates us to act morally. The chosen actions, 
demonstrates our volition and motivation, as our desires reflect our appetites 
and inclinations. This means that some cultivation is necessary, in order to shape 
our desires and inculcate morality. Reason only steps in secondarily to direct the 
impulse. “Reason is, and ought only be, the slave of the passions, and can never 
pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”23 
Hume goes on to argue that moral distinctions of right and wrong are felt 
responses that stem from the ‘moral sense’.24 You know that something is 
virtuous by the pleasing sensation, an immediate response to human behaviours. 
This is a naturalistic account where feelings of approval and disapproval are our 
                                                          
 
21 Hume, Treatise, II:III:III, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 413. 
22 This is a reflection of Hume’s broader theory of mind, a detailed description of which is not 
necessary for our purposes. 
23 Hume, Treatise, II:III:III, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 415. 
24 Hume, Treatise, III:II:I, Selby-Bigge, (Ed.), pp. 470-476. 
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natural sympathetic responses to behaviour.25 By extension, when we are 
presented with other people’s difficulties, the faculty of the ‘moral sense’ enables 
us to recognise and through generalisation of this sympathy, empathise with 
others. “We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in 
feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is 
virtuous.”26  
 This is not to say that every time we make a moral judgment, it is 
necessary to actually experience a feeling of disapproval.  While feelings 
are a natural aspect of morality, moral judgments themselves are assertions 
about the morality of another’s actions and character, not simply an individual’s 
emotional response. Reason allows us to generalise passions and weigh them 
against broader aims of what is good for all. But it is the laws of human nature, in 
particular the sentiment of humanity, which, explains the power that the virtues 
have over us in terms of motivating us to act morally. As Hume explains, having a 
sense of virtue is the human capacity to feel satisfaction of a particular kind in 
the contemplation of a certain type of character. The feeling itself constitutes our 
praise or admiration. “We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it 
pleases: in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel 
that it is virtuous.”27 We perceive many things and then conceive that the act is 
virtuous.  
Hume’s legacy is to teach us that there is no necessary a priori relation 
between acts and judgments of virtue and vice. The problem of empiricism is 
that moral knowledge is neither self evident nor capable of logical 
demonstration. We infer connections between events without any direct 
perception of it, strictly speaking. We are not witnesses to badness itself. In 
terms of morality, this suggests that judgment is grounded in an inter-subjective 
calibration of value. This opens the way for Dewey’s ‘community of enquiry’ 
where moral judgment is concerned. 
 
                                                          
 
25 Hume, Treatise, III:II:I, Selby-Bigge, (Ed.), p. 471. 
26 Hume, Treatise, III:II:I, Selby-Bigge, (Ed.), p. 471. 
27 Hume, Treatise, III:I:II, Selby-Bigge, (Ed.), p. 471. 
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3.4 The Role of Utility in Moderating the Passions 
 
The Humean account of motivation is important to this thesis as it foreshadows 
many aspects of Mill and Dewey. Hume’s particular brand of sentimentalism 
posits that without warm feelings arising from virtuosity or aversive feelings of 
disgust when confronted with vice, morality would not have any influence over 
us and as we saw in the previous section, reason has a secondary, instrumental 
role. Reason allows us to engage in a process of generalisation from experience, 
so that we can identify “those universal principles, from which all censure or 
approbation is ultimately derived.”28 It assists us to make judgments about our 
originally existing passions and it enables us to infer someone’s character from 
their actions, leading to general rules based on historical precedence.  
Hume provides a utility driven account of social virtues, which, as we will 
see in chapter five, foreshadows my social and political reading of Mill’s 
utilitarian theory. Hume argues that social virtues are judged in terms of their 
benefits. This is not to say that there is something intrinsically or objectively 
good in something’s being useful. As Hume argues, useful things incite a feeling 
of approbation in us, so long as we have the relevant background learning…  
A machine, a piece of furniture, a vestment, a house well contrived for use and 
convenience, is so far beautiful, and is contemplated with pleasure and approbation. An 
experienced eye is here sensible to many excellences, which escape persons ignorant 
and uninstructed…In general, what praise is implied in the simple epithet useful! What 
reproach in the contrary!29 
 
Hume grounds his theory on the relationship between the individual and society, 
where human nature is viewed as both self-interested and social.30 “Morals 
excite the passions and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly 
impotent in this particular."31 Morality involves a felt response of sympathy that 
is mediated by considerations of utility, elevating moral over selfish passions. So, 
in terms of motivation, we care about others because we have the natural ability 
to sympathise. While moral judgments have their roots in subjective felt 
responses to objective circumstances, it is through the sympathetic passions 
                                                          
 
28 David Hume, Enquiry Morals, I:I:138, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 174.  
29 Hume, Enquiry Morals, II:II:142, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 179. 
30 Hume, Treatise, III:II:I, Selby-Bigge, (Ed.), p. 477-484. 
31 Hume, Treatise, III:I:I, Selby-Bigge, (Ed.), p. 457. 
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tempered by considerations of utility that we are engaged by our moral lives so 
that our actions are adjudicated and regulated by moral principles. It is at this 
point that “reason and sentiment concur”32. Hume’s moral judgments are 
generalised through intersubjective mediation and societal conventions, an idea 
that will be built upon in the following chapters.  
While many actions will give rise to feelings of pleasure, only those which 
give rise to approval/disapproval are considered relevant to morality.33 “’Tis not 
contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching 
of my finger.”34 This is a way of reinforcing the limitations of reason. Recall the 
role of reason as the discoverer of causal relations, as outlined in section 3.2. 
Whilst reason conceives causal connections, it does not, as we have just seen, 
motivate us to act. On the one hand we need to desire to do some thing or have 
an aversion to having it happen, in order for us to be motivated to bring it about 
or prevent it.35 On the other we are motivated to engage in reasoning in order to 
promote positive, as opposed to negative affects – in order to realise our 
preferences.36  
Reason can only tell us how to bring about whatever it is that we desire. 
As Paul Guyer argues, Hume is not out to prove that reason cannot produce 
passions that would be motivating, but rather that passions do not provide 
premises for reasoning.37 
The relevant point to our discussion is that it is the passions, not reason that 
motivate actions, so it is the passions, not reason that must be moderated. As 
Hume puts it: “…we can change people’s passions by changing their relation to 
relevant objects, which will naturally cause such a change although not give a 
reason for any change of passions.”38 Morality hinges on the cultivation of self-
desires in line with society-desires. This process of modifying the passions 
                                                          
 
32 Hume, Enquiry Morals, I:I:136, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 172. 
33 Paul Guyer offers a compelling analysis of the role of reason in terms of mediating moral 
feeling in chapter four “Reason, Desire, and Action” of Paul Guyer, 2008, Knowledge, Reason, and 
Taste, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 161-197. 
34 Hume, Treatise, II:III:III, Selby-Bigge, (Ed.), p. 416. 
35 Guyer, 2008, p. 168. 
36 Guyer, 2008, p. 168. 
37 Guyer, 2008, p. 169. 
38 Guyer, 2008, p. 173. 
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involves changing relations to relevant objects by changing perceptions, through 
custom and repetition.39 Socially embedding desires allows Hume to explain how 
impulses and passions can be modified in order to effect change in our 
behaviour.40  
As we will see in chapter four, Guyer argues that Hume and Kant are 
aligned in many ways. While their conceptions of reason were very different, 
their theories of moral motivation are comparable. Hume and Kant have similar 
“models of how our deepest moral commitments actually move us to action.”41 
Hume’s concept of the object of reason was narrow, defined in terms of real 
relations and real existences. As we will see in the next chapter, Kant’s ‘reason’ 
was broader as it provides for a universally binding notion of obligation. For now 
it is enough to point out that in Book III of the Treatise, Hume argues that the 
passions are shaped by custom and a societal sense of approval and disapproval. 
He embeds the passions as moral desires within a social context rather that the 
individual or isolated mind, where constellations of feelings, outcomes and 
other’s responses, which cohere over time and through association, impact on 
our subsequent desires and deliberations.  
The other crucial aspect to moderating the passions is the end to which 
Hume thought all our desires ultimately aim namely, tranquillity – of both 
individuals and society.42 This entails that an individual’s morality is not 
idiosyncratic as it is intersubjectively constrained. The embedding of passions 
(both direct and indirect) in the broader utility of society, guards the virtuous life 
against being driven by idiosyncratic desires. As we will see more clearly in later 
chapters, and is of key importance to Dewey’s proceduralism, objectivity 
emerges out of intersubjective agreement.  
                                                          
 
39 A theme taken up by Dewey and expanded upon in his discussion of habits (5.2). 
40 Hume, Treatise, II:III:IV-V, Selby-Bigge, (Ed.), pp. 418-424. 
41 Guyer, 2008, p. 189. The problem that Hume and Kant identify is that those who cannot control 
their impulses are not free. For Kant, no one deserves esteem for what happens to him or her but 
only for what they freely do. Freedom of choice is a necessary but not sufficient condition of 
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42 Guyer argues that this is evident in Hume’s treatment of reason. While it is neither natural or 
reasonable to prefer the destruction of the world over the scratching of one’s finger, we can set 
ourselves the goal of a life that would satisfy a coherent set of desires in which the desire for 






A detailed account of Dewey’s proceduralism is set out in chapters six and seven, 
however relevant connections between Hume and Dewey can be extrapolated 
from the information assembled above. Integral to their connection is the role 
that Dewey affords feelings and reason in relation to moral judgments, however 
this connection is limited. As we have just seen, Hume explained motivation at 
the most fundamental level, in terms of the individual’s natural ability to 
sympathise. By extension, he claimed that the individual cares about society 
because she recognises that the satisfaction of the desires of others impacts upon 
the satisfaction of her own desires. In contrast, Dewey considers the individual 
as a product of society, rather than existing prior to it and rather than 
cooperating with it for her independently perceived interests. I argue that this, 
reversal of direction of relation between individual and society forms the basis 
for Dewey’s non-dichotomous treatment of the sentimentalism-rationalism 
structure.  
In Hume there is a weak sense of individual responsibility resulting from 
his grounding the fundamental aspect of morality in the passions, in the 
immediate felt response of dis/approbation. This is a result that Dewey sought to 
avoid, while maintaining certain aspects of Hume’s empiricism. For example, 
Dewey extends Hume’s sentimentalism regarding the cultivational aspect of 
sentiments, positioning them as an important feature of the moral life. For 
Dewey, the key to society’s functioning and therefore the optimal functioning of 
human life is in the cultivation of the capacity to make moral judgments. This 
shifts the emphasis of morality away from the passions and refocuses it on 
learning to reflect responsibly when engaged in decision-making processes. For 
Dewey, actions are virtuous if they enhance “an individual’s freedom to construct 
harmonious, flexible, stable life projects that further enhance the individual’s 
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capacity to participate in his or her community's life.”43 The virtues and vices are 
thus identifiable character traits that can be cultivated, repaired and restored. 
Associating Hume with Dewey enables me to draw conclusions otherwise 
overlooked. For example, Dewey argued that praise and blame are useful tools 
for ensuring that the broader outcomes of actions on society in general influence 
our moral judgments. These aspects can be seen in Dewey’s analysis of the 
double sense of “judgment”. On the one hand it is intellectual, a matter of 
reasoning, of weighing the pros and cons. On the other it is making a judgment of 
moral condemnation or approval. According to Dewey’s reflective morality, a 
rational principle is discovered, which will make coherent “…the inconsistency 
and arbitrary variations in popular expressions of esteem and disapproval.”44 
This does not mean that all our opinions will eventually converge. The toing and 
froing between self and society, the weighing and balancing of reasons allows us 
to arrive at a reasoned conclusion that will in turn shape our subsequent 
sympathies. This demonstrates that Dewey, like Hume, recognised the crucial 
role of sentiments in moral judgments and that he took Hume’s motivational 
account of the role of social approval and disapproval seriously. 
Making moral judgments is both an intuitive and reasoned endeavour for 
Dewey. Much like Hume’s conception of the constellations of feelings and 
associated ideas, on Dewey’s account ‘intuition’ combines the associations, 
reasons and feeling brought together in past experiences. One aim of Dewey’s 
proceduralism is to cultivate deliberative decision-making, which is motivating.  
Moral judgments, whatever else they are, are a species of judgments of value. They 
characterise acts and traits of character as having worth, positive or negative. Judgments 
of value are not confined to matters which are explicitly moral in significance…poems, 
pictures, landscapes…economic standing…weather...all judgment is estimation, 
appraisal, assigning value to something.45  
 
Dewey’s focus on the development of reflective evaluation was a way of using the 
Humean feelings of approval and disapproval as learning tools that make people 
more conscientious of their moral responsibilities. This enabled him to shift the 
                                                          
 
43 Jennifer Welchman, 1995, Dewey’s Ethical Thought, Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, p. 216. 
44 John Dewey & James H. Tufts, 1932, Ethics: Revised Edition, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 
p.258. 
45 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p.290. 
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emphasis away from treating reason as an exercise to be carried out in an 
individual’s isolated head and toward reason embedded within a community of 
rational interactions. Reason thus becomes an arbitrator of communication, 
where one is required to give an account of oneself in terms shared by that 
community. As we shall see in 6.2, this reflects Dewey’s broader philosophy of 
mind, which identifies the irreducible interrelationship between nature and 
nurture, sentience and sapience. The social life shapes human nature just as 
human nature shapes the social life. 
For both Hume and Dewey, the job of morality is to address ethical 
problems and in doing so, foster social cooperation.46 Jennifer Welchman 
provides an insightful summary of the Humean aspects of Dewey’s reflective 
morality: 
[T]o read Dewey as a pragmatic Humean is to highlight the nonteleological, 
antimetaphysical aspects of Dewey’s thought, including the temporality and fragility of 
the values we cherish and pursue, their origin and dependence on the character of our 
transactions with our physical and social environments, and finally, the possibility of 
enhancing those values through the creative application of the latest insights and 
techniques of modern experimental science…Life, as Dewey sees it, is a process of 
continual change, the context of action ever varying…Since the social and physical 
environments in which human communities operate are not static, communal strategies 
for ameliorating the ills of the situations to which they fall heir will require continual 
reconstruction, renovation and replacement.47 
 
Dewey develops Hume’s idea of the socially embedded process of experience 
into a more explicit ‘experience in community’ concept. He also maintains 
Hume’s reference to utility. Dewey treats morality as an ongoing process, where 
problems are to be addressed and readdressed in accord with the success or 
failure of their restorations. As will be established, Dewey’s fundamentally 
pluralistic and non-absolute view of morality recognises the role of both feelings 
and reason, accommodating them in equal measure. 
A philosophical moral theory addresses what constitutes being right and 
wrong regarding actions, which impact upon the concept of self and the rights of 
others. It also addresses why we are motivated to act in accord with these moral 
judgments. Hume’s assertion that morality is primarily felt is a sentimentalist 
explanation for why we are motivated to act morally. Feelings of approbation 
                                                          
 
46 Welchman, 1995, p. 216. 
47 Welchman, 1995, p. 217. 
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and disapprobation are natural, directly perceived impressions. They are 
sensations, felt responses, which like our senses, provide us with primary 
information. In terms of their content, they are an equivalent information source 
to seeing, hearing, touching, and so on. These feelings are what Hume calls the 
direct passions and when over time they are observed to be in constant 
conjunction with particular outcomes and responses, they are gradually 
calibrated with social norms. This is an empiricist account of moral motivation, 
where internal reasons are based in natural feelings. By including sociability as a 
natural feeling, Hume is able to explain how our common human nature is the 
foundation for morality. 
The felt response to virtuous and vicious behaviour is also an essential 
part of making moral judgments for Dewey. His reflective theory of morality 
treats the positive affect of moral acts on the self and others as necessary aspects 
of moral motivation, moral judgment and character development. Praise and 
blame are useful as indicators of moral rightness and wrongness and as tools for 
the inculcation of the virtues. Reflective evaluation is developed through the 
inculcation of the self within society. This removes morality from the isolation of 
an individual’s Humean flutterings of feeling and heady rationalisations. In 
contrast, the Deweyan self is embedded in society and that in itself entails that a 
community of rational interactions arbitrates feelings and reasoning. The social 
life shapes human nature just as human nature shapes the social life. 
Hume’s legacy is to provide an empirically grounded motivational account 
of moral action. Accordingly, as morality makes us do something, it necessarily 
involves the will. His explanation for how we are moved to act was that we are 
sentimental beings. Human sentience imbues us with the capacity to feel, to 
immediately be affected by our environment. By placing sentiments in the 
primary position and relegating reason to serving means to ends, Hume 
succumbs to the problem of division, as per standard 18th century philosophy of 
mind, discussed in terms of cognitivism and non-cognitivism in chapter eight. 
While Dewey concurs with Hume’s internalist explanation of moral motivation, 
he argues that it is at the cost of reason and externalism. Thus, as I argue in the 
next chapter, Dewey turns to Kant for an account of the external and combines 
the two in order to transcend dichotomous analytic debates about the internal 
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and external (sentience and sapience). Dewey recognises that as they are 
integral aspects of how we experience the world, any ethical theory needs to be 
able to account for both.  
Hume’s defense of the role of feeling in moral judgment is informative. By 
allocating morality a place in our experiential reality, Hume paves the way for 
Dewey’s conception of experience. “In his forward to the 1930 Modern Library 
edition of Human Nature and Conduct, [Dewey] wrote: “were it not for one 
consideration, the volume might be said to be an essay in continuing the 
tradition of David Hume.””48 This one consideration makes all the difference. 
Hume does not satisfactorily acknowledge the two-way relation between social 
life and human nature. This is what Dewey emphasises: “[Hume] saw the part 
played by the structure and operations of our common nature in shaping social 
life…[but] failed to see with equal clearness the reflex influence of the latter upon 
the shape which a plastic human nature takes because of its social 
environment.”49  
While this indicates an important development in Dewey’s thought 
further to Hume, the edifying role that Hume allotted passions in moral 
judgments is not to be undervalued. As Welchman states: “Hume anticipates 
Dewey’s depiction of human acts and projects as the outcomes of human 
passions and dispositions to act rather than from the agency of a will governed 
by the faculty of reason.”50 To elaborate on Welchman’s thought, we can stipulate 
that as Dewey would not separate passions from reason, the will would not be 
governed by reason alone. Dewey recognised that virtues and vices are socially 
constructed norms, ideals that ‘fall out of’ our communicative practices and in 
this respect are subject to the constraint standardly associated with reason.  
                                                          
 
48 Welchman, 1995, p. 213. Quoting Dewey, 1930, Forward to the Modern Library edition, HNC, 
MW 14:228. 
49 Welchman, 1995, p. 214. Quoting Dewey, 1930, Forward to the Modern Library edition, HNC, 
MW 14:229. 
50 Welchman, 1995, p. 215. For Hume ref., Welchman, 1995, p. 215, F/N 24: “For example, Hume 
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they are the real offspring of those passions, and are only a more artful and refn’d way of 
satisfying them. Nothing is more vigilant and inventive than our passions.” (Treatise of Human 
Nature, p. 526.)” 
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In the next chapter, further aspects of Dewey's account will come into 
focus by making connections between certain features of Kant and Dewey’s 
ethics. At first glance, Dewey’s assertion that the will is regulated by the passions 
and that moral values are whatever enhances smooth running societies, seems to 
signify a point of difference to Kant. However, by adopting a pragmatic reading of 
Kant via Paul Guyer and others, we can see aspects of Dewey’s thought 
foreshadowed in Kant and consequently those aspects of Dewey’s thought are 
brought to view in a new light. In Humean terms, the shared faculty of the 
passions ensures that we empathise with others and have a vested interest in 
creating amenable communities (Mill), a Humean conception of which 
emphasised the importance of acting in a way, which achieved tranquility.51 In 
Kantian terms, right or virtuous acts are those that best contribute to individual 
freedom and the realm of ends. In Deweyan terms, they are those acts, which 
contribute to harmonious life and enhance an individual’s ability to contribute to 
their community.  
                                                          
 
51 Again drawing on Paul Guyer’s analysis in chapter four of Reason, Knowledge, and Taste, 2008, 
this aspect of Hume in relation to Kant, will be further developed in 3.4. 
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4. Making Connections: Immanuel Kant & John Dewey  
 
Immanuel Kant’s aim was to provide a philosophical defence of our common 
sense knowledge of morality, where morality is objectively grounded. Kant 
identifies, through philosophical analysis, the most basic principle of the moral 
system. The outcome is a normative theory of morality that identifies duties and 
moral obligations to perform right actions, as the basis of moral responsibility. In 
this chapter I explore those aspects of Kant’s moral theory that are relevant to 
Dewey’s proceduralism. I argue that these aspects facilitated Dewey’s 
establishment of the interface between experience, which engages subjectivity, 




Given the historical trajectory of this thesis, I present Kant as responding to the 
shortcomings he saw in Hume. While for Kant, Hume’s sentimentalism was a 
helpful description of how and why we act morally, it failed to provide grounds 
for moral obligation and by extension, take into account how we can be held 
responsible. Kant argued that a moral theory must do more than account for an 
individual’s motivation: it must be able to explain how morality is universally 
and necessarily obligatory, while being grounded in human rationality. Kant 
argued that the moral law is identified and determined through rational 
deliberation. Maxims were derived from this law by a test of universalizability, 
that is, the categorical imperative. This will be discussed further in the sections 
below. While both Hume and Kant agree that motivation is a necessary 
component of moral judgment, they diverge on the source of motivation. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, Hume argued that the source of moral 
motivation was the passions, although he admitted that these were constrained 
by intersubjectively mediated conventions of society. Kant’s dissatisfaction was 
aimed directly at this aspect. His response was to embed moral motivation in 
respect for the moral law. In doing so he broke the mould regarding the 
separation of concept and feeling, another idea that I return to later. 
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Kant’s aim was to provide a metaphysically robust normative theory of 
morality. What is generally called his deontic approach, awards primary place to 
acting in accord with universal moral laws, discoverable by all rational agents 
through reason. By grounding moral judgment in reason, Kant is attempting to 
eliminate private, arbitrary or idiosyncratic bases to morality, including 
eliminating prudential reason as a ground for morality. He thought that this was 
the only thing that made sense, lest rightness and wrongness be simply matters 
of fortuitousness, a person’s natural characteristics (like height and weight) or, 
in regards to Hume, subjective and potentially volatile, feelings. To paraphrase 
Paul Guyer, at least one way of looking at Kant’s conception of his philosophical 
task was to base the key principles of his moral theory on more secure 
foundations than the foundations identified by Hume, which rested at best, on 
experience and custom, and at worst on mere dogmatism.1 For Kant, morality 
must be a set of necessary characteristics and behaviours, not matters of fortune 
and luck.  
I argue that Kant’s obligatory ends can be understood in the teleology of 
reason itself, which contains the idea of the moral world, or kingdom of ends, as 
well as the transcendental idea of the highest good.2 On this view, virtue is 
understood as doing what is right, not just with a legalistic attitude, but striving 
to act always from the moral motive, which is a matter of obligation arising from 
one’s respect for the moral law. As free rational beings, we self legislate the law 
and then out of respect for our own rational nature, we ultimately act from the 
moral motive – rather than, for example, for fear of externally imposed sanctions.  
The general picture of Kant’s deontic moral theory is outlined in section 
4.2. His 1785 publication, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals3 and his 1790 
work, the Critique of the Power of Judgment4 provide the backdrop for the 
ensuing discussion on the relationship between reason and feeling in section 
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4.3.5 It then outlines how Kant arrives at the fundamental principle of morality, 
namely, the categorical imperative, and how it is universalizable, that is, 
unconditionally valid for all rational creatures. Kant’s view of the relation 
between reason, feelings and rational judgment is then outlined. In section 4.4 I 
offer a pragmatist reading of Kant drawn primarily from Paul Guyer’s argument 
for interdependence between moral goodness and what constitutes the realm of 
ends. Section 4.5 examines the relation between Kant and Hume. Section 4.6 
extracts connections between Kantian and Deweyan pragmatism and the 
conclusion, (section 3.7), offers an analysis of the influence of both Hume and 
Kant on Dewey.  
 
4.2 The Theoretical Groundwork of Kant’s Deontic Moral Theory 
 
The basic picture of Kant’s deontic moral theory is that virtue lies in the good 
will of the agent. The argument can be put simply: good will is manifested in the 
performance of an action for the fulfilling of a duty out of respect for the moral 
law that you have self-legislated as a free rational being. The test of 
universalizability, which is called the categorical imperative (hereafter CI), 
where the moral context is concerned, is to “act only according to that maxim by 
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”.6 This 
test provides the means for the identification of moral laws and is accessible 
through the exercise of reason. It is only through the exercise of morality that we 
can be free, that is, free from acting merely from compulsion. As such, Kant 
identifies rationality’s ultimate value as the means to freedom or autonomy. 
Central to Kant’s commitment to the CI and the autonomy of the will is that the 
CI is synthetically true as an a-priori proposition, that is, necessary and universal. 
Before going into more detail about what this is and why it is important, I explain 
                                                          
 
5 I am interested in the Groundwork in this section, as opposed to Kant’s more mature work on 
morality, namely his 1797 Metaphysics of Morals, which is discussed later in the chapter. I start 
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non-dichotomous conceptual framework. Keeping Kant’s texts in their chronological order 
enables me to build toward this point. 
6 Kant, GW, [AK 421:52], (Pasternack, Ed., trans. Paton), p. 50. 
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the theoretical underpinnings, in particular the relations from which he builds 
his theory. 
Kant’s metaphysics was a response to both the rationalists (Descartes, 
Spinoza, Leibniz) and the empiricists (Locke, Berkeley and Hume). Kant thought 
that both the rationalists and the empiricists mistakenly assume that we can 
know things, as they are in themselves, independent of the conditions of our 
experience of them. His alternative was to offer a metaphysical account of truth 
that accommodated aspects of both rationalism and empiricism and in doing so 
he arguably paves the way for Dewey’s non-dichotomous treatment of the 
sentimentalism-rationalism structure. The aim of Kant’s Groundwork was to set 
out this metaphysics of rational, necessary, a priori yet synthetic moral laws. The 
sole feature that gives an action moral worth is not the outcome that is achieved 
by the action, but the motive that is behind the action. Moral acts are those done 
from duty, out of a feeling of respect for the moral law. The categorical 
imperative is Kant’s statement of this duty and particular maxims drawn from it. 
We are bound by duty (hence deontology) to obey moral maxims, which are 
knowable via the test of universalizability (the CI).  
The cornerstone of Kant’s metaphysics is his argument for two 
irreducibly different types of necessary truth: analytic a priori and synthetic a 
priori. The latter is the revolutionary aspect of Kant’s metaphysics and in 
conjunction with his work in the third Critique, paves the way for my pragmatist 
reading of him. Analytic judgments are a priori because they are necessarily true 
or false based on the relevant concepts. For example, the statement ‘bachelors 
are unmarried men’ is true because its negation necessarily leads to a logical 
contradiction. By identifying synthetic a priori truths, Kant is able to conceive of 
the necessity and authority of objects of reason, such as the moral law, over 
actions in the sensuous world. The outcome is a moral law that is just like a law 
of nature as described by physics. It holds true in all cases, independently of 
evidence from sense experience and is not negotiable – it is a priori and 
therefore necessary. This sets the moral law apart from practical rules, which 
rest on empirical grounds (a posteriori). Whilst the moral law is necessary, it is 
not analytic, like purely deductive inferences such as mathematical reasoning. 
The moral law is synthetic and hence involves drawing upon experience. 
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Kant's aim is to demonstrate that reason itself can establish a foundation 
for morality. He is responding to the question: what would need to be the case 
for morality to be possible? Whilst Kant relies on a broader conception of reason 
than Hume, he does concur that the moral law is not an empirical matter of fact 
(section 3.2). Insofar as it is not a logical relation either, it is not an analytic truth. 
Instead, Kant argued that the moral law (the CI) is a synthetic a priori 
transcendental deduction. He offered a transcendental proof, which took 
experience as actual. That is, synthetic truth is always calculated relative to 
experience, and in this case, moral experience. 
Kant’s combination of the a priori with the synthetic enables him to assert 
that the moral law is necessary and universal. As Guyer points out, this argument 
is based on the claim that causal laws of nature hold for all objects of experience, 
including our mental constructs (the conceptual).7 This is a naturalistic 
explanation where a-priori knowledge is based on innate (or strictly speaking 
primitive8) categories, or key concepts, in our minds that are a condition of 
perception and cognition. These categories direct our ability to have experiences 
and in turn rely on experience, for their instantiation as concepts. As will become 
evident later in the thesis, this is an important aspect. As Guyer puts it, Kant is 
asserting that like mathematical relations, moral laws are not relative to culture 
or the individual.9 
Kant argued that empirical explanations, including Hume’s, were unable 
to provide an a priori account of the conceptual aspect of perception. This was a 
most unacceptable situation for Kant. Paul Guyer explains: 
He clearly thought that Hume had raised a genuine problem about the real foundations 
of the concept of causation and the necessary truth of both the general principle that 
every event has a cause as well as particular causal laws…unless the metaphysical 
concepts at stake were both properly founded and properly limited, that is, restricted to 
the properly demarcated sphere of human experience, perfectly reasonable doubts 
about their cognitive value beyond this sphere could end up undermining our confidence 
in their use within this sphere.10 
  
                                                          
 
7 Guyer, 2008, pp. 163. 
8 Primitivism holds that the predisposition is innate, but will atrophy without the appropriate 
environmental triggers. See Fiona Cowie, 1999, What’s Within? Nativism Reconsidered, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
9 Guyer, 2008, p. 161. 
10 Guyer, 2008, pp. 2-3. 
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The identification of synthetic a priori truths, reached through the 
transcendental deduction, establishes the necessity of moral laws as a priori 
principles that assume the occurrence of human sense-experience. We might 
now think of the synthetic a priori as what the perceptual and cognitive seems 
assume about the world in order to provide coherent concepts of it. The 
conceptual captures the specifically human capacity to know what is seen 
through the manifold of intuitions, that is, anything that is brought to our 
attention through the senses.  
Instead of drawing ideas from such impressions and finding relations 
between these ideas, as Hume proposed, according to Kant we subsume the 
manifold of intuitions, under a concept of the understanding. An example will 
help clarify this. Take seeing some trees. As ‘intuitions’, we come to understand 
trees via a manifold of various sensations available to us. We see a tree, perhaps 
hear its leaves rustling in the wind, then reach out and touch its rough bark. Each 
of these sensations (intuitions) are a part of the manifold of identifying the tree 
that stands in front of us. Identifying them as a discreet object, ‘tree’, 
presupposes the imposition of a concept. From there we are able not only to 
identify and name them as trees, but also count them, group them into broader 
concepts, such as ‘species of trees’, ‘forest’, and so on. Metaphysically, the former, 
the knowledge of sensible reality is only possible if we have the necessary 
concepts in the first place, so it is a mistake to think that we can know things as 
they are in themselves.  
The a priori gives Kant moral truth, universality and necessity. The 
synthetic nature enables Kant to establish “principles which lie at the basis of our 
knowledge...[that]…have no intrinsic necessity, [they have synthetic a priori 
necessity, not analytic a priori necessity] and cannot possess the absolute 
authority ascribed to them by rationalists.”11 Just as experience is not possible 
without concepts, concepts are not possible without experience.12 As Kemp 
Smith explains, inductive inference from the data of experience is only possible, 
                                                          
 
11 Norman Kemp Smith, 1962, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason 2nd Ed., New York: 
Humanities Press, p. xxxv. His italics. 
12 Immanuel Kant, 1787, pp. 208-238. [AK IV: 177-218].  
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if previous acceptance of rational principles is independently established, we 
may not, therefore, look to experience for proof of validity.13 Mirroring Hume’s 
epistemological argument re impressions and ideas (3.2), Kant acknowledges 
that it is not revealed through analysis nor is it self-evident. Unlike Hume, Kant 
posits that this means that there is no intrinsic necessity to the moral law (the 
CI), rather, it is arrived at by assuming what must be the case transcendentally, 
in order for moral experience to be possible. The CI is established only as a 
condition of morality, without being demonstrable in actual experience.14 This is 
transcendental idealism.  
To paraphrase Guyer, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism is the theory that 
we impose the a priori forms of cognition on our experience but that they do not 
reveal the real nature the objects of this experience as they are in themselves.15 
Kant’s argument involves two stages. First, he demonstrates that ordinary 
cognitive capacities presuppose a priori cognition and second, he offers an 
explanation of such a priori cognition via a transcendental argument.16 Kant’s 
transcendentalist aim is to argue for the existence of fundamental cognitive 
capacities, of which intuition and concepts form the basis. Paul Guyer is useful on 
this point:  
In the metaphysical exposition, Kant pursues the antiskeptical strategy of arguing that 
what he clearly assumes to be several ordinary and fundamental cognitive capacities, 
namely the ability to represent objects as numerically distinct from one another and 
from ourselves (Pure Reason, A 23-24/B 37-38) and the ability to represent states of 
affairs, whether external or internal, as successive or simultaneous (A 30-31/B 46), as 
well as the perhaps less commonsensical disposition to represent space and time as 
single infinite wholes, of which particular bounded spaces and times are parts rather 
than instances (A 24-25/B 39-49, A 31-32/B 47-48), can all be explained only on the 
supposition that we have a priori representations of space and time as the forms of 
empirical intuitions, that is, immediate representations of particular objects in 
experience.17 
 
Kant is positing that a priori cognition of space and time is the fundamental form 
of all intuition (sensation). That is, our ability to distinguish objects and 
moments from one another and to treat individual spaces and times as parts of 
all encompassing wholes is necessary. These a priori synthetic aspects of 
                                                          
 
13 Kemp Smith, 1962, p. xvi. 
14 Kemp Smith, 1962, p. xxxv. 
15 Guyer, 2008, p. 42. 
16 Guyer, 2008, p. 40. 
17 Guyer, 2008, pp. 40-41. 
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common sense are the fundamental bases that facilitate our understanding of 
experience. The only basis that Kant provides for this claim is that it can be no 
other way. As Guyer notes, nothing else can explain, how we have a priori 
cognition of objects, that is, knowledge of the necessary features of all objects, 
prior to the experience of any particular object.18 
Kant is asserting that human knowledge is relational. In the Analogies of 
Experience,19 he argues that the concept of the understanding involves three 
regulative principles, namely, substance, cause and community, which we 
impose in advance on experience.20 The first, the principle of the persistence of 
substance enables us to perceive qualitative change. For example, in order to 
know by experience that my lounge room wall has changed colours, I must not 
only perceive the different colours, but also that the wall endures over time. The 
concept of substance is an a priori condition for our experience of an external 
world of material objects. The second, the principle of causation, asserts that the 
experience of events, of things happening one after the other, is a synthetic 
condition that we determine prior to experience. For example, without the 
concept of causality, we cannot make sense of our experiences of successions of 
developments – of a fire causing a kettle of water to boil.  
The final feature of nature that acts as a regulative principle imposed in 
advance on everything we experience is, community. The experience of a world 
of coexisting things requires the presumption of interaction between individual 
things. For example, in order to believe that the earth, sun and moon are a part of 
this solar system, I must make some estimation of the mass of each as well as 
take into account the reciprocity of the gravitational forces between them. As 
Garth Kemerling explains, on Kant’s view, this notion of the natural world as a 
closed system of reciprocal forces is an a priori condition for the intelligibility of 
experience.21 This is a naturalist explanation of the understanding.  
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19 Kant, 1787, pp. 208-238, [AK IV: 177-218]. 
20 Much of the following discussion on Kant’s Analogies of Experience is drawn from Garth 
Kemerling, 1997/2011, Kant: Experience and Reality, 
http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5g.htm Accessed 17th March, 2015. 
21 Kemerling, 1997/2011. 
 63 
Morality, no less than knowledge, presupposes a priori principles. These, however, are 
never self-evident, and cannot be established by any appeal to intuition. They have 
authority only to the extent to which they can be shown to be the indispensable 
presuppositions of a moral consciousness that is undeniably actual.22 
 
Three of Kant’s pure concepts of the understanding (substance, cause and 
community) are a priori features of nature, which are applied to the manifold of 
intuitions and enable unity of apperception. Without them, experience cannot be 
made intelligible. This forms the metaphysical foundation for Kant’s 
Transcendental Idealism, where he applies the transcendental argument to 
morality in order to conclude that moral laws are of a universal nature and as 
such are universally binding – obligatory. As ideals that cannot be given in 
experience, moral laws can only be subject to this kind of transcendental proof. 
As will soon become evident, it is the a priori concept of ‘community’, which 
provides the grounds for my pragmatic reading of Kant (4.4). 
 
4.3 Respect & Moral Motivation 
 
In the last section we established that in terms of his moral theory, Kant sought 
the second category of necessary truth, the synthetic a priori, as a way of 
fortifying the authority of the moral law. The central metaphysical question in 
Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason23 is: ‘how are synthetic a priori judgments 
possible?’ The answer is long and much argued over, however Kant’s general 
point is that synthetic a priori claims, like those from geometry and natural 
science, are true because of the structure of the mind that knows them. As the a 
priority of the moral law enables it to transcend experience by ensuring that it is 
not situation specific, its validity is established neither through experience 
(induction) nor theoretical reason (deduction), but by its universal applicability 
to all rational beings. They are facts of which we are a priori conscious. So, our 
knowledge of the moral law is, like sense-experience, a given fact, our rationality 
enables us to then deduce its transcendental conditions and establish its validity.  
                                                          
 
22 Kemp Smith, 1962, p. xxxvi. 
23 Immanuel Kant, 1788, Critique of Practical Reason, Mary Gregor, (trans. & Ed.), 1997, Critique of 
Practical Reason/Immanuel Kant, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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Kant’s program can be read as an endeavour to construct valid 
foundations for pure moral philosophy, devoid of everything empirical, including 
anthropology, social norms, psychology, culture and so on. “Do we not think it a 
matter of the utmost necessity to work out for once a pure moral philosophy 
completely cleansed of everything that can only be empirical and appropriate to 
anthropology?”24 Kant thought pure grounds for morality were necessary 
because people do what they shouldn’t do, so we cannot expect to derive what 
we should do from what we do.25 Moral philosophy derives its force from reason 
and gives humankind, as rational beings, a priori laws. Kant’s aim is to construct 
moral laws that are universal and necessary so that they are capable of providing 
a ground for obligation and thereby action.  
Hume recognised that the validity of concepts (such as causation) is not 
an empirical matter, as it cannot be proven by experience. In contrast, Kant 
argues that experience is impossible without concepts as they describe the way 
the mind provides a systematic structuring, which in part constitute 
representations. This structure is prior, in explanatory terms, to the mental 
representations that both empiricists and rationalists analysed. Kant’s 
methodological innovation, the transcendental argument, enables him to 
separate the moral law from experience. To put this in contemporary terms, with 
the tools we have available today, it is quite reasonable to replace the 
transcendental argument with a naturalist explanation regarding what would 
need to be the case in terms of cognitive processes in order for us to be able to 
perceive and cognise as we do. These explanations would demonstrate how such 
cognisance is possible in the mind, that is, how the brain would need to be 
structurally, in order for such reasonings to take place.26  
                                                          
 
24 Kant, GW, [AK 389:vi], (Pasternack, Ed., trans. Paton), pp. 20-21. 
25 Or as Hume puts it: “‘what is, is no test of what ought to be.’” in Kemp Smith, 1962, p. 572. This 
will be a recurring theme, for now we just need to acknowledge that Kant thought that the is-
ought or description/prescription distinction was insurmountable. 
26 An excellent argument for interpreting Kant’s work as a naturalistic endeavour can be found in 
Christine Korsgaard’s “The Authority of Reflection”. Christine M. Korsgaard, 1996, “The Authority 
of Reflection” in The Sources of Normativity, Onora O’Neill (Ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 90-130. Evidence for this view of Korsgaard: David Copp, 2004, “Moral 
Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity” in Peter Schaber (Ed.) Normativity in Naturalism, 
Rutgers University: Transaction Books, pp. 7-46, pp. 35-38. This does not entail that any of the 
aforementioned are pragmatists or that they offer a pragmatist reading of Kant. An argument 
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Where moral motivation is concerned, we might apply the same 
reasoning. Unlike the moral law, (the CI), moral judgments are context specific. 
They are informed by experience and are used to work out how to instantiate the 
moral law. Moral judgments involve the test for universalizability. This is 
categorical as we recognise that the demands of universalisability are 
unconditional. It remains an imperative because while we recognise that the 
resulting judgment is something that we ought to follow, it may subjectively be 
seen as a constraint, as something that we may not always want to follow, 
regardless of knowing that it is what we ought to. How then, is moral law 
affective? What is it that motivates us to follow moral laws, to act from duty and 
subscribe to obligation?  
Kant’s answer resides in the will, or more precisely the good will. “It is 
impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be 
taken as good without qualification, except a GOOD WILL.”27 The will is a faculty 
of choosing only that which reason, independently of inclination, desire, or 
consideration of consequences, recognises as practically necessary (a priori 
synthetic). Kant is defining will through practical reason. He is moving moral 
goodness away from conditional goods, such as virtues and character, in order to 
exclude any taint of contingency, where their dependence on circumstances 
leaves too much leeway for their goodness.  
Morality is thus the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will i.e., to the possible 
giving of universal law by the maxims of the will). The action which can be compatible 
with the autonomy of the will is permitted; that which does not agree with it is 
prohibited. The will whose maxims are necessarily in harmony with the laws of 
autonomy is a holy will or an absolutely good will. The dependence of a will not 
absolutely good on the principle of autonomy is…obligation. The objective necessity of 
an action from obligation is called duty.28 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
against Kantian naturalism can be found in Jennifer Uleman, 2010, An Introduction to Kant’s 
Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A naturalist reading of Kant forms the 
foundation for a pragmatist understanding of Kant and underpins such interpretations as Guyer’s 
and McMahon’s. Eames offers an excellent outline of pragmatic naturalism in general: S. Morris 
Eames, 1977, Pragmatic Naturalism: An Introduction, Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois University Press, and chapter four of Talisse & Aikin, 2007, pp. 84-106. 
27 Kant, GW, [AK 393:1], (Pasternack, Ed., trans. Paton), p. 25. 
28 Kant, GW, [AK 440], (Pasternack, Ed., trans. Paton), p. 57. 
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Kant’s unconditional good will is an attempt to insert necessity and for that 
matter, certainty, into goodness.29  He advocated that reason requires acting 
from a sense of duty and as rational creatures we act dutifully. His point is that 
while we rightly consider the virtues to be valuable, they are not stable. So, in the 
Groundwork Kant discusses the limitation of the virtues in relation to what can or 
cannot be sacrificed. For example, one may forfeit bravery in the face of justice, 
or honesty in the face of cruelty. A ‘good will’, on the other hand, is valuable in 
and of itself.30  
Kant recognised that while society has a role in sanctioning the moral law 
through punishment and so on, the motivational heart of cultivating a ‘good will’ 
can only be respect for the moral law. The good will is good as an end in itself, 
not because of its effects, of what it accomplishes, or because it is competent. It is 
good only because of its willing.31 By outlining a morality of pure practical 
reason Kant is attempting to find a source of our personhood within a sensuous 
world because for Kant, personhood is constituted by our moral capacity. The 
challenge of morality is to be driven only by our naturally imbued rationality, the 
laws of reason, not the physical laws of nature. The function of reason is to 
secure an individual’s happiness (conditional good) and to manifest a good will 
in itself, a will acting out of reason (unconditional good). Our rationality is our 
gift, which allows us to direct the laws of nature so that we secure our own 
happiness and manifest a will that is an end in itself, a will that is reasonable and 
that is effective. We recognise the power of reason to lift us above mere 
compulsions. In this sense, the respect for the moral law ‘falls out of’ reason, a 
hallmark of our rationality.  
 My claim is that this is a naturalistic explanation of the motivational 
aspect of the moral law, which as a law, stands as a command. Moral laws do not 
rest on any end or desire for an end. They are justifiable only if they are 
                                                          
 
29 An excellent discussion, backed by contemporary scientific research, on the difference between 
auto-organisation (determinism) and auto-control (willed actions), how they are both organised 
and determined by nature and how they interface can be found in Barbara Maria Stafford, 2008, 
“The Remaining 10 Percent: The Role of Sensory Knowledge in the Age of the Self-Organizing 
Brain” in James Elkins (Ed.), Visual Literacy, New York: Routledge, pp. 31-58.  
30 The only good thing without any qualification is a ‘good will’. The ensuing discussion is drawn 
from Kant, GW, [AK 437-443], (Pasternack, Ed., trans. Paton), pp. 54-59.  
31 Kant, GW, [AK 394:3], (Pasternack, Ed., trans. Paton), p. 26. 
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universalizable. If we can show that a fully rational agent should act in a certain 
way, then the act is not justified by experience and is therefore a priori, 
necessary and universal. However, as the predicate is not contained in the 
concept ‘rational agent’ so it cannot be derived by analysis. Therefore it is not an 
analytic truth but a synthetic truth (synthetic a priori). Paul Guyer explains: 
Now as Kant points out, there are actually two questions I must ask when I ask whether I 
could will my proposed maxim to be a universal law of nature: first, whether it would 
even be logically possible for me to act on my maxim if everyone else were to do so too; 
and second, even if it would be logically possible for me to will the universalization of my 
maxim, whether that is something I could rationally will, that is, something that would 
be consistent with my willing things in a rational way.32 
 
If any being were perfectly rational, it would automatically act in accordance 
with this law, and the law would therefore not appear to be a constraint. But we 
are not perfectly rational, we have desires and inclinations, and so the moral law 
may end up conflicting with our irrational side. Kant insists that the essence of 
an act’s moral worth is that it be based on an impersonal principle valid for all. 
To test the maxim of the proposed action, we must ask ourselves whether if 
universally adopted, would it further a systematic harmony of purposes of the 
individual and the human race? Kant argues that it must amount to this. As is 
about to become evident, I think it looks like the test of universalizability is 
catching moral worth up in outcomes – in a kingdom of ends – of what is best for 
humanity. This leads us to a pragmatist reading of Kant, which whilst not 
common, is well supported by Kant’s later essays and third Critique, as 
evidenced in the ensuing sections. 
  
4.4 The Interdependence of Moral Motivation, Moral Goodness & 
the Kingdom of Ends 
 
The question of whether moral goodness is interdependent with or independent 
of a kingdom of ends is a contentious topic in contemporary Kantian scholarship. 
John Rawls is an advocate for independence.33 He claims that the good will is 
                                                          
 
32 Paul Guyer, 2006, Kant, New York & London: Routledge, p. 192. 
33 John Rawls, 1989, “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy” in Eckart Forster (Ed.), Kant’s 
Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus postumum, California: Stanford 
University Press, pp. 81-113, p. 93.  
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defined in terms of the moral law, which is arrived at through pure reason. So, 
the kingdom of ends does not need to be worked out, or explained, because if we 
act from duty, as Kant tells us to, then we will necessarily act in accord with the 
kingdom of ends. Paul Guyer, on the other hand, argues that they are 
interdependent, that is, a good will, goodness, is not possible without a 
community-derived ideal.34 I argue that Guyer’s pragmatist interpretation of 
Kant, based on an argument for interdependence between moral goodness and 
the kingdom of ends, explains inadvertently the basis of Dewey’s non-
dichotomous view of experience. 
The view that moral goodness and the kingdom of ends are 
interdependent is useful as it explains the connection between reason and desire 
and provides an explanation of Kantian moral motivation. What’s more, support 
for the interdependent interpretation can be found in several of Kant’s texts. For 
example, in his essay “On The Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory” 
Kant writes: 
The need to assume, as the final end of all things a good that is the highest good in the 
world and also possible through our cooperation is a need [arising] not from a deficiency 
in moral incentives but from a deficiency in the external relations within which alone an 
object as end in itself (as moral final end) can be produced in conformity with these 
incentives. For without some end there can be no will…But not every end is moral (e.g., 
that of one’s own happiness is not), but this must rather be an unselfish one; and the 
need for a final end assigned by pure reason and comprehending the whole of all ends 
under one principle (a world as the highest good and possible through our cooperation) 
is a need of an unselfish will extending itself beyond observance of the formal law to 
production of an object (the highest good).35 
 
Kant’s postulation of a moral final end provides further evidence for the 
interpretation of the interrelatedness between what constitutes moral goodness 
and what constitutes the kingdom of ends. On this view, the realm of ends is the 
goal of morality, what would be realised if everyone followed the categorical 
imperative. Guyer explains: 
I take Kant to mean that while adopting only maxims that treat all others as ends in 
themselves may require that one cannot regard one’s own particular ends as sufficient 
and conclusive reasons for the adoptions of maxims, what it is to treat rational beings as 
ends and not merely as means is precisely to regard all of their ends as worthy of 
                                                          
 
34 Guyer, 2011, pp. 88-120.  
35 Immanuel Kant, 1793, “On The Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory” in Mary J. 
Gregor (Trans. & Ed.), 1996, Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, AK 8:273-8:313, pp. 273-310, [AK FN 8:280], p. 282. Hereafter OCS.  
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promotion just because they have been set by those rational beings in the exercise of the 
rational and free agency that gives them their dignity as ends in themselves.36 
 
We have a moral requirement to treat all rational beings as ends in themselves 
and not merely as means to ends.37 This entails that the realm of ends 
formulation of the categorical imperative requires us to act in accord with moral 
or universalisable ends. Individual and community ends are promoted only if 
they conform to ultimate goodness, or the kingdom of ends. To paraphrase 
Guyer, a world in which the goal of the realm of ends was realised would be a 
moral world.38  
This does not mean that the idea of a kingdom of ends is always explicit in 
one’s moral judgments. The way we judge what is right implies such an end 
implicitly, even if we have never articulated it to ourselves and have never heard 
mention of it. Rather, the idea of an end ‘falls out of’ reason, through the process 
of rationalisation. The categorical imperative is, for example, a characterization 
of the idea of how a moral world would look and can be realised. 
The end that is natural for every rational being might be only his or her own happiness, 
but the end that is determined a priori and necessarily for every rational being through 
pure reason is surely the morality of all and the happiness of all as a consequence of that 
morality, so all rational beings must be able to believe in the possibility of this end for all 
in order to maintain their moral resolve.39 
 
The realm of ends constitutes our goal for making choices about moral actions. 
Kant’s further ‘ends in themselves’40 requirement reinforces the obligation to act 
from duty, or in accord with the realm of ends. The highest good is the condition 
reached if all rational beings were to act in accord with these moral laws. As laws 
they are prescriptions that are necessary components for the ideal moral world.  
As demonstrated in previous sections, Kant argued that as the teachings 
of morality are universally applicable rationally accessible moral laws, they must 
command everyone, no matter what their personal inclinations are. Nonetheless, 
we may recognise that not all of our objectives are pursuable and it is here that 
feelings are pertinent. As Guyer explains, the realization that we cannot always 
                                                          
 
36 Guyer, 2011, p. 91.  
37 Kant’s second formulation of the CI: Kant, GW, [AK 4:429], (Pasternack, Ed., trans. Paton), p. 52. 
38 Guyer, 2011, p. 93. 
39 Guyer, 2011, p. 97. 
40 To treat all rational agents as ends in themselves and never as means. 
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satisfy both our inclinations and our duty causes us pain; this moral feeling is the 
result of respect for the moral law.41 Respect is the moral feeling of pleasure that 
is produced by our decision to adhere to the moral law.42 Unlike Hume, Kant 
argues that feelings are the result of adhering to the moral law, not the instigator 
of doing so. Feelings are not the source of the content of the moral law, nor our 
motive to adhere to it.43 As Kant states in his Introduction to the Doctrine of 
Virtue, the “very concept of duty is already the concept of necessitation of free 
choice through the law.”44 But what support do we have of this? What are the 
metaphysical grounds for Kant’s position that reason affects our feelings? Guyer 
responds that there is none – this is a psychological, not a metaphysical, 
explanation. It is grounded in the observation that reason can affect our feelings 
and that developing one’s feelings of respect and love for others inevitably 
follows from the duty of acting beneficently toward others.45 
Kant’s 1798, Anthropology From A Pragmatic Point of View,46 elucidates 
this point in terms of the difference between anthropology for pragmatic 
purposes, as opposed to physiological ones.47 This demarcation enables Kant to 
provide an explanation of how we discern our inner selves and thus have the 
uniquely human ability to have the idea of ‘I’.48 He calls this ‘pragmatic 
knowledge of the world’ and it involves what a person, as a free agent, makes, or 
can and should make of herself.49 It is this power, this ability to think, or in Kant’s 
                                                          
 
41 Paul Guyer, 1993, Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 360-1. 
42 McCarty offers an interesting and informative discussion of intellectualist vs. affectivist 
interpretations of Kant’s notion of respect for moral law: Richard McCarty, “Kantian Moral 
Motivation and the Feeling of Respect” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 31:3, (July 1993), 
pp. 421-435, pp. 425-427.  
43 Guyer, 1993, p. 360. 
44 Immanuel Kant, 1797, “The Metaphysics of Morals. Part II: Metaphysical first principles of the 
doctrine of virtue”, in Mary J. Gregor (Trans. & Ed.), 1996, Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, [AK 6:373-6:493], pp. 507-603. [AK 6:379], p. 512.  
45 Guyer, 1993, p. 365. 
46 Immanuel Kant, 1798, Anthropology From A Pragmatic Point of View, in Mary J. Gregor, (Trans., 
Intro., Notes), 1974, The Hague: Martinous Hijhoff, pp. 3-27, [AK: 7: 119-148]. Hereafter 
Anthropology.  
47 Holly Wilson offers an excellent account of Kant’s pragmatic anthropology as a method of 
teleological judgment (as found in COPJ) that evaluates contingent means to the final ends of 
human existence. Holly L. Wilson, 2006, Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology: It’s Origin, Meaning and 
Critical Significance, Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 109-122. 
48 Kant, Anthropology, p. 9. [AK: 7: 127]. 
49 Kant, Anthropology, Preface, p. 3. [AK: 7: 119-120]. 
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words, ‘the understanding’ that gives us the ability to discern the ‘I’. In turn, the 
‘I’ must be cultivated to take into account the broader needs of the community, 
lest we end up an egoist.50 Kant is making a connection between freedom and 
thinking that goes beyond learning and involves thinking for one self.  
As we saw in the last section, Kantian ‘understanding’ is more than 
apprehending ideas; it is the ability to abstract what is common between them to 
produce a concept combined with reflection that produces knowledge of the 
object.51 Freedom is increasing knowledge through experience and enlarging 
experience itself through understanding.52 “The opposite of egoism can be only 
pluralism, that is, the attitude of not being occupied with oneself as the whole 
world, but regarding and conducting oneself as a citizen of the world.”53 This is 
the job of anthropology.54 The human ability to abstract ideas from concrete 
objects, demonstrates a freedom of the power of judgment and the autonomy of 
the mind.55 One can conclude from Kant’s discussion in the Anthropology that he 
awards community the role of cultivation, development and tempering of our 
thinking. 
People who have to force themselves to reluctantly abide by the moral 
law never get to feel the happiness and pleasure, via respect, that adherence to it 
produces. They have failed to cultivate the natural propensity of an inward 
commitment to duty. As Kant states: “That being able to communicate one’s state 
of mind, even if only with regard to the faculties of cognition, carries a pleasure 
with it, could easily be established (empirically and psychologically) from the 
natural tendency of human beings to sociability.”56 What is important is that we 
                                                          
 
50 Kant explains that there are three forms of egoism: logical, aesthetic and moral. Kant, 
Anthropology, p. 11. [AK: 7: 130]. The presumption of understanding, or logical egoist, deals in 
the deduction of truths and so considers it unnecessary to test his judgments against the 
understanding of others. The presumption of taste, or aesthetic egoist isolates himself in his own 
judgments of taste and the moral egoist in his own eudemonic happiness, with no thought of 
duty. Mere understanding is egotistic lest it is tempered by participation in community.   
51 Kant, Anthropology, p. 19. [AK: 7: 138]. 
52 Kant, Anthropology, p. 20. [AK: 7: 140]. 
53 Kant, Anthropology, p. 12. [AK: 7: 130]. The use of the term pluralism is not to be interpreted in 
light of value pluralism as discussed in chapter eight. 
54 The Anthropology can be viewed as Kant drawing on the practical conclusions he reached in 
“The Doctrine of the Right” in his 1797, MOM.  
55 Kant, Anthropology, p. 13. [AK: 7: 131]. 
56 Kant, COJ, p. 103, [AK 5: 218]. 
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recognise that these natural predispositions to feeling need to be cultivated 
under the guidance and motivation of the principle of duty.57 Principles are 
incomplete without feelings. “Principles by themselves cannot constitute the 
perfection of ourselves or the happiness of our friends without tender feelings, 
but feelings themselves cannot be relied upon to keep and preserve even our 
deepest attachments without the firm hand of principles behind them.”58 
Because feelings [inclinations] are easily way laid and fragile, they must always 
be governed and cultivated in accordance with reason, that is, in accordance with 
the moral law.  
The connection between the development of understanding and 
knowledge in relation to culture is found in Kant’s 1784 essay Idea of A Universal 
History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective.59 Kant sets out ten propositions in order 
to argue that human actions are determined in accordance with universal 
natural laws.60 He begins with the recognition that humans often act selfishly, 
foolishly, childishly and even destructively. He cites this as evidence that while 
we have the natural capacity to go beyond mere animal instincts, we are by no 
means perfectly rational citizens either.61 This is an attempt to reconcile thinking 
and activity with the laws of nature. Ultimately, he is aiming to at the a-priori 
concept, a universal end, toward which human history is heading, which he calls 
‘cosmopolitanism’. This cosmopolitical end is unconditional and universal, a 
concept of moral and political perfection where the exercise of reason is the 
condition of freedom.  
Humans are the only animals with the natural disposition to reason, 
however it is an ability that can be developed through “experimentation, practice 
and instruction”62 within the species. This is evidenced by the historical progress 
of societies over time and is elucidated by Kant most clearly in propositions 
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58 Guyer, 1993, p. 392. 
59 Immanuel Kant, 1784, “Idea of A Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective” Accessed 
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62 Kant, Cosmopolitan, p. 5, [AK 8:19]. 
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three and four, where he discusses antagonism, or “unsociable sociability”63 as 
nature’s way of developing our rational predispositions to our highest 
humanity.64 “This means that nature employs in order to bring about the 
development of all of the predispositions of humans is their antagonism in society, 
insofar as this antagonism ultimately becomes the cause of a law-governed 
organization of society.”65 Kant is asserting that both sociability and unsociability 
are aspects of human nature that create an essential antagonism out of which 
individual will, desires, preferences, inclinations are forcibly moderated by our 
communal will, desires, preferences, inclinations.  
Kant recognised that the human desire for sociability bolsters our natural 
inclination to selfishness. Allen Wood captures this aspect of Kant’s ethical 
thought in his discussion of ‘unsociable sociability’.66 Wood points out that for 
Kant, the external means for limiting conflict is a crucial aspect of the natural 
development of our faculties.67 Kant’s ethical theory aims to lay out a rational 
plan for how humanity will find rational concord – that is a human society free 
from antagonism, where every free rational being is treated as an end and the 
free development of each has become the free development of all.68 Sociability 
gives the individual recognition and enables her to measure her own self-worth. 
The resistance between the two, the antagonism between self interest and 
sociability, “awakens all human powers and causes human beings to overcome 
their tendency to idleness and, driven by lust for honor, power, or property, to 
establish a position for themselves among their fellows, whom they can neither 
endure nor do without.”69 As social beings we develop our rational powers and 
only become fully human when we feel and understand ourselves as individuals 
who belong to societies. In other words, it is only through community with 
others that we fully realise our individuality. 
                                                          
 
63 Kant, Cosmopolitan, p. 6, [AK 8:20]. 
64 Paul Nadal http://belate.wordpress.com/2011/12/26/kant-cosmopolitan-philosophy-world-
history/ Accessed 15/06/2014 
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Kant’s response to Hume captures the validity of the fear of subjectivity, 
lest moral judgments be whimsical, arbitrary, a case of anything goes.70 The fear 
of incorporating feelings into moral judgments may also be seen as reflecting a 
deeper worry: that decisions based on feelings are irrational and unstable. The 
traditional alternative to such subjectivity is to institute absolutes, a rule-
governed basis of some kind. Jennifer McMahon argues that a pragmatist reading 
of Kant offers us some middle ground in the form of intersubjective agreement.71 
Grounding her view on Kant’s notion of universal communicability and the 
intersubjective validity of judgments of taste, McMahon extends the role that 
Kant awards community.72 McMahon recognises that there is space for the 
incorporation of subjectivity and objectivity in both aesthetic and moral 
judgments precisely at this point of intersubjectivity.  
Guyer’s interpretation of Kantian moral motivation incorporated 
inclination by subsuming it under reason. McMahon builds on this picture: 
“cognition is always an exercise of concepts and understandings whose 
normative grounds involve adjudication between our own judgments and how 
we imagine others would judge.”73 Motivation is thus tied to community – to 
intersubjective agreement. “It is the dignity and sublimity of adopting an outlook 
that we judge all other rational beings would adopt.”74 This connects us back to 
Guyer’s reading of Kant’s theory of pleasure and its relation to communicability. 
Universality in Kant’s sense is expressed in terms of a comparison between one’s 
own judgment and the judgment of others. Within such judgments, there is an 
implicit aim of moving toward consensus, “even if only in direction rather than in 
actual outcome”75 as McMahon points out. 
As the fundamental principle of moral law, the categorical imperative is 
the result of a synthetic a priori judgment and as such exercises a relation 
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between pure reason and experience. The CI is the conclusion of any rational 
being who applies reflection to experience. As such it is a necessary conclusion. 
The a priori aspect enables Kant to assert that obeying the law is not a choice; it 
is a matter of self-constraint. The synthetic aspect provides that in practice, 
when thinking about actions, the individual considers their maxims in light of 
universal laws by implicitly weighing them against some concept of a relevant 
ideal. If we understand Kant as suggesting that we need to hold an ideal kingdom 
or realm of ends in view in order to decide whether the maxim on which one acts 
is universalisable (the interdependent view), we see that he does provide a 
motivational story that goes far beyond the rationalists before him, by 
incorporating key aspects of empiricism and in some respects a veiled and 
remote consequentialism.  
A pragmatist reading of Kant asserts that there must be some 
interdependence between moral goodness and what constitutes the realm of 
ends in order for moral considerations to be motivating. This reading is justified 
by its ability to explain the Kantian relationship between self and society, which 
in turn facilitates a robust account of motivation within universalizability. 
Members of any community have an obligation, a moral duty to act in accord 
with principles that a community of rational agents would agree to and which 
treats all members as ends in themselves not as means. Individual actions are 
not constrained by the moral law in virtue of dogma or external authority. 
Reason finds the moral law in the context of community exchanges, not in a 
person isolated from community or the exercise of sociability. In this way, each 
of us becomes legislators of the moral law. Kant relies upon (and here we can see 
a shadow of Hume) the idea that there is a collective happiness: “…the highest 
good, at least insofar as that can be the aim of our own efforts, while still not the 
motive for morality, is the proper object or goal of it.”76 If the collective 
happiness is the goal, or proper object of morality, has Kant erased the deontic 
aspect of his theory and placed a telos, a felt response to actions (happiness), in 
its place?  
 
                                                          
 
76 Guyer, 2008, p. 55. 
 76 
4.5 Kant in Response to Hume  
 
In treating Kant’s transcendental logical argument as a response to Hume, 
certain aspects of it are foregrounded. By grounding our ideas of causation, 
moral law, the self, and so on, in the a priori Kant shifts our conceptual 
knowledge away from Hume’s psychological account and toward a ‘rational 
empiricism’. As noted above, the kingdom of ends is not a concept we hold prior 
to our morality. Instead, it ‘falls out of’ our exercise of reason. And so we are led 
back to the most apparent gaping fissure between Hume and Kant’s accounts of 
morality: the role of reason. Hume acknowledges the instrumental role of reason, 
but argues that in terms of motivation, reason is impotent. Reason is assigned 
the role of determining the means that will achieve desired ends and a role in 
deliberating about what the desired end is, through the association of the objects 
of reason with particular sentiments. In contrast, Kant argued that reason 
provides the motive, the end and the principles.77 Kant’s emphasis is on 
grounding the moral self in the thinking self. Hume, on the other hand, viewed 
the self first and foremost as a feeling self. Nonetheless, both agree that any 
moral principle must also be a motive for action.78  
In so far as Kant’s philosophical aim can be described as finding secure 
foundations for key principles, it can be seen as a response to Hume’s indictment 
of reason, that is, his assertion that principles rely on experience and custom at 
best or dogmatism at worst. In reply, Kant provides his transcendental proof of 
the synthetic a priori necessity of knowledge of moral laws. Guyer acknowledges 
that at face value the two answers seem worlds apart: “…the difference between 
a philosopher who held that the use of reason is never more than merely 
instrumental to the realization of goals set entirely by sentiment and one who 
held that the fundamental principle of morality must be founded in pure reason 
                                                          
 
77 James King addresses this very point: “Kant and Hume construe differently how the self stands 
relative to morality: for the one being moral consists in being a will necessitated by reason, while 
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is obvious.”79 However, while their theories are in some ways in opposition with 
one another, there are, some points of convergence, particularly in terms of 
moral motivation. Their historical connections to Dewey can be more easily 
discerned by highlighting these similarities.  
Hume outlined the general principles of morals, directly addressing the 
rationalist question of whether these principles are derived from reason or from 
sentiment.80 As far as Hume was concerned, the problem with the rationalist’s 
emphasis on reason was that they cannot account for motivation: “They discover 
truths: but where the truths which they discover are indifferent, and beget no 
desire or aversion, they can have no influence on conduct and behaviour.”81 This 
is why Hume asserts that initial feelings are only secondarily regulated by 
reason. The regulation is motivated by a desire for consistency with oneself and 
agreement and cooperation with others – feelings are mediated by reason in 
order to account for broader sympathetic concerns. Moral judgments are thus 
socially driven generalisations of feelings that assist us in our endeavour to form 
habits that engage with the virtuous and avoid the vicious.  
 In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant provides a response to Hume’s 
skeptical inclinations. He even addresses Hume directly in his discussion of the 
similarity between his synthetic a priori judgments and Hume’s judgments of 
certain kinds that go beyond our concept of the object, such as that of ‘causation’ 
(AK 764-66).82 According to Kant, Hume’s failure to recognise the second 
category of universal truth (synthetic a priori) leaves him unable to forge a path 
between the rational and the empirical. In response, Kant demonstrates that 
human cognitive capacities presuppose a priori cognition and that these are best 
explained by his Transcendental Idealism,83 in which he provides certainty for 
the fundamental principles of experience by removing doubt via a 
                                                          
 
79 Guyer, 2008, p. 8. As the most comprehensive contemporary discussion of the connections 
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80 Hume, Enquiry Morals, I:I 134, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 170. 
81 Hume, Enquiry Morals, I:I 136, Selby-Bigge (Ed.), p. 172. 
82 Cited in Guyer, 2008, p. 14. 
83 But as noted in section 3.2 above, explained in contemporary terms as principles used to 
explain the possibility of cognitive outputs, which are underdetermined by the nature of 
perceptual inputs. 
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transcendental proof. This provides assurance “…that there cannot be any 
theoretical knowledge of the application of these principles beyond the limits of 
experience, to things in themselves, although things in themselves can be 
conceived for practical purposes.”84 Thus in terms of moral law, Kant’s aim was 
to provide a clear formulation of the principle of moral law. Has Kant simply 
found firmer grounds for the rationalist position that Hume derided? If 
happiness and inclination have nothing to do with morality and are perhaps even 
hindered by the moral calculations that we perform, why would anyone act 
morally? The problem of motivation remains for Kant: why would anyone follow 
the first principle? 
 An extension of the naturalised interpretation to a pragmatic reading of 
Kant is based on the idea that he thought that reason could be practical insofar as 
it can produce the motivation that moral action requires. Hume’s reason is 
capable of supervising our desires, so while one may prefer the destruction of 
the world to the scratching of one’s finger, in the context of our larger moral 
lives, this preference would be judged unreasonable. The charge of radical 
selfishness is countered by Hume’s generalisation of humanity via the shared 
feeling of sympathy and it is here that Kant and Hume meet. Hume rightly 
identifies the role that desire plays in terms of motivation. Without feelings of 
concern, for the self, for others, for humanity at large, there is nothing that drives 
us to act. Reason works out which action will best meet our concerns, but it is 
our concerns that are in the driver’s seat. While Kant’s moral feeling results from 
pure practical reason making us feel respect for the moral law, his notion of 
‘collective happiness’ allows him to ground reason in a motivational story similar 
to Hume’s. Both cite humanitarian concerns as the source of our motivation to 
‘do the right thing’. 
As Guyer argues, Kant and Hume agree that we can modify our passions 
and desires, not to extirpate them, because this would lead to “stupid 
insensibility”, but to gain mastery over them or better still – harness them to 
fruitful ends.85 Kant insists reason is the source of such mastery.86 Hume and 
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Kant both understood that the principles of morality cannot be derived from self-
love – community is essential. As Guyer explains, for Kant the feeling of respect 
for the moral law often recruits other more specific feelings to which we have 
some natural disposition, such as feelings of sympathy toward other humans or 
aesthetic feelings toward nonhuman nature, to its own cause.87  In earlier 
writing, Kant had argued that we have a natural feeling for freedom, and pure 
reason is the only way to achieve it. In mature writing, he drops this 
instrumentalist approach but still maintains freedom and autonomy as the 




Kant understood that rationality enables humans to rise above instinctual 
sentimental responses by ruling ourselves rather than being ruled by nature. 
Guyer explains: “Kant’s ultimate idea seems to be that moral worth attaches to 
the active use of our free will, rather than to any inclinations we have, precisely 
because it is this which distinguishes us from all other animals as mere products 
of nature.”88 The rational capacity of humans to hold the concept of morality, to 
choose to rule ourselves by reason, enables us to rise above all other animals. 
This is a theme that Dewey picks up on and develops when he addresses the 
rational capacity of humans in terms of how morality manifests in action through 
reflection:  
Perhaps the most striking difference between immediate sensitiveness, or “intuition,” 
and “conscientiousness” as reflective interest, is that the former tends to rest upon the 
plane of achieved goods, while the latter is on the outlook for something better. The truly 
conscientious person not only uses a standard in judging, but is concerned to revise and 
improve his standard.89 
 
Dewey understood that sentiment couldn’t be isolated from sentience as human 
feelings are saturated with the habits of thought, prior reasonings and social 
interaction. Acknowledging the fundamental role that both reason and 
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sentiment, for example, play in experience reflects aspects of Hume and Kant in 
Dewey’s thought.  
Whilst chapter two made it clear that the foundation of Dewey’s rejection 
of dichotomies is laid by Peirce and James, shadows of this idea can be seen in 
Kant’s treatment of respect. Kant recognised that human development includes 
cultural, moral and aesthetic cultivation. He also recognised that it is only 
through the reconciliation of the antagonism between the individual and social 
will that we can attain this. Without this reconciliation, “all human talents would 
thus lie eternally dormant, and human beings, as good-natured sheep that they 
put out to pasture, would thus give their own lives hardly more worth than that 
of their domesticated animals.”90  
Men of intellectual ability and broadminded disposition! I honor your talents and love 
your feeling for humanity. But have you thought about what you are doing, and where 
your attacks on reason will lead? Without doubt you want to preserve inviolate the 
freedom to think; for without that even your own free flights of genius would soon come 
to an end.91  
 
As rational beings we are imbued with the capacity to live freely within the 
bounds of sociability. Quarrelsome natures are but a part of what it is to be fully 
human for Kant and it is out of this very aspect of human nature, our penchant 
for disagreement and antagonism that the possibility of universality arises. 
At the core of his difference to Kant’s moral theory is Dewey’s aversion to 
the idea that a moral theory must advocate for either ‘being good’ OR ‘doing 
good’.92 Where Kant is concerned with the former, Dewey recognised that means, 
ends and the processes involved in identifying them are equally fundamental to 
moral life. His instrumentalist approach to the deontic tradition changed the 
focus from the irrefutable and conclusive commands of the moral law to its 
various instantiations socially authorized flexible guides to moral action. This 
marks the beginning of Dewey’s expansion of Kant’s project.  
Another parallel can be seen in their treatment of intersubjective 
agreement. A useful discussion is found in McMahon’s argument for 
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intersubjectivity being valuable in terms of leaving room for disagreement. 
Communal exchanges involve comparison and result in judgments that involve 
community endorsement. “Kant writes that aesthetic reflective judgment is a 
kind of sensus communis where the latter is “a power to judge that in reflecting 
takes account…of everyone else’s way of presenting…to compare our own 
judgement with human reason in general.””93 We can apply the same treatment 
to moral judgments. A direct example can be found in Kant’s discussion on the 
relation between free speech and free thought, where he stresses that unless we 
are able to communicate our thoughts to others, our thinking will stagnate.94  
Kant argued that we do not gain knowledge from either intuitions or 
general principles alone; it is always a complex relation between the two. 
Naturalised readings of Kant’s view suggest that it is our humanness and our 
brain functions that imbue us with the capacity to carry out these relations, 
which are informed by the broader social responsibilities to the collective 
happiness. This can be seen in Dewey:  
Out of resembling experiences general ideas develop; through language, instruction, and 
tradition this gathering together of experiences of value into generalized points of view 
is extended to take in a whole people and a race. Through intercommunication the 
experience of the entire human race is to some extent pooled and crystallized in general 
ideas. These ideas constitute principles.95  
 
And later he writes: 
Rules are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things. But principles are intellectual; 
they are the final methods used in judging suggested courses of action…the object of moral 
principles is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to make 
for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in the particular situation in which 
he finds himself.96 
 
In Kant, the ideas of an end and respect for the moral law are transcendental. 
That is, they must be the case in order for morality to be possible. As I've 
expressed earlier, the moral law ‘falls out of’ reason. In Dewey reasoning 
exercised within a ‘community of enquiry’, that is, under the constraints of 
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communicability, are social enquiries that identify principles that facilitate 
sociability – democracy ‘falls out of’ reason in this sense.97  
As we saw in the previous chapter, Dewey takes Hume’s psychological 
empiricism and incorporates it into his account of moral obligation. While he 
agrees that the root of moral obligation is embedded in our impulses and 
passions, he argues that the obligation to resist our immoral impulses and 
passions emerges out of the conflict and interrelationship between our interests 
and the interests of others in the context of intersubjectivity. This explanation is 
helpful in terms of making sense of interminable moral disagreement, 
particularly in terms of understanding how making wrong decisions and 
choosing actions that result in dubious and harmful consequences is possible, 
even with careful thought. According to Dewey, we are concerned to get things 
right, we are motivated to choose moral acts, because we implicitly recognise 
that well functioning communities depend on well functioning individuals. His 
recognition that feelings affect judgment-making at both an individual and 
societal level, alerted him to the need to offer an account that not only aims to 
get things ‘right’ but also to the development of tools, such as ‘discursive’ 
deliberation, that will facilitate such processes to create the context for 
incorporating another’s feedback.98 
Kant recognised that the rationalists and empiricists mistakenly assumed 
that we could know things, as they are in themselves, independent of the 
conditions of our experience of them. Dewey focused on what constitutes an 
experience and how it could interface with rational deliberation. This is where 
he draws upon aspects of Kant’s formulation; an experience, which by definition 
is personal but which nonetheless, engages universal terms. To understand more 
fully how this interface between experience and rational deliberation manifested 
in practice, we turn in the next chapter to a consideration of John Stuart Mill’s 
conception of experience.   
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5. Making Connections: John Stuart Mill & John Dewey 
 
The phenomenon that is morality is, for the utilitarian, best explained in terms of 
its purpose, namely, producing happiness, rather than its cause, acting from duty 
(Kant) or its motivational capacity, giving rise to a sense of disapproval or 
approval (Hume). The telos thus dictates the morality of an act: acts are moral if 
their consequences contribute to happiness. The first principle of morality is 
therefore, to act so as to achieve or contribute to this ultimate end. In order to 
present a more liberal and munificent reading of John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian 
theory and highlight the role that community plays in it, his Utilitarianism1 is 
read in light of his thoughts in On Liberty2. I conclude that Mill can be considered, 
in some respects as the bridge between Hume and Kant on the one hand and 




John Stuart Mill was raised a utilitarian by his father, Scottish philosopher James 
Mill, who was the secretary to the forefather of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham. 
The principle of utility, or the "greatest happiness principle", was the foundation 
for all of Bentham's thought. It identified the telos of moral action as "happiness" 
which he understood as a predominance of "pleasure" over "pain":  
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and 
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine 
what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the 
chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in 
all we say, in all we think.3 
 
Bentham and Mill Snr emphasised the value of rationality and raised Mill on a 
highly intellectual diet in an isolated environment.4 According to Isaiah Berlin, 
this took its toll on the young J.S. Mill and lead to an eventual breakdown and 
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rethinking of the utilitarian theory that he had inherited.5 Mill recognised that 
his emotionally starved education had left a gap in his development.6 He realised 
that while the happiness principle is to be upheld as the overall aim of morality, a 
broader conception of it was needed. A liberal reading of Mill, where the rational 
decision maker is embedded in the social and political realm in which they 
participate, underpins this interpretation. Mill’s broad ends of diversity, 
versatility, spontaneity and uniqueness of a man or group or civilization emerges 
out of his political thought in On Liberty. This facilitates a liberal interpretation of 
his principle of happiness, as found in his Utilitarianism. Acting so as to achieve 
or contribute to happiness is no longer an immutable and fixed ultimate end, 
rather it is a guiding principle that can account for the multifaceted and complex 
nature of happiness of both the individual and society.  
I argue that Mill’s utilitarian telos of happiness must necessarily take the 
individual as well as the society into account, lest we end up with a selfish 
individualistic hedonistic morality. Drawing on his own highly intellectual 
upbringing and eventual mental break down, Mill realised that an internal make-
up that disposes individuals to live moral lives is not only a necessary 
component of a well functioning society but also relies on living in societies that 
evoke sociable feelings. The individual cannot be happy living in a community in 
which a large proportion of people are unhappy. The resulting moral conscience 
is a product of both nature and nurture: it is in equal parts an innate or natural 
sense of duty that is then influenced by the society in which it participates. 
Embedding the telos of happiness within the self in relation to and within 
broader society, ensures that all rational persons will choose the moral act, or 
that which contributes to happiness, as it is in their own and their society’s best 
interest. 
Most of Utilitarianism is concerned with setting out, examining, and 
explaining utilitarianism – why we look at it as a desirable theory and why 
anyone would accept it. In section 5.2 I set out Mill’s principle of moral 
                                                          
 
5 Isaiah Berlin, 1991, “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life” in John Gray & G. W. Smith (Eds.), J. S. 
Mill On Liberty in Focus, London & New York: Routledge, pp.131-161, p. 133. 
6 Mill, Autobiography, pp. 112-119.  
 85 
happiness. This allows me to assess if Mill succeeds in showing that morality is a 
matter of maximising desirable consequences and if his conclusion that the 
ultimate end of happiness is justified. I then examine what Mill understands as 
the sanction for the principle of happiness (5.3). Section 5.4 considers the 
implications of Mill’s concept of ‘experiments in living’ through the lens of the 
collectivism found in Utilitarianism in order to mitigate the apparent 
individualism of On Liberty. The result is a liberal interpretation of Mill that 
introduces the points of connection between Mill and Dewey in section 5.5. The 
chapter ends with a final summary of the place Mill has in the tradition of Hume 
and Kant and how in the historical trajectory of this thesis, it provides a bridge 
from Kant to Dewey (5.6). 
 
5.2 Mill’s Principle of Moral Happiness 
 
As we saw in chapter four, Kant determined the foundations for the possibility of 
morality. As we will see in the following chapters, Dewey focuses on how 
morality was manifested in experience. Mill took an a posteriori view, where 
judgments of right and wrong remained fallible. For example, a recurring theme 
in On Liberty is the value of freedom of thought in regards to forming opinions 
and warranted beliefs. “Strange it is, that men…acknowledge that there should 
be free discussion on all subjects which can possibly be doubtful, but think that 
some particular principle or doctrine should be forbidden to be questioned 
because it is so certain, that is, because they are certain that it is certain.”7 Mill 
champions the fallibilist idea that all topics, from science through to morality, 
remain in principle questionable and open to disproof. If Kant thought that we 
left behind dogma, then Mill surely goes much further. According to Mill, the best 
that human reason admits of are “beliefs which we have most warrant for, [but 
which nonetheless provide,] no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to 
the whole world to prove them unfounded”.8 Mill argued that the criterion of 
good opinion needed to be thoroughly questioned. For an empiricist like Mill, 
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this is the only way that knowledge can be attained and this is the sum total of 
certainty that is available to fallible human beings. 
A difficulty facing Mill throughout his utilitarian treatise is the recognition 
that there is an ultimate end and that the positing of happiness as the ultimate 
end, does not admit of proof beyond intuition.9 The positing of an ultimate end is 
nothing more than an empirical resort to one’s own and other people’s 
experiences. It is a conclusion about the purposes and goals of action. The proof 
rests solely on the intellectual perception of a basic ‘truth’. 
Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to 
be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good 
without proof…If, then, it is asserted that there is a comprehensive formula, including all 
things which are in themselves good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as an end, 
but as a means, the formula may be accepted or rejected, but is not a subject of what is 
commonly understood by proof.10 
 
Mill wants to demonstrate that the one and only morally significant 
consequence, or purpose of morality, can only be happiness. Happiness is the 
ultimate end and no other proof, other than the matter of fact that people desire 
their own happiness, is possible. Nonetheless, Mill develops the telos of 
happiness so that it incorporates the broad multifaceted end that he seems to 
have had in mind. For example, Mill treats the principle of utility as the ‘Greatest 
Happiness Principle’: 
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals “utility” or “the greatest happiness 
principle” holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; 
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended 
pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of 
pleasure…pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and 
that all desirable things…are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as 
means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.11 
 
It is important to remember that when Mill talks about pleasure, he isn’t talking 
about “frivolity and the mere pleasures of the moment.”12 Morally significant 
consequences are those that lead to more than mere sensuous moments of 
happiness, or the hedonist gratification of individual pleasure. While utility 
equals pleasure and pleasure equals happiness, each aspect goes beyond how 
they are standardly conceived. Pleasure is what happiness is and happiness is a 
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desirable consequence of actions. As Mill states: “I regard utility as the ultimate 
appeal on all ethical questions: but it must be utility in the largest sense, 
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.”13 
In order to further restrain the hedonistic tilt, Mill embeds his notion of 
happiness relative to the good of the community, rather than any individual. In 
On Liberty Mill commits us to the cultivation of the intellect and judgment of 
mankind. He calls this the ‘cultivation of the understanding’.14 This is a direct 
criticism of and a call to revolt against the tyranny of the majority: 
There needs protection…against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; 
against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own 
ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the 
development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony 
with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its 
own.15 
 
Mill offers the ‘cultivation of the understanding’ as a protective device against 
political despotism and calls for the recognition that rules merely seem self-
evident and self-justifying because they are so embedded in custom. At the heart 
of these customs is the practical principle that human conduct is regulated by a 
“feeling in each person’s mind that everybody should be required to act as 
he…would like them to act.”16 
The purpose of Mill’s definition of utilitarianism as the attainment of 
pleasure and the absence of pain is to emphasise the production of consequences 
that produce pleasure not pain and thus contribute to happiness. Put plainly, we 
are striving for morally significant consequences because they are desirable in 
them selves, and produce happiness. More often than not, the principle of 
happiness, as qualified in this way, will be sufficient for making moral judgments, 
in suitably socialised individuals – a point we will return to later. The first 
principle of utility, namely that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only 
things desirable as ends, is based on the notion that pleasure is the only 
desirable end. The principle is a normative statement about moral ends: it is 
                                                          
 
13 Mill, On Liberty, p. 31. 
14 The notion of the ‘cultivation of the understanding’ is discussed throughout the second chapter 
of Mill, On Liberty, pp. 36-71. 
15 Mill, On Liberty, p. 26. 
16 Mill, On Liberty, p. 27. 
 88 
morally right or good to produce some desirable consequence. Things are thus 
desirable in so far as they are means to or tend to produce these ends.  
Mill offers a weak justification for his normative conclusion that 
happiness is the only desirable consequence of actions. His answer rests on the 
ultimate end argument; happiness is what human beings are really striving for 
and as this is an ultimate end, it does not admit of proof, or at least not logical 
proof. Two related problems arise. Firstly, how does Mill contain his notions of 
pleasure and happiness to those that are morally significant? Secondly, 
happiness is a very ambiguous telos and qualifications in terms of pleasure and 
the absence of pain do very little to clarify exactly what Mill means by happiness. 
Reading Utilitarianism in light of On Liberty offers us some assistance in terms of 
containing and explaining what constitutes moral happiness. 
Isaiah Berlin describes Mill’s notion of happiness as something that 
“comes to mean something very like ‘realisation of one’s wishes’, whatever they 
may be.”17 While Berlin’s account captures the broadness of Mill’s notion of 
happiness, it does not address the first problem outlined above, namely how Mill 
contains ‘one’s wishes’ to morally significant consequences. After all, when we 
talk about anything being the only end or the only desirable end, there is a 
danger that the notion, in this case pleasure, will have to be so broad as to 
include everything. A solution is to embed Mill’s notions of utility, pleasure and 
happiness in the good of the community, as described in On Liberty. This enables 
Mill to ensure that ‘one’s wishes’ are moral.  
When viewed as a socially grounded notion that is only ever fully realised 
within the broader context of the individual participating in community and 
leading a fulfilling, flourishing and moral human life, Mill’s ‘happiness’ is 
accorded moral stability. Thus such pleasures as freedom, justice and liberty are 
the means, the instruments of happiness and so stand as exemplars of the moral 
life. Individual conceptions of happiness are not limited to self-regarding 
hedonistic pursuits of happiness. They include values such as democracy, liberty 
and freedom, that is, pleasures that are tempered by community values and 
promote the flourishing of everyone. This community-bound view of happiness 
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enables the incorporation of the broader factors involved in Mill’s theory of the 
good, such as the community as a condition of individual happiness. 
The second problem for Mill is that happiness is a very ambiguous telos. A 
possible response is to think about Mill’s happiness as being more like Aristotle’s 
eudemonia.18 For Aristotle, eudemonia resulted from living an active life that is 
governed by reason. Thus eudemonic happiness is more akin to well being or 
living well than the highs of an individual’s emotions, for example. The idea is 
that if we combine the happiness that is grounded in the good of the community 
with eudemonic happiness, or a ‘life well lived’ then we end up with a rich 
description of happiness that is morally significant. This interpretation is 
supported by Mill’s own presentation of happiness in terms of a public and 
private life that is imbued with liberty, variety and justice. As Mill states: 
I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the 
largest sense, grounded in the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those 
interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to external 
control, only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the interests of other 
people. 19 
 
So, while the happiness telos is broad, in terms of potential contributors, it is also 
quite specific in terms of being more than, say, an individual’s mood. We can see 
how Mill constrains the ambiguity of the telos of happiness by grounding utility 
in the permanent interests of humanity, rather than the interests of any one 
person’s desires. While this provides evidence of his embedding morality in the 
good of the community, the question of what is/not included on the list of 
contributors to moral happiness remains. 
Mill is careful to distinguish the relevant pleasure from mere gratification 
of individual desires. He does this by highlighting that there are qualitative 
differences between the higher (intellectual) and lower (sensuous) pleasures: 
Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both 
give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that 
is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently 
acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though 
knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it 
for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in 
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ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality so far outweighing quantity 
as to render it, in comparison, of small account…It is better to be a human dissatisfied 
than a pig satisfied.20 
 
According to Mill, this is a naturalistic account based on the unique human 
feature of dignity. Pleasures of the intellect are preferable because they are 
dignified, whereas pleasures of sensation, which we share with other animals, 
are not.21 The idea is that we prefer, or at least recognise the superiority of those 
pleasures, which take particular account of this feature of being human. Ranking 
intellectual pleasure, above sensuous pleasure because of the dignity it accrues 
to the subject, is analogous to preferring actions that represent our capacity to 
raise ourselves above self-interest. Human nature responds to the community 
context by choosing actions that have morally significant outcomes.  
Mill’s contention that humans will choose pleasures of the intellect over 
pleasures of the body is based solely on empirical evidence. Humans experience 
both the higher and lower pleasures and do in fact prefer higher pleasures (all 
else being equal) as those with the highest value. This is a naturalist account of 
preference that identifies as evidence the uniquely human capacity to find 
pleasure in the intellectual, to go beyond sensual pleasures, as evidence. Reading 
Mill’s political and moral theories together strengthens this account. As John 
Gray argues, Utilitarianism provides an argument for the qualitative superiority 
of intellectual happiness, On Liberty analyses the social order in which these 
interests can be pursued and in which a certain level of cultural and moral 
development has been generally achieved.22 Mill takes Hume’s positive feeling 
and transforms it into a moral compass that demands intellectual understanding 
of one’s actions. Empirical evidence supports his argument that humans prefer 
and therefore choose acts that demonstrate discrimination and judgment over 
and above those that do not. This is not to say that all people, at all times, will 
choose in this way, but that, as Gray states, “a preference for activities involving 
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the exercise of autonomous thought and of capacities of imagination and 
discrimination will dominate the lives of experienced judges.”23 
 
5.3 The Sanction of the Principle of Happiness 
 
The community context is crucial to Mill’s account. Perhaps the clearest way to 
demonstrate this is to examine the link between Mill’s political and moral 
thought. As we saw earlier, the key principle of Utilitarianism is the Greatest 
Happiness Principle.24 Mill states that the object of his essay On Liberty is to: 
…assert one very simple principle…that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, 
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others. His own good, either physical or moral is not sufficient warrant. 
 
On an individual level liberty includes the liberty of thought and feeling, the 
freedom of opinion and preference, of taste and pursuits. Societies are composed 
of individuals who all participate in various communities, so if we scale 
individual liberty to the level of community, we find that the two are inextricably 
linked and that link is through actions and their ensuing consequences. Merging 
the principle of liberty with the principle of happiness results in a community-
bounded utilitarianism and a clearer statement of what constitutes moral 
happiness: that which produces the most happiness is a civilised community that 
promotes liberty of action. 
In such a community, individuals participate in societies that recognise 
the higher pleasures as a way of conceiving of a state of affairs as unified and 
resolved. It is a mental state that is achieved through the taking of actions that 
result in consequences that contribute to the eudemonic happiness of the 
individual cognisant of the impact of their actions on others and their society in 
general. Humans are progressive beings and thus their interests and the 
interests of the societies in which they participate change, in accord with deeper 
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and broadening understandings. While this view is not directly attributable to 
Mill, it does emerge out of the combination of his two principles. As we will see in 
chapter six, it is this aspect of utilitarianism, the self-realisation that Dewey 
extends to community-realisation. 
In chapter four of Utilitarianism, “Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle 
of Utility”, Mill offers a meta-ethical explanation of what gives the principle of 
happiness its binding force. The question driving this chapter is: Why would 
anyone take utilitarianism as their personal, prescriptive practical principal? 
What motivates us to act morally? He offers the relationship between laws and 
sanctions to illustrate his point. Laws are sanctioned by punishments, that is, the 
incentive to obey the law is to avoid punishment. For example, the law says that 
you cannot kill someone. The sanction or the motivation to obey this law is the 
consequence of defying it, that is, varying degrees of jail sentences. Thus people 
follow laws, act on them, because they are afraid of punishments. What is the 
sanction then for the utilitarian principle? 
Mill is asking much broader questions of morality in general: Why should 
I be moral? Why should I behave according to what is morally required? Why 
should moral requirements matter to me when deciding what to do? The first 
principle of utilitarianism is grounded in the meta-ethical theory that the good is 
that which tends to promote happiness. This is a generalisation of the natural 
feeling of unity that we share with our fellow humans, a deeply rooted human 
characteristic and an essential aspect of our consciousness. The secondary 
principles of custom and the consecration of morality through education and 
opinion, builds the foundation for the role of duty. 
Those sanctions are either external or internal. The external…are the hope of favor and 
the fear of displeasure from our fellow creatures…for whether there be any other ground 
of moral obligation than the general happiness or not, men do desire happiness…they 
desire and commend all conduct in others toward themselves by which they think their 
happiness is promoted…The internal sanction of duty…a feeling in our own mind; a pain, 
more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral 
natures rises…into shrinking from it as an impossibility. This feeling, when disinterested 
and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty…is the essence of conscience.25 
 
Mill is asserting that duty has both an internal and external power over us. Our 
hope of favour and fear of displeasing others, or God, as well as our fear of 
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punishment, provide the external sanctions. The internal, our conscience, is a 
feeling in our minds, which can be cultivated and intensified by the pain (and 
presumably pleasure), which comes to be associated with it. 
Mill recognised that external sanctions, in the form of punishments, are 
useful tools of moral development. So, for example, initially we obey and 
dutifully follow the laws of our society, then, with moral maturation, one begins 
thinking for oneself and will, at times, realise that the moral thing to do conflicts 
with external sanctions. 
So long as they are co-operating, their ends are identified with those of others; there is at 
least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their own interests. Not only 
does all strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each 
individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others, it 
also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good, or at least with an 
even greater degree of practical consideration for it.26 
 
Acting morally is in our own interest and the interest of others. This is the 
incentive to give and receive, to participate in society. This sounds somewhat 
like what a social contract theorist would say, that is, moral rules are the rules of 
cooperation that rational people would agree to comply with on the condition 
that others comply with them too. Mill would certainly agree with the idea that 
we are motivated to act morally by our desire to participate in and receive 
rewards from participating in well functioning societies, however he is not a 
social contract theorist.27 For Mill, cooperation is something that emerges by 
being in a community, not something that motivates you to join that community. 
Reading Mill’s ethical and political theories together allows us to come to 
a pragmatic understanding of his concept of duty. Where Kant’s duty is based on 
a concept of what constitutes rational behaviour, Mill argues that acting morally 
is in our own interest and the interest of others and it is this and this alone that 
sanctions moral action. Happiness is the one thing that all humans strive for – it 
is a part of human nature. Humans also live in societies. Being in societies raises 
sociable feelings hence individual happiness depends on community happiness. 
The incentive to give and receive, to participate in society, to act morally is thus 
inextricably tied to one’s own happiness, which is heightened by the happiness of 
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others. Millsian societies cooperate with external sanctions, rules or laws, in 
order to maximise happiness. Moral obligation is manifested as a desire to 
maximise our own happiness, moderated by our participation in society, rather 
than as a contractual agreement conditioned on the compliance of others. 
That happiness is the thing that all humans strive for and that pleasures 
of the intellect are prioritised, is an empirical fact for Mill. Moral acts are based 
on observation of particular instances in experience. Moral norms are nothing 
more than general principles, whether or not they are upheld is a matter of 
public (external) and private (internal) sanction based on the human disposition 
to seek pleasure and avoid pain. The sanction for the principle of happiness is 
thus both internal and external. Internally, all humans strive for happiness. 
Externally, there is the recognition that happiness is enhanced by well 
functioning societies. 
 
5.4 ‘Experiments in Living’ 
 
In chapter three of On Liberty,28 Mill offers an empirical account of learning to be 
good, based on the idea that we learn through ‘experiments in living’.29 This is 
also where Mill’s ideas on the relation between the individual, society and 
collectivism are developed, where individualism is conceived of relative to the 
role that the individual plays in society. Mill recognised that as there are plural 
conceptions of the good, there are many different ‘experiments in living’.30 As 
liberty entails individual choices, be they good or bad, ‘experiments in living’ give 
people the opportunity to develop ideas, make mistakes and learn from them. 
The idea is that experimental lives are a valuable resource to the social progress 
of society and they validate the idea of freedom and liberty – individuals cannot 
be harnessed in case we limit the possibilities for social growth.  
By reading the two texts together, the collectivism of Utilitarianism is 
balanced out by the individualism of On Liberty. Mill supports individualism only 
insofar as it is a way to develop better societies. Societies function better if they 
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are made up of excellent individuals, who are permitted to make mistakes and in 
doing so identify possibilities for growth. It is only through ‘experiments in 
living’ that unusual and different ideas will emerge. Our moral duty, which we 
identify in part by the pleasure it gives us, is to participate in society, to develop 
ourselves while holding the idea of the benefits to others in mind. This is a 
socially progressive view, where individual liberty is balanced against societal 
needs, as opposed to the pursuit of hedonistic self-interests. A commitment to 
collective happiness is therefore a pre-requisite to individual happiness. 
We are now able to present morality and politics as two interrelated 
aspects of how to live a eudemonic life: how to make good choices that contribute 
to individual and societal happiness. When we view the Greatest Happiness 
Principle in light of his political theory, we save Mill from being labeled an ethical 
egoist, a hedonist or from thinking that society, government, institutions and so 
on, have no place in individual’s lives. Quite the opposite is true. Evelyn Brister 
explains: 
Mill comes back again and again to the idea that society has, can, and will progress. But 
that progress is built on two things: first, that people have liberty to change their lives in 
ways that are an improvement over past ways of living; and second, that they are 
motivated to develop and build the society, as a collective, rather than (just) to tend their 
own self-interests.31 
 
Moral happiness does not emanate from self-love, that is, from tending solely to 
one’s own interests. The state has an interest in making sure that choices in how 
to live are available. The only stipulation is that an individual’s choices do not 
harm others.32 
Aspects of Dewey are foreshadowed in Mill when Mill discusses the 
connection between individual modes of life, character, conduct and judgments 
through an explication of experience.33 For example, Mill relates in his 
autobiography that his experience of depression led him to realise that the 
experimental childhood his father James Mill and his mentor Jeremy Bentham 
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subjected him to, was lacking. Mill was raised to “desire the maximization of 
social utility as his primary end”34 which, as Elizabeth Anderson points out in her 
insightful analysis of the impact of Mill’s depression on his theory, is no doubt a 
noble cause, but nonetheless one which failed to account for the higher pleasures 
and as such failed to be of any use to Mill when in the depths of depression.35 
Interestingly, Mill attributed the cure for his depression to the poetry of William 
Wordsworth and Samuel Coleridge,36 a discovery that guided him to understand 
the qualitative differences between higher and lower pleasures. 
Anderson argues that Mill’s higher pleasures, namely the moral, aesthetic 
and sympathetic, are characteristic of the higher faculty of good.37 On this view 
the moral perspective appeals to our conscience and arouses feelings of approval 
or disapproval in reaction to the pleasure or pain an action causes. There is a 
direct affect where the aesthetic, for example, appeals to our imagination, 
arousing feelings of admiration or contempt and the sympathetic appeals to 
fellow feeling, arousing feelings of love, pity and dislike. Mill realised that 
Bentham’s account of happiness could not make sense of these characteristics, 
which are good in themselves and as such, seemingly pursued for their own 
sakes, while at the same time promoting the characteristics necessary for a 
functional community. Bringing his political and utilitarian theories together 
gives us a way through this dilemma. 
Mill reconstructed his moral theory in light of its ability to provide him 
with the tools to face a crisis. He modified his conception of the good to include 
what was intrinsically valuable and then offered a cultivational account of how 
the individual is motivated to pursue these higher goods. Why? Because a 
creative life, an experimental life, a free life, is far more rewarding.38 As 
Anderson points out, Mill’s own experience of depression, forced him to engage 
with the crisis as a means to working out “a way of life that relieves the suffering 
and sets new goals [that Mill] recognizes as worthwhile, and for a new theory 
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which can explain the failures of the old way of life and the successes of the 
new.”39 A key to Mill’s moral theory is the recognition that the higher pleasures 
direct us to the ideals of action and are only experienced if we are free to 
experiment, free to explore different possible ways of life that may contribute to 
these higher community bound pleasures.40 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
The crucial role of feeling and attitude in Hume’s understanding of moral 
motivation and ends, and the prominence of reason in Kant’s, are, as we will see 
in chapter six, relevant to Dewey’s conception of experience. Mill’s view 
highlights an important aspect in regards to the relationship between theory and 
practice: we revise moral norms on the basis of intellectual reflection on actions 
and their consequences, in terms of the effects on the self and society in general. 
Rather than just pigeon hole this as consequentialism, it is important to keep in 
mind Kant’s a priori synthetic moral law (the categorical imperative) as the basis 
for the possibility of moral norms. Norms are contingent (synthetic) while the 
moral speaks to us of universality (a priori). Further to this, borrowing from 
Hume, according to Mill, feelings like higher pleasures can be cultivated to guide 
us to moral ends. We will see that this liberal interpretation of Mill, fostered by 
reading his Greatest Happiness Principle in light of his Principle of Liberty 
provides us with the foundations for Dewey’s proceduralist account. 
Nobler sentiments, dispositions to experience Mill’s higher feelings, 
enable us not only to judge what is moral, beautiful and brave, for example, but 
to also seek them over and above the lower pleasures. This is because they have 
a cognitive, not merely phenomenal, dimension.41 Only those who have 
experienced the higher and lower pleasures are qualified to differentiate 
between higher and lower qualities of goods and so judge accordingly. As 
Anderson observes, Mill’s psychological analysis offered utilitarian theory two 
new dimensions: 
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First…a new kind of sentiment...aroused a recognition of values distinct from pleasure... 
Cultivation aroused by the sentiments, not by associating their objects with external 
pleasures but by attuning the agent to dimensions of value internal to the sentiments—
values which could not be experienced apart from sentiments…second...a new kind of 
pleasure…the pleasures we take in the conscious realisation of other values.42 
 
Mill’s personal experience, his own various life experiments, allowed him to 
strengthen the connection of the self to society. Underpinning his thesis is the 
understanding that one cannot maintain a passion for helping humanity unless 
they have cultivated a feeling of unity with other people. Without the cultivation 
of feelings of empathy, if we simply pursue our own pleasures, we miss out on 
the higher pleasures. By binding the attainment of higher pleasures to the 
cultivation of moral motives and by linking individual happiness to social 
happiness, Mill secures firm grounds for moral motivation.  
Mill’s ideas in regards to the higher pleasures and ‘experiments in living’ 
are arguably made more explicit by Dewey, who maintained that experience is 
an amalgamation of primary sensation AND reflection.43 The reflective aspect of 
experience provides Dewey with an account that emphasises the role of both self 
and community-realisation. 
Our [Dewey & Tufts] own theory gives both self and consequences indispensable roles. 
We have held…that neither one can be made to be merely a means to the other. There is 
a circular arrangement. The self is not a mere means to producing consequences because 
the consequences, when of a moral kind, enter into the formation of the self and the self 
enters into them.44 
 
Mill and Dewey recognised that actions have consequences – not only in terms of 
outcomes – but also in terms of transformation of the self and others (as did 
Hume, see 3.4). We can think of this in terms of actions being effective and 
affective. Effects are the outcomes or consequences of actions, accessible insofar 
as they contribute to adjudicating ethical problems. Affects are the consequences 
of actions that shape the formation of the self. So our actions impact on our 
environment and in turn, define the self. 
Mill and Dewey agree that the inherent social nature of human beings 
entails that we weigh up our actions in terms of their possible consequences 
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both on others and ourselves, but Dewey did not think that this consideration 
alone was enough for motivational necessity.  
The identity of self and an act, morally speaking, is the key to understanding the nature 
of motives and motivation. Unless this unity is perceived and acknowledged in theory, a 
motive will be regarded as something external acting upon an individual and inducing 
him to do something…this view…leads to the conclusion that the self is naturally, 
intrinsically, inert and passive, and so has to be stirred or moved to action by something 
outside itself…the self…is always active; that it acts by its very constitution, and hence no 
external promise of reward or threat of evil to induce it to act. This fact is confirmation 
of the moral unity of self and action.45 
 
Dewey is emphasising the point that selfhood, or character, is not a mere means 
of natural forces but rather it has agency. This active self is a causal agent that 
embodies the sentimental and rational aspects of human nature.   
Dewey echoes Mill’s distinction between low and high pleasures with his 
distinction between what is valued immediately in impulse and unreflective 
habit, as compared to what is valued reflectively. However, Dewey attempts to 
avoid separating them so categorically in practice.  Dewey’s unification of the 
two offers a naturalistic account of our highly sensitive capacity for awareness of 
incompatible preferences, a state of unsettledness that triggers reflection and the 
need for deliberative choice. 
Incompatible preferences hold each other in check. We hesitate, and then hesitation 
becomes deliberation: that weighing of values in comparison with each other of which 
we have already spoken. At last, a preference emerges which is intentional and which is 
based on consciousness of the values which deliberation has brought into view. We have 
to make up our minds, when we want two conflicting things, which of them we really 
want. That is choice. We prefer spontaneously, we choose deliberately, knowingly.46 
 
Placing the reflective method of enquiry, the process itself, in the primary 
position rather than any fixed answers to questions about the good, 
distinguishes the implications of Dewey’s account clearly from Mill’s. No single 
outcome – such as happiness – guides all decisions, instead, emphasis is placed 
on the process and participation in enquiry. For Dewey, a moral life is 
participation in a process, which aims to identify best thinking practices that, will 
contribute to human life. This is a process that reduces the ills of society by 
reducing or removing obstacles to social cooperation through the 
implementation of (democratic) communication, or communication properly so 
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called.47 While Mill recognised that communication is an essential part of 
criticism and verification, Dewey treated critique and warrantability as the 
defining features of social and individual development.48 
Holding someone liable for their actions, holding them responsible, is a 
method of making people aware of their individual and social obligations to 
themselves and others. As Dewey puts it: “One is held responsible in order that 
he may become responsible, that is, responsive to the needs and claims of others, 
to the obligations implicit in his position.”49 The idea of self-realisation is that 
holding someone liable for their actions, for what they do, is used as a tool for 
self-transformation. The processes involved in self-realisation create the 
conditions for the revision of action. 
In the strictest sense it is impossible for the self to stand still; it is becoming, and 
becoming for the better or worse. It is in the quality of becoming that virtue resides. We 
set up this and that end to be reached, but the end is growth itself. To make an end a final 
goal is to arrest growth.50 
 
This emphasis on self-realisation echoes Mill, but Dewey makes it more explicit. 
This can be clearly seen in Dewey’s non-dichotomous treatment of motives as 
both those interests, which form the core of the self and supply principles; and 
as objects, be they perceived or thought of, which effect an alteration in the 
direction of activity.51 As Dewey puts it, benevolence is not something, which a 
man has; it is something that a man is.52 Such qualities are modes of activity, not 
forces that produce actions.53 
Dewey’s vision is to instantiate the capacity to reflect as the bedrock from 
which all individuals conduct their behaviour. As there is no single fixed criterion 
for decision-making, no telos, all considerations about what to do are matters for 
(democratic) communication and decision-making. Democracy is not a political 
system for Dewey; it is a way of life. The democratic life is one where members of 
societies have relationships with each other that are grounded in mutual respect 
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and regard. Dewey turned the focus away from Millsian ends toward process. 
This emphasis on the value of the communication process, leaves room for 
disagreement as it appreciates that whilst a final, fix-all solution or universal 
agreement may not be found, it is this very scope for disagreement that 
characterises an evolving and dynamic community. 
Moral judgments are not inclinations or personal preferences. As a 
judgment they are consistent with a constellation of feelings, associations, habits 
of mind (Hume) and are comparable, communicable judgments (Kant). In Kant 
the comparative aspect emerges out of intersubjectivity, that is, a comparison 
with what others would judge. Interpreting Utilitarianism in light of On Liberty 
enables us to explore the cultivational aspect of the higher pleasures within an 
individual’s obligation to society. Mill is offering us a psychological explanation 
for why individual freedom, as set out in On Liberty is tempered by our 
understanding of the good. His assertion that the higher goods are good in 
themselves, allows him to incorporate ideals into his theory. Arguably, and given 
the historical tracing of ideas in this thesis, we can view Mill as tempering the 
Humean idea of the sentiments with these higher evaluative standards. Our 
moral judgments are justified if they refer to the higher goods, which 
importantly are not knowable a-priori, but are the outcome of ‘experiments in 
living’. We appeal to ideals in order to make claims about some goods being 
intrinsically higher than others, or to criticize a decision, preference or desire. 
But it is experience, shaped by human constants, (a kind of Kantian a-priority) 
that gives us these ideals. In terms of experimenting with how to live, Mill’s 
discussion of freedom is moderated by the individual’s understanding of the 
intrinsic value of the higher goods, for both the self and the society. 
The seeds of these ideas can be traced from Hume to Kant through Mill to 
Dewey. An idea shared by all four is that we can only be free as individuals 
within communities, lest we be brutes, compelled by our animalistic instincts. 
This is a naturalistic explanation of what it is to be human, explicitly, to have the 
rational capacity to temper our inclinations. Through the cultivation of the 
higher goods (Mill), including the sociability required of tranquility of the 
sentiments (Hume), reflective judgment and reason (Kant) and higher pleasures 
(Mill) we become truly free. Mill can account for why there is such human 
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diversity in terms of preferences and sources of pleasure and pain, a state that 
necessitates a corresponding diversity in modes of life.54 The substantiation of 
ideals, of the higher goods, enables him to temper individual desire through the 
understanding that “it is possible to judge one way about the good, but to feel 
quite differently about it”.55 He is advocating for the freedom to live an 
experimental life that in turn arbitrates societal customs, lest they stagnate and 
fester, becoming impediments to progress.  
Mill embeds the rational decision maker in the social and political realm, 
in which they participate, which in turn, embeds the telos of happiness in a self 
within broader society. By scaling individual liberty to the level of community, 
we end up with a broad community-bound utilitarianism that ensures that all 
rational persons will choose the moral act. Individuals participate in societies 
that weigh their moral judgments with consequences that contribute to 
eudemonic happiness simply because acting morally is in their own and others 
interests. Seeing Mill as a precursor to Dewey clarifies the community impact on 
the individual but in turn, seeing Mill’s influence on Dewey, reminds us of 
aspects of Mill often overlooked. Mill introduces the idea of higher pleasures and 
accounts for how they emerge in experience through reflection. He attaches 
higher pleasures to ends, which enhance community and long term absence from 
pain. As such, Mill addresses the interface between rational deliberation and 
experience, accounting for how we are motivated to act to achieve rationally 
identified ends. It was now up to Dewey to flesh this out in terms of insights 
gained from both psychological theory and epistemological pragmatism of the 
early 20th Century. Our different historical trajectory sets us to now turn to 
Dewey’s vision of instantiating habits of social enquiry, as the bedrock from 
which individuals conduct their behaviour through a process of democratic 
communication and decision-making. 
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6. John Dewey’s Experience 
 
I focus on the role of Dewey’s conception of experience as a foundation for his 
revision of previous accounts of how an event either is meaningful or 
alternatively, acquires meaning. Dewey thinks of an event as experienced rather 
than perceived. In this way he can argue that in constituting an event, we imbue 
it with meaning – a process engages background and foreground learning 
respectively. Importantly for Dewey, experience is constructed by terms 
developed within communities and for this reason, language and communication 




Throughout Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology,1 
Dewey addresses his theoretical predecessors, Hume, Kant and Mill. He 
demonstrates that as morality is largely concerned with controlling human 
nature, it is only from observation of human nature that we can learn how to be 
moral. Drawing on the shortfalls of the earlier theorists strengthens this thesis. 
The problem, as Dewey sees it, is that the rules of morality and the ends to which 
they aim have been so divorced from human nature that their realisation is 
impossible. He thus sets out to develop a moral theory, which offers a tenable 
and attainable moral life grounded in intelligent conduct. 
Dewey thought that by divorcing morals from the actualities of human 
physiology and psychology, morality had become too caught up in the negatives; 
observing prohibition, avoidance of evil, not doing things, and so on. Treating 
morality in the negative has meant that we psychologise wrongness, badness and 
evil as reasons for social out-casting and rightness, goodness and altruism as 
indicators of Godliness. This, he argues, has led to morality being in the hands of 
religious institutions, which often cannot agree and fail to be consistent in their 
teachings. In response, Dewey locates the source of morality in intersubjective 
agreement, human relations and the nuances of a situation. Dewey recognised 
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that an adequate ethical theory must be able to identify, explain and offer a 
process for taking all features of the moral life into consideration. Things such as 
character (virtues), acts (rules and outcomes), context, intelligence (rational 
reasoning) are all essential aspects of Dewey’s proceduralist theory of reflective 
ethical conduct. 
There is a sense in which, Dewey’s ethics derives from considering Kant’s 
unification of pure and practical reason in the third Critique (section 4.2) and 
Mill’s idea of ‘experiments in living’ (section 5.4). Modeled on the method of 
scientific enquiry, Dewey’s democratic, social or life enquiry is an active method 
of responding to moral disagreements through the identification of flexible sets 
of criteria (chapter seven). When he speaks about enquiry as methodologically 
akin to scientific study, Dewey has in mind a method of discovery and invention. 
This is a creative process where new ideas are cashed out and tested in the 
world with the aim of producing knowledge that remains fallible – open to 
change as it is assessed and reassessed in relation to experience. Dewey is 
endeavouring to capture this same process of experimental thinking. He applies 
it to the process of addressing moral disagreement and describes it as a form of 
enquiry. When Dewey considers moral judgments as the product of intelligent 
deliberation, the reflective nature of judgment is to the fore. 
Primary textual evidence is used to explicate Dewey’s notion of 
‘experience’ in Section 6.2. The relationship between biology and behaviour is 
central to Dewey’s theory and is the grounds for thinking about the role of 
habits, impulses and intelligent conduct in Section 6.3. In 6.4 we turn to 
communication and Dewey’s argument for meaning being a language event. 
Section 6.5 concludes that the main lesson from Dewey’s reconstruction of 
‘experience’ is a shadow of Hume (3.2), namely that perception is always 
accompanied by conception. The final section (6.6) concludes the chapter and 
paves the way for analysis of Dewey’s notion of ‘enquiry’. 
 
6.2 Experience  
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Dewey’s Experience and Nature2 presents us with hypotheses about how 
experience is experienced.3 The basic empirical premise is that the qualitative 
aspects of experience, our sentiments and values, for example, are inextricable 
parts of how we understand the world. Expanding on the pragmatist foundations 
of his forebears Peirce and James (chapter two), Dewey constructs a non-
psychodualist account of experience, where the knower does not stand outside 
of that which is known. He argues that when we talk about justification of beliefs 
we must talk about justification within the context of the process of enquiring 
into experience. If we fail to accommodate experience of our experiences into 
our theories of truth and knowledge, we end up with a dualistic and 
dichotomised notion of the “knower as a spectator”.4 The problem can be 
restated: some forms of empiricism are too restrictive and rigid in their 
treatment of objectivity and this leads us to falsely question the reality of 
affective qualities of our experience, such as values and aesthetics. 
Dewey takes the Darwinian theory of natural selection and applies it to 
our experience of nature as a whole. This is a broad interpretation of nature that 
includes both physical and social processes, be they biological, social, aesthetic, 
moral or scientific. 
There are traits, qualities, and relations found in things experienced, in the things that 
are typically and emphatically matters of human experience, which do not appear in the 
objects of physical science; namely, such things as immediate qualities, values, ends. Are 
such things inherently relevant and important for a philosophical theory of nature? I 
have held that a philosophical empiricism must take the position that they are 
intrinsically pertinent.5 
 
Peirce’s enquiry based on the scientific method is fully developed by Dewey into 
an intricate process of observation of the social. The outcome is a method of 
social enquiry where the relationships between all the different features of 
nature, including generic traits, such as qualities, values, ends and so on are 
                                                          
 
2 Dewey, 1958, (1925), EN. 
3 Gregory Fernando Pappas, “Reconstructing Dewey Today” Dewey Scholars in Dialogue with 
Interactive Constructivism Perspectives Of Pragmatism: Video interviews, Dewey-Center Koln 
http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31783 Accessed 07/03/2012. 
4 Steven Fesmire, “Reconstructing Dewey Today” Dewey Scholars in Dialogue with Interactive 
Constructivism Perspectives Of Pragmatism: Video interviews, Dewey-Center Koln 
http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31783 Accessed 09/03/2012 
5 John Dewey, 1940, “Nature in Experience” in The Philosophical Review, XLIX, pp. 244-258, p. 
247. Hereafter NE. 
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studied. Dewey’s aim is to embed experience in realism as a manifestation of 
nature, where poetry and art are as real and informative as science and 
mathematics.6 
This is a simple claim: the social is as real and discoverable as the 
physical. Dewey is not claiming that there is no difference in ontological status – 
obviously trees and virtues do not exist in the same way, after all you cannot 
touch bravery, or turn it into a table. What he is claiming is that we are able to 
study and know about each directly. Our experience of bravery is equally as real 
as our experience of a forest of trees.  
The phenomena of social life are as relevant to the problem of the relation of the 
individual and universal as those of logic…nature is construed in such a way that all 
these things, since they are actual, are naturally possible; they are not explained away 
into mere “appearance” in contrast with reality. Illusions are illusions, but the 
occurrence of illusions is not an illusion, but a genuine reality.7 
 
Dewey’s investigation of ‘how the world is’ focuses on how things interact with 
one another and the effects that these interactions have. This form of social 
enquiry focuses on the observable relationships in physical and social processes 
of nature granting subjective, qualitative, phenomenal experience equal standing 
to physical objects. Earlier forms of empiricism, from Peirce, James, Hume and 
Mill, are used as a springboard.  
We cannot underestimate the richness of Dewey’s experience that 
incorporates cognition, as it indirectly marks the theoretical foundations of 
certain contemporary theories of value, such as John McDowell’s.8 The 
consequence is that there is no need to work out how to interface experience 
(sensation) and cognition (reason) as the two are bound up through and through 
in humans with higher cognitive processing. This means that social interactions 
are a contributing factor to the emergence and cultivation of higher cognitive 
processing. McDowell indirectly corroborates when he argues that we cannot 
                                                          
 
6 Dewey, EN, p. 19. 
7 Dewey, EN, p. 20. 
8 John McDowell, 1983, “Aesthetic value, objectivity, and the fabric of the world” in E. Schaper 
(Ed.), Pleasure, Preference and Value: Studies in Philosophical Aesthetics”, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 1-16. Connections between Dewey and McDowell will be made throughout 
this and following chapters. Understanding Dewey in light of Hume, Kant and Mill strengthens 
this connection. 
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fully describe the world in terms of properties without any reference to the way 
that they affect us.9  
Dewey’s ‘experience’ represents the pragmatist idea that perception is 
constructed, or perhaps interpreted, not given. Whilst my focus is on explaining 
what the conception is and what philosophical work it does, it is interesting to 
note that contemporary evolutionary biologists and neurobiologists essentially 
endorse this view.10 Dewey employed ‘experience’ as a system of interactions 
observable and analysable through the process of enquiry. He argued that the 
starting point for enquiry is contained in this relationship between the world 
and the self.11 This is a profoundly naturalistic approach: we can know what 
exists through the study of nature, where nature is understood as the whole of 
what is experienced, and we as social, cognitively active beings are construed as 
part of nature.  
 
6.3 Habits & Perception  
 
In HNC Dewey is particularly interested in the relations between habits, impulses 
and intelligent conduct in order to explain the relationship between our biology 
and our behaviour. As Dewey states: 
We can recognize that all conduct is interaction between elements of human nature and 
the environment, natural and social…freedom is found in that kind of interaction which 
maintains an environment in which human desire and choice count for 
something…When we look at the problem as one of an adjustment to be intelligently 
attained, the issue shifts from within personality to an engineering issue, the 
establishment of arts of education and social guidance.12 
 
Dewey is less concerned with the philosophical issue of interfacing the sensuous 
with rationality than with the more practical problem of explaining the role habit 
                                                          
 
9 McDowell, 1983, p. 2. 
10 For example, Sperry’s split-brain experiments and the abundance of literature and research 
that it instigated. R. W. Sperry “Brain Bisection and Mechanisms of Consciousness” in J. C. Eccles 
(Ed.,) Brain and Conscious Experience, New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 298-313.  
11 An interesting transactional account of Dewey’s Theory of Valuation can be found in Morris 
Eames, 1961, “The Cognitive and the Non-Cognitive in Dewey’s Theory of Valuation” in The 
Journal of Philosophy, 58: 7, pp. 179-195, p. 192-195 in particular. Eames argues that experience 
is the starting point of enquiry, a theme arguably developed by Hildebrand’s transactional 
analysis that posits the PSP: Practical Starting Point in David L. Hildebrand, 2003, Beyond Realism 
& Antirealism, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. 
12 Dewey, HNC, p. 10. 
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plays in moral judgments. He identifies habits as socially shaped dispositions or 
modes of response that inform the way we interpret experience and react to the 
environment. This description is an attempt to identify social interactions and 
customs as shared habits of a group that are passed on at a subconscious level. 
His broad aim is to bring habits into conscious awareness and thereby shift the 
focus of morality toward intelligent conduct. Regardless of whether conduct is 
good or bad, it is always social, so identification of ethical habits, of good social 
behaviours, provides us with fodder for reflective processes of social enquiry. 
By stressing the sensual aspect of consciousness as an integral part of 
moments of perception, Dewey’s account can accommodate the qualitative 
aspect of it: “…optical qualities do not stand by themselves with factual and 
emotive qualities clinging to their skirts.”13 In other words, there are no qualities 
with the unique phenomenological status of being objects of direct awareness. 
The quality, our experience of the object, is always had in virtue of a concept of 
the object in mind.14 To cite Dewey’s example: we cannot have the concept of 
liquidity without the liquidity of water.15 In other words, the way the world is 
(the liquidity of water) gives rise to the concept (of liquidity) and as implied in 
his discussion, this means that we cannot perceive the liquidity of water without 
a concept of liquidity in mind. This is where Dewey is much clearer on the 
implications of his social theory than Mill was of his, railroaded as he was by his 
particular brand of empiricism. Dewey argues that nature cannot be split into 
perception and sensation, because perception includes consciousness of many 
qualities and these do not differ in their phenomenological status. All things, 
which are present in consciousness, including sensations, are present in the 
same way, that is, in virtue of structuring devices such as concepts.  
The essence of this position is evident in Peirce: “We must not begin by 
talking of pure ideas—vagabond thoughts that tramp the public roads without 
                                                          
 
13 John Dewey, 1934, Art as Experience, New York: The Berkeley Publishing Group, p. 128. 
Hereafter AE. 
14 Hark Kant in sections 4.2 & 4.3!  
15 Dewey, AE, p. 128. 
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any human habitation—but must begin with men and their conversations.”16 At 
the heart of Dewey’s approach is the role that pragmatists afford language in 
regards to communication of meaning. As Dewey explains: 
The heart of language is not “expression” of something antecedent, much less expression 
of antecedent thought. It is communication; the establishment of cooperation in an 
activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each is modified and 
regulated by partnership. To fail to understand is to fail to come into agreement in 
action; to misunderstand is to set up action at cross purposes….Meaning is not indeed a 
psychic existence; it is primarily a property of behavior, and secondarily a property of 
objects.…a distinctive behavior; cooperative, in that response to another’s act involves 
contemporaneous response to a thing as entering into the other’s behavior, and this 
upon both sides.17 
 
Language is a natural function of human association that has consequences that 
afford changes in the world. These consequences produce effects that react upon 
other events, physical and human, giving them meaning or significance.18 Dewey 
is treating language as an “experienced event”,19 as what constitutes the 
relations, between a speaker and an object or between speakers. 
Dewey’s 1896 article “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”20 helps to 
explain his view of language and meaning and their connection to 
communication as an event.21 In terms of its historical context, Dewey’s 
explanation of the reflex response can be seen as resisting the behaviourist trend 
of reducing the concept of being human to a physically and socially determined 
creature, explainable by prior conditioning. Dewey replaces the stimulus-
response model of conditional learning with the reflex arc, which attempts to 
incorporate the overall experience, including the context, into the explanatory 
model. It is perhaps most easily explained by the child-candle instance that 
Dewey cites from James: Suppose…that we have a baby before us who sees a 
                                                          
 
16 CP 8, p. 112. See also, Charles Sanders Peirce, “Volume 2, 1893-1913” Peirce Edition Project 
(Ed.’s), 1998, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Bloomington & Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press. 
17 Dewey, EN, p. 179 
18 Dewey, EN, p. 173 
19 Dewey, EN, p. 173 
20 John Dewey, 1896, “The Reflex Arc in Psychology” in Psychological Review, 3, pp. 357-370. 
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Dewey/reflex.htm Accessed 22/03/2012 
21 Notably the article is a very difficult and convoluted piece. This may have been because it was 
written at the time when Dewey was emerging from his idealist Hegelian upbringing and 
replacing it with a Jamesian evolutionary naturalism. However, whatever the reasons for its 
convolutedness, the message is clear: the stimulus-response and the reflex circuit views are 
inadequate accounts of learning as they are unable to explain the broad view of an inclusive 
meaning. 
 110 
candle-flame for the first time, and, by virtue of a reflex tendency common in 
babies of a certain age, extends his hand to grasp it, so that his fingers get 
burned.22 
The behaviourist interpretation of this scenario is that the sensation of 
light is a stimulus to the grasping as a response. In turn, the burning is a stimulus 
to the withdrawing of the hand response. Dewey admits that while this account 
is adequate in a rough practical way, it is unable to account for the sensorimotor 
experience as a whole. The problem is that the stimulus-response picture 
maintains rigid distinctions between sensations (stimulus), ideas (central 
activity of making connections) and the resulting action (response). By treating 
each as a disjointed part it is unable to account for the coordination of the act as 
a whole. 
Paul Ballantyne23 argues that many responses to Dewey’s Reflex Arc 
paper present an oversimplified view of his argument, portraying Dewey as 




The diagram shows these two distinctions between a reflex act: the stimulus-
response (A.) and the reflex circuit view (B.). The problem with the stimulus-
response view (A.) is that it implies a one-way causal chain of events where 
environmental contingencies impose themselves on a passive organism. In turn 
                                                          
 
22 William James, 1890, The Principles of Psychology, New York: Henry Holt. 
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/j/james/william/principles/chapter2.html Accessed 
05/02/2013. 
23 Paul F. Ballantyne, 2008, History and Theory of Psychology: An early 21st century student's 
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24 John G. Benjafield, 1996, A History of Psychology, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 
http://www.igs.net/%7Epballan/section4(210).htm Accessed 22/03/2012. 
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the organism is forced to respond. The reflex circuit view (B.) in contrast, 
replaces this one-way stimulus and response view with a bi-directional 
transaction between the environment and organism. While the latter picture 
does allow for some sort of active processes like a sensory-motor feedback loop 
and is thus able to account for the ongoing to and fro between organism and 
environment, it is also too narrow, falling short in its inability to take context 
into account. That is, the circuit view also falls short of capturing the complexity 
of Dewey’s account, the reflex arc view, which is able to incorporate the broader 
naturalistic view of organism in communication with its environment in an 
interactive and transactive way.  
Dewey is attempting to reorder the basic terrain that wrongly gives rise 
to understanding the human being as a determined product of nature or society, 
that is, with no genuine agency. There is an active relationship, an interactive 
process at play, between the nature of the organism and the contingencies of the 
environment.25 Dewey explains this other dimension in terms of context within 
the process of experience. The problem with both the stimulus-response and the 
circuit view of reflex responses is that they treat the outcome as a separate 
experience to the stimulus. Dewey however, treats all aspects, including the 
initial ocular discernment of the flame, the movement towards it, the burning 
sensation, the cry of ‘ouch’, the tears and the movement away from it, as 
members of a whole experience: an all-inclusive context and so rejecting aspects 
of the stimulus-response model: 
…failing to see unity of activity, no matter how much it still leaves us with sensation or 
peripheral stimulus; idea, or central process (the equivalent of attention); and motor 
response, or act, as four disconnected experiences, having to be somehow adjusted to 
each other, whether through the intervention of an extraexperimental soul, or by 
mechanical push and pull.26 
 
The recognition that both the sensation and the movement lie inside, not outside 
of the act, reflects the idea that all actions, processing and reactions occur in the 
one human. The stimulus-response and circuit views imply that the environment 
is responsible for the activity of the organism and its response, whereas the 
reflex arc places some responsibility on the shoulders of the experiencer. 
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26 Dewey, 1896, pp. 360-361. 
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To return to our earlier example of the flame: while many animals learn 
to respond to flames just as humans do, they lack the conceptual capacity to give 
meaning to the experience. For humans, there is more to the experience than a 
simple stimulus and response, the experience itself includes affective responses 
that are informative in terms of what is learnt about fire in general, which is built 
upon with each new experience. The importance of contextual differences can be 
drawn out through the use of another of Dewey’s examples, which he quotes 
from Baldwin’s analysis of reactive consciousness in his 1891 chapter “Feeling 
and Will”. 
In this there are, [Baldwin] says, “four elements corresponding to the four elements of 
the nervous arc. First the receiving consciousness, the stimulus – say a loud, unexpected 
sound; second, the attention involuntarily drawn, the registering element; and, third, the 
muscular reaction following upon the sound – say flight from fancied danger.” Now, in 
the first place, such an analysis is incomplete; it ignores the status prior to hearing the 
sound. Of course, if this status is irrelevant to what happens afterwards, such ignoring is 
quite legitimate. But is it irrelevant either to the quantity or the quality of the stimulus?27 
 
Dewey is emphasising the important difference that context makes in terms of 
mediating the impact of the stimulus and in turn the response. As Dewey 
explains, a loud bang will have a different effect in the middle of an otherwise 
quiet, lonely night than if it occurs during a hunting expedition. More than this, 
what one hears depends on context. In the first case, one might hear a threat, 
while in the other, an animal being killed. . In other words, the stimulus is a part 
of a larger coordinated experience that includes context. Dewey calls this an 
experiential matrix. 
The overall point is that there is no metaphysical dualism according to 
which the sensation of the organism is distinct from the psychical idea or the 
physical response of action. Instead, the stimulus and response are teleological 
distinctions, that is, distinctions of function, in terms of the part they play with 
reference to reaching or maintaining an end.28 There are two aspects of this 
teleological process, which are important to distinguish. Firstly, the relation 
represents an organisation of means with reference to a comprehensive end.29 
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Psychology, New York: Henry Holt. 
28 Dewey, 1896, p. 365. 
29 Dewey, 1896, p. 365. 
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This is a nod to the notion of Darwinian adaptation – the act is accomplished due 
to the ability of humans to be conscious of a stimulus as a stimulus and a 
response as a response. Secondly, the distinction of stimulus and response is one 
of interpretation of a continuously ordered sequence of acts. 
Both the stimulus and response are acts that aim at reaching an end, 
which the individual learns to discern within contextual bounds. For example, a 
child who burns itself on a candle is not altogether put off reaching out and 
touching things in general. What the child has learnt is a response that is specific 
to the members of the context. With time this response will be generalised across 
all flames, but not, for example, across all sources of light. Thus both stimulus 
and response have functional value in so far as they, for example, facilitate 
learning. The resulting education will be modified by further experiences in 
accord with the source of the stimulus and the effect that stimulus has on the 
organism. What is important about this particular paper of Dewey’s is that it 
establishes the backbone of his proceduralist account of ethics. The way we 
carve up moral concerns into themes or analyse morality into its elements 
depends on the ends at which we aim and the context in which actions and 
reactions take place. 
 
6.4 Communication: Language & Meaning 
 
Where does this leave us in regards to language and meaning? Dewey’s criticism 
of the stimulus-response view is that it maintains dualistic conceptions about the 
nature of sensations and actions and ignores context. His alternative asserts that 
as actions are mediated by the context in which they occur, methodologically, no 
one principle can possibly explain in an interesting way the reason for what 
might appear to be the same kind of action in different contexts. This leads us to 
how Dewey thought meaning was created by us to include a place for ‘self’ and 
‘environment’. Dewey thought about this in terms of mind and consciousness.30 
He wrote: 
                                                          
 
30 Dewey is not claiming to offer a theory of mind or consciousness; rather this is a useful 
explanatory model that enables him to better account for his notion of experience.  
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Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of 
organic life; consciousness in a being with language denotes awareness or perception of 
meanings; it is the perception of actual events, whether past, contemporary or future, in 
their meanings, the having of actual ideas.31 
 
For Dewey mind is responsible for operative meanings, constantly chugging 
away and enabling connections to be made via habits and impulses without 
direct awareness. Consciousness, in contrast, intermittently steps in to provide 
reflective power and draw out new and novel meanings and ideas. Effective 
communication is therefore a process that makes demands on individuals to 
consciously put themselves in another person’s shoes, to take the stance of 
another person, in order to better understand and grasp meanings. This demand 
is in reaction to a problem, a disturbance that kick starts conscious thought and 
triggers the need for effective communication. So mind, consciousness and 
communication are the explanatory terms in his theory of meaning. 
Dewey argues that meaning is a language event that includes aspects of 
both Idealism and epistemological realism. He argues that events acquire 
meaning by the way a community’s conception of an event constitutes that 
meaning: 
In formulating the distinction between existences and objects of reference, whether 
cognitive, esthetic or moral, philosophy does not exact that violent break with common 
sense which is found in the assertion of Idealism that events themselves are composed of 
meanings. Nor does it involve that break with common sense found in epistemological 
realism, with its assertion of a direct dealing of mind with naked existences unclothed by 
intervention of meanings.32 
 
His point against the realist is that they are unable to account for moments of 
conscious awareness where indeterminacy of meaning still endures. What they 
fail to take into consideration is that there is an antecedent stock of meanings 
(mind), which we take for granted and use without consciousness. Reflective 
thinking, conscious enquiry, is not demarcated as an isolated component of 
arriving at ideas and meanings. The standard realist view fails to take into 
account the implicit knowledge garnered from previous inferences and 
investigations explicitly operated on earlier in the mind.33 
                                                          
 
31 Dewey, EN, p. 303 
32 Dewey, EN, p. 325-6. 
33 See, for example, Adam Morton, A Guide Through the Theory of Knowledge, Oxford: Blackwell, 
pp. 93-103 in particular. 
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Realism implicitly postulates a pre-established harmony of the knower 
and things known, that tends to pass over the fact that such harmony is always 
an attained outcome of prior inferences and investigations.34 This approach 
leads to a conception of error that Dewey rejected. The practical problem of the 
view that Dewey sought to revise involves the assumption that the mind is 
capable of immediately grasping and registering objects in their entirety.35 For 
Dewey, error is an important part of truth finding processes. Instead of 
assimilating error with falsity, or contrasting it with correctness, he incorporates 
it into his theory of perception, which in turn grounds his notion of meaning. 
Perception may be constituted by many aspects of mind, such as imagination, 
fancy, reverie, affection, love and hate, desire, happiness and misery, to name but 
a few.36 This is an evolutionary view of perception where under the constraint of 
effectiveness relative to need or interest, an error is an important part. 
Arguably for Dewey, by focusing on the functional role of each, perception 
and meaning are conceived as much in terms of their role in communication as in 
their role in knowledge formation. To use Dewey’s example, a stick ceases to be a 
lever once it is no longer in use as a way of opening a tin.37 It reverts to being a 
stick once the relationship between it and its consequence are no longer 
distinguished. Analogously, perception and meaning are shaped by 
consequences. Dewey discusses this idea in terms of language.38 Language (and 
other artificial signs, such as pointing and so on,) is a means of interpreting, 
understanding and registering the relationships between things so as to have 
fruitful communication. It is important to stress that for Dewey, information 
processing and language operate interdependently. Language is a part of nature, 
not something over and above nature that simply describes or attempts to 
capture it. Language is part of what we describe when we describe nature, an 
implication of which is that while constrained by natural laws, it in turn 
constructs what we can know of nature.  
                                                          
 
34 Dewey, EN, p. 309. 
35 Dewey notes that this may be a remnant of God having a perfect mind and man being created 
in the image of his maker. Dewey, EN, p. 309 
36 Dewey, EN, p. 310. 
37 Dewey, EN, p. 187. 
38 Dewey, EN, p. 188. 
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A recurring theme in Dewey’s work in terms of language and meaning 
was that all thought has an aesthetic aspect that cannot be captured by literal 
propositions. Truth is therefore more than accurate correspondence and 
meaning is not merely propositional. Rather, context conditions, that is, 
qualitative responses, are equally authoritative. Dewey thus speaks about 
language and meaning as an experienced event. This is why the concept of 
experience is so central for Dewey. He wants to place the first person perspective 
at the heart of his philosophy, but he is not interested in the private, 
idiosyncratic or even the personal. It is the first person plural he is interested in; 
hence he constructs his account in terms of perception, meaning, language 
within broad conceptions of mind and consciousness. Dewey argued that a 
theory of language and meaning had to be able to account for broader 
meaningful experiences because qualitative experience is an aspect of 
understanding. 
It is interesting to note that contemporary research in the cognitive 
sciences offers support for Dewey’s theory. Tom Cochrane’s work “Music, 
Emotions and the Influence of the Cognitive Science” focuses on whether it is the 
music itself that possesses aesthetic properties and/or any values that result 
from such possession, or whether it is purely a subjective matter.39 Cochrane 
concludes that in order to account for the aesthetic meaning of musical 
experiences, we need to seek some kind of reflective equilibrium between how 
listeners do in fact respond to music, and what seems to be conceptually 
essential.40 Cochrane identifies the affective capacity of the qualitative aspect as 
the source of music’s meaning. The qualitative aspect refers to something that 
emerges from the notes that are played, defined by my experience of it. While 
this experience is not fully captured in a literal sense, by language, language 
nonetheless plays a part in the quality of my experience. 
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Jennifer Welchman talks about this aspect of Dewey’s treatment of 
language in terms of how language and communication mark an important break 
between humans and other animal species.41 The fact that there is something 
significantly different happening for the creature that is part of a language using 
community, cannot be undervalued. As Welchman observes, language use 
enables an opening up of an inner life, it gives users the ability to think about 
what one cares about and in turn this enables us to have values.42 We value what 
we care about. When Dewey talks about a communicative practice, he is 
addressing this broader aspect of what it is to be language-using humans. 
Language use is an ability to engage in communicative practices, involving 
expressions of thought, which in turn allows for the construction of personhood 
and makes it possible to have values.43 
Dewey’s view of communication is reflected in the work of George 
Herbert Mead, who proffers an empathetic view of communication.44 Mead’s 
(1934) work emphasised the individual’s capacity to take on the role of other 
persons as a way of understanding how they view the world. The ability to 
project oneself into the standpoint of another is an essential aspect of 
communication because communication is a relationship, a process rather than a 
particularity. As Dewey argued: 
Language is specifically a mode of interaction of at least two beings, a speaker and a 
hearer; it presupposes an organized group to which these creatures belong, and from 
whom they have acquired their habits of speech. It is therefore a relationship, not a 
particularity....When we attribute meaning to the speaker as his intent, we take for 
granted another person who is to share in the execution of the intent, and also 
something, independent of the persons concerned, through which the intent is to be 
realised….This community of partaking is meaning.45 
 
While there are many contemporary accounts of what constitutes taking on 
another’s perspective, or empathy, Dewey and Mead’s accounts are not analysed 
in this light here. Rather, I draw attention to their notion of communication as 
                                                          
 
41 Jennifer Welchman, “Reconstructing Dewey Today” Dewey Scholars in Dialogue with Interactive 
Constructivism Perspectives Of Pragmatism: Video interviews, Dewey-Center Koln 
http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31783 Accessed 07/03/2012 
42 Ibid.  
43 This aspect of how values are constructed through communication will be very important in 
the discussion of community and shared values in later chapters.  
44 George Herbert Mead, 1934, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
45 Dewey, EN, p. 185 
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interaction. This is very different to a ‘pipeline’ view of communication where 
information goes in one end and out the other unchanged. Mead and Dewey’s 
view of communication is about transformation and interaction within the 
context of experience. As Larry Hickman puts it, there is never any immaculate 
transfer46 – communication can never escape context because life experiences, 
interests and talents of the individuals involved always constrain and 
characterise it. There can be no meaning without the participation of language-
users engaged in a communication event. 
The whole of what is experienced is more than a particular situation; it is 
the entire context of who we are. As Gregory Pappas explains, for Dewey, context 
is the right here and now PLUS history, economic standing, religious beliefs, 
cultural identity, political climate and so on.47 Dewey’s ‘situations’ are, as 
Matthew Brown points out: 
…objective aspects of the agent-environment interactions. Situations are not 
subjective/mental entities; they are concrete elements of the natural world. Agents 
perceive not only the constituents of their situations but the “pervasive qualitative 
character” of the situation, a qualitative perception (or feeling) of the character of 
objective transactions between the agent and the environment…Dewey’s theory requires 
the recognition of a background composed of ordinary objects, events, agents, and their 
interactions as the relevant context of a practice or inquiry, as well as a perceptual claim 
about the qualitative unity of that context.48 
 
Hence, experience is multifaceted. Habits, including habits of thought that I 
inherited from my culture and philosophical education, for example, are all 
located in the context of experience. Insofar as context includes information 
garnered from past experiences, it is historical. This means that our interactions 
in experience are never uninformed, so we never have to start from scratch. The 
immediate environment, the individual situation in which the problem occurs, is 
also a part of the context, as Hildebrand puts it, the situation is the source of the 
means, criteria, and clues to problems.49  
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49 David L. Hildebrand, 2016, “The Paramount Importance of Experience and Situations in 
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I am doing-and-undergoing-amid-things, and one aspect of my doing is thinking. In the 
same way my breathing involves the atmosphere, my thinking involves whatever 
perceptual, conceptual, and physical elements are in play…All creatures are organisms-
in-environments and all thinkers are experiencers-in-problematic-situations.50 
  
Then of course there is the level of engagement of the individuals involved, 
which allows room for individual variations and explanations of behavioural 
differences. Dewey’s method of incorporating a multi-faceted description of 
context in the construction of meaning makes space for him to accommodate 
difference and the disagreements that ensue. 
 
6.5 Experience & Experiencing 
 
The human capacity to review, interpret, record, search, select and experiment, 
to think reflectively about the events of experience, enables Dewey to account for 
the transformative process of experience. Situational traits such as uncertainty, 
questioning, hypotheses and alternatives, are integral aspects of the way we 
experience the world, triggering the need to attempt to arrive at conclusions. 
These traits are just as much a part of nature as height and weight. This must be 
the way the world is so as to generate ignorance and enquiry. Processes of doubt, 
hypothesising, trial and temporal conclusions are evidence of genuine hazard, 
contingency, irregularity and indeterminateness in nature. All are settled in the 
occurrence of thinking.51 Whilst Dewey argues that the content of experience is 
neither subjective nor objective as such, it is important to remember that this is 
not a relativistic view. Dewey avoids ‘the private’ (the relativism or the 
subjectivism) of experience through his conception of the way experience is 
beholden to the concepts we apply, concepts that we have in virtue of being 
internalised through community exchanges.52 Perception is internal and 
external, immediate sensations and interpretations, objective and subjective, 
perceiving and conceiving, sentience and sapience, evaluations and valuings. 
                                                          
 
50 Hildebrand, 2016, p. 85. 
51 Dewey, EN, p. 69. 
52 The technicalities of which will be explored in detail in chapter seven. 
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As will be explored further in the ensuing chapters, John McDowell’s 
rejection of the two-factor approach to perception in Mind, Value & Reality53 can 
be viewed as a contemporary corroboration to Dewey’s view of perception. The 
general theme of McDowell’s work can be summarised as a refutation of 
subjectivist positions54 from emotivism through to Simon Blackburn’s 
projectivist quasirealism.55 McDowell’s position is based on the refutation of the 
subjectivist premise that phenomenological qualities, such as values, are not 
found in the world, but projected onto it, a mere reflection of subjective 
responses.56 Reminiscent of Dewey, McDowell observes that this subjectivist 
position is embedded in a metaphysical error where the thesis that value is in 
the world is seen as interchangeable with the thesis that value is objective.57 
McDowell’s point is that qualitative experiences are equally valid aspects of our 
perception; in fact they are inextricable aspects of perception, as experiences of 
objects. Nonetheless, values are not brutely there, independently of our 
sensibility, although, this does not prevent us from supposing that they are there 
independently of any particular apparent experience of them.58 Values are 
understood as being objectively grounded – we cannot divorce our sapience 
from our sentience.59 
Hildebrand explains that the pragmatist strategy was to turn away from 
redundant psychodualist traditions and replace it with a transactional analysis 
where the self is in an ongoing process, a toing and froing with the broader 
environment: 
Where traditional philosophy assumed the theory of psychophysical dualism and took as 
one of its primary tasks the explanation of how the apparent interaction between minds 
and the external world was possible, pragmatists began by accepting experienced 
transactions between organism and environment as real and then sought to describe the 
variety of ways such transactions happen. Thus, pragmatist metaphysics made 
continuity through change basic…and took inquiry-for-purposes as a natural 
complement.60 
                                                          
 
53 John McDowell, 1998, “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following” in Mind, Value and Reality, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 198-218.  
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John McDowell talks about this in terms of the mistaken separation of our 
capacity to feel from how we perceive and conceive the world.61 Instead, these 
associations are treated as different modes of interaction, as transactions that 
form the bedrock for individual and social habits, customs, culture, politics and 
institutions, all of which are open to review, followed by revitalisation or 
rejection. 
Dewey’s main lesson in regards to experience is that perception is always 
accompanied by conception – which was why the one-way stimulus and 
response view and the bi-directional view were inadequate (6.3). Neither theory 
can account for context, or ‘situation’ as Dewey terms it. We are not passive 
receivers of stimuli; we are interactive organisms. Life is an ongoing interaction, 
a transaction between organism and environment, generally running smoothly 
through mechanisms of impulses and habits – walking, eating, talking, digesting 
and so on. A situation that is not satisfied by these primary responses disrupts 
this general flow and triggers the need for reflective thinking. Enquiry is the 
observation and analysis of the relations between events and objects within the 




Dewey’s pragmatic treatment of meaning, language and communication turns 
the spotlight on the fullness of experience. Empirical evidence in support of the 
idea that consciousness of meanings denotes redirection of meanings, (which are 
always ultimately meanings of events), is supplied by obvious facts of attention 
and interest on one side and the working of established and assured habits on 
the other.62 We trundle along, without need of conscious construction of 
meaning. It is only when something out of the ordinary, some startling and 
unexpected aspect of perception looms into view that we are forced to engage in 
the making of meaning: the “re-direction, re-adaptation, re-organization”63 of 
                                                          
 
61 McDowell, 1983, pp. 1-16. 
62 Dewey, EN, p. 311. 
63 Dewey, EN, p. 312. 
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meaning. Objects remain the same; it is our consciousness of their meaning that 
changes in line with context. In terms of its role in theory building, reflective 
thinking is just as much an activity as actions are. There is no question of priority 
or causal sequence as intentional change in direction of events is transforming 
change in the meaning of those events.64 
This empirical method calls for direct assessment of the world in the here 
and now. It is only the empirical method that can do justice to this inclusive 
integrity of “experience”.65 Revising both Idealism and epistemological realism, 
Dewey writes: 
Non-empirical method starts with a reflective product as if it were primary, as if it were 
the originally “given.”…object and subject, mind and matter…are separate and 
independent. Therefore it has upon its hands the problem of how it is possible to know 
at all; how an outer world can affect an inner mind….One thinker turns metaphysical 
materialist and denies reality to the mental; another turns psychological idealist, and 
holds that matter and force are merely disguised psychical events….To a truly 
naturalistic empiricism, the moot problem of the relation of subject and object is the 
problem of the relation of what consequences follow in and for primary experience from 
the distinction of the physical and the psychological or mental from each other.66 
 
Dewey is responding to the idealist and the realist when he asserts that the 
problem with the non-empirical method is that it starts with the products of 
reflection and then works at applying them to the world as we experience it. The 
problem stems from beginning with the results of a reflection that has already 
dichotomised the subject matter experienced from the state of experiencing and 
ends in a debate about whether or not the products of reflection are real or ideal. 
Dewey puts this metaphysical debate to one side and instead treats 
reflective thought as building upon and transforming what we know directly 
from experience where the whole is distinguished [but not dichotomised] into 
subject and object, nature and mental operations – to include experiencing in 
experience.67 We love, know, act for and against things, have ideas, mental 
intents and emotions. These reactions, the attitudes themselves, then become the 
objects of reflection. As Dewey articulates, we primarily observe things, not 
observations, however, the act of observation may be enquired into and form a 
                                                          
 
64 Dewey, EN, p. 316. 
65 Dewey, EN, p. 9. 
66 Dewey, EN, p. 9-10. 
67 Dewey, EN, p. 9. 
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subject of study and become thereby a refined object, as too the acts of thinking, 
desire, purposing, the state of affection, reverie, and so on.68 Steven Fesmire’s 
argument for the role of imagination in Dewey’s ethics supports this account of 
moral judgment:  
Moral deliberation can be artfully developed only through a socially responsive 
imagination that skillfully perceives paths of mutual growth…Conceiving the aesthetic as 
a phase of everyday experience aids the development of moral ideals consonant with the 
central role of imagination. Intelligent dramatic rehearsals are directed toward the 
ultimate art of bringing about democratic consummations in experience. this is not a 
mechanical measure or a necessary and sufficient condition of moral value of the “X is 
good, Y is bad” variety. It is an ideal to strive for to consummate and revivify meaning 
and value.69 
 
The objective things, say the history of a forest and the path of the river that runs 
through it are candidates for perception. The subjective, emotive reaction to the 
forest being turned into wood chips and the river being damned for power, are 
the qualitative candidates of perception. Both aspects are equally accessible, 
analysable and refinable through the activity of ‘enquiry into experience’.70 
This is a two-fold description of the interaction between the human 
organism and the environment. Human experience is treated as a process of loss 
and reestablishment of equilibrium with its environment. The experience of 
living is not just an organism in an environment, it is an activity that involves an 
interaction between the organism and the environment. Reflective analysis or 
conscious thought bisects this activity into its external and internal parts. For 
example, there are external conditions—air breathed, food taken, ground walked 
upon—as well as internal structures—lungs respiring, stomach digesting, legs 
walking.71 Basic biology demonstrates that needs become apparent when there 
is a lack of environmental unity, a state that all animals have the capacity to 
address and satisfy. Humans, however have the capacity to be conscious of this 
disunity and reflect on it. It is at this point, the point of reflection, that internal 
responses, referred to earlier as qualitative responses inform the reflective 
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enquiry process. Dewey views these as rationally grounded aspects of nature 
mediated by communicative restraints. 
Dewey offers a change of focus from problems and solutions to process 
and demands a commitment to approach enquiry in the spirit of communication 
rather than coercion. I will not be focusing on the abundant literature on the 
difference between communication and coercion, although this literature 
arguably springs from Deweyan scholarship.72 I have provided the foundations 
for arguing that for Dewey, genuine communication involves a relation and 
interrelation between people where values and terms of reference are 
constructed anew. That is, communication is not a matter of simply conveying 
information or forcing a conclusion. Furthermore, in Dewey’s conception of 
enquiry, error and disagreement play a crucial role, as will be demonstrated in 
the next chapter. We return to these themes again in chapter eleven, where a 
selection of case studies are analysed to demonstrate the role of disagreement in 
motivating thinking and action, when the grounds of disagreement are allowed 
to engage feeling and reason. 
 
 
                                                          
 
72 See, for example, Habermas, 1984, The Theory of Communicative Action, T. McCarthy (trans.), 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
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7. John Dewey’s Enquiry 
 
Dewey structures enquiry by characterising the aim of it not in terms of 
discovering truth but in terms of unifying discordant situations.1 We generally 
trundle along acting and reacting to our environment, but from time to time we 
come across a situation that requires interpretation. These ‘problematic 
situations’ or moments of incongruence emerge out of experience and force us to 
stop, evaluate and to ask: ‘What is right?’ ‘What should we do?’ The historical 
tracing if ideas presented in this thesis facilitates our appreciation of Dewey’s 
social enquiry as addressing and responding to weaknesses in Hume’s 
sentimentalism, Kant’s rationalism and Mill’s consequentialism. Dewey’s enquiry 
can be seen to transcend Kant’s pure and practical reason distinction, and 
provide the means by which to understand rationally grounded Humean feelings 




The aim of Dewey’s enquiry is to provide a process that can account for the 
complex reality of moral judgments, without recourse to blaming a lack of 
rationality, to human shortcomings. The goal of social enquiry is to discover a 
new and modified understanding of a given issue, when opposing views threaten 
to derail a way forward. Opposing sides, are given the context to think of more 
compelling reasons for their positions; and this can inadvertently lead to a 
modification of their respective positions. The aim is to seek consensus through 
the identification of shared or common values. Finding shared terms of reference 
serves this aim without either side needing to abandon their principles or values. 
For Dewey, the spotlight is turned away from solutions and toward 
communication. The aim of the process of enquiry is discovery and in this 
context, this can involve a deeper engagement with unfamiliar terms of cultural 
or social reference. 
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 Section 7.2 outlines Dewey’s notion of social enquiry, of ‘enquiry into 
experience’, as he calls it. Based on his description of the enquiry process in 
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, I then delineate the six stages of Dewey’s method of 
social enquiry, highlighting the parallels and differences between it and the 
scientific method. Section 7.3 demonstrates that Dewey’s notion of warranted 
assertability is an attempt to offer a pragmatic interpretation of how truth 
functions in moral and aesthetic enquiries – judgments of value – as opposed to 
how truth functions in science. This links back to Dewey’s notion of experience, 
where values are an integral aspect of moral judgment. The final section, 7.4, 
summarises the impact that the particular historical tracing in this thesis has 
had. Dewey is presented as having established the foundations for contemporary 
understandings, which acknowledge that we cannot fully describe the world 
without any reference to the way that it affects us, for the simple reason that our 
sentience cannot be removed from the way we perceive and conceive the world.  
 
7.2 Dewey’s Process of Social Enquiry  
 
Dewey takes the method inherited from his pragmatist forbears Peirce and 
James and develops a form of social enquiry that aims to minimise the influence 
of bias or prejudice and attain test results that are untainted by partiality.  
This particular affair is referred to here not so much as a matter of doctrine as to afford 
an illustration of the nature of empirical method. Truth or falsity depends upon what 
men find when they warily perform the experiment of observing reflective events. An 
empirical finding is refuted not by denial that one finds things to be thus and so, but by 
giving directions for a course of experience that results in finding its opposite to be the 
case. To convince of error as well as to lead to truth is to assist another to see and find 
something which he hitherto has failed to find and recognize.2 
 
The appeal of the scientific methodology is its attempt to standardise procedures 
and criteria in order to minimise the influences of idiosyncratic beliefs and 
perceptions in the formulation of theories. The scientific method adheres to 
experience in terms of its rigorous allegiance to empirical methodologies and its 
aim to discover facts about the way the world is for creatures like us. It relies on 
observation as the impetus for hypothesising and as the grounds for testing.  
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Clearly the parallel to scientific enquiry is limited, after all the good, 
beautiful and right cannot be looked at under a microscope or crashed together 
in the Hadron Collider. However, as seen in the previous chapter, when 
objectivity is not conceived to require a mind independent basis, they are 
observable aspects of experience. As science constructs hypotheses from 
observations, which are then subjected to testing, it tends toward using its body 
of theory as the basis from which to conceive problems that generally emerge 
from practice, or experience. Analogously, for Dewey, moral problems are 
conceived within the body of value already held and so they emerge from current 
practices or experience. Disanalogously, social enquiries are structured not in 
terms of discovering truth but in terms of unifying a discordant situation, where 
there may be more than one possible solution.3  
Dewey’s ‘The Pattern of Inquiry’ outlines the process: “Inquiry is the 
controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that 
is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the 
elements of original situation into a unified whole.”4 Here Dewey outlines exactly 
what he means by ‘situation’.5 A situation is not a single object or event, or even a 
set of objects or events. A situation is a contextual whole that we experience. 
Within this contextual whole, objects and events interact and we form judgments 
about them. “In actual experience, there is never any such isolated singular 
object or event; an object or event is always a special part, phase, or aspect, of an 
environing experienced world—a situation.”6 Pappas argues that this situational 
approach to moral decision making “affirms that reasonable moral judgments 
and decisions come from intelligently exploring and assessing the situation in its 
qualitative uniqueness.”7 The situation triggers the enquiry process, a process of 
intelligently, critically and creatively engaging with problems as they crop up in 
experience. This aspect sets his theory apart from its predecessors.  
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Dewey explains this process of enquiry as involving six stages. Firstly, 
there are the antecedent conditions of enquiry, namely, the indeterminate 
situation.8 Dewey’s conception of a “situation” refers to his inclusive, reflex arc 
theory of perception (6.3). By stressing the sensual aspect of consciousness as an 
integral aspect of perception, he identifies an indeterminate situation as marked 
by a disruption in perception. This disruption evokes doubt and instigates the 
need for enquiry.  “To see that a situation requires inquiry is the initial step in 
inquiry.”9 The indeterminate situation may be something as benign as, for 
example, a noise that wakes you up at night and suggests that there is a burglar in 
the house. There are two important aspects to this first stage. Firstly, the doubt 
that arises is not simply a subjective feeling, it is the experience of registering an 
indeterminate situation. Secondly, the doubt emerges out of our experience of 
the situation. It is the situation, which is doubtful, and this in turn leads to the 
individual feeling doubt. The situation has these traits, these qualities.10 As such 
our response is grounded objectively. The situation itself triggers a demand – 
“Address this problem now!” 
The second stage is the institution of a problem, or the identification of 
what the problem is. So, in the case of the mysterious noise in the middle of the 
night, the problem would be whether or not there is a burglar in the house. The 
third stage involves the determination of possible ways to resolve it, where the 
solution is problematised in a process akin to the construction of a hypothesis, as 
opposed to a final end or answer. In determining possible relevant solutions one 
is at the same time determining relevant factual conditions, as secured by 
observation. Hence in the process of determining the problem, relevant 
possibilities or ideas emerge. Ideas, the ‘maybe I should do this or perhaps that’ 
are forecasters of anticipated consequences of what will happen if certain acts 
are instituted. As predictions about possible outcomes, ideas are equivalent to 
scientific hypotheses – I could lay here and wait to hear more noises or I could get 
out of bed and check the house for burglars.  
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The examination of the problem aims at a progressive determination of a 
problem and some conception of a possible solution.11 This is a form of reflective 
thinking as a reasoning process that interweaves the observable (facts AND 
values) with possible solutions in accord with their predicted outcomes. 
Reasoning is thus the fourth stage of the pattern of enquiry and is employed to 
examine and check the operational effectiveness of the idea in relation to the 
whole situation.12 This is the equivalent of the way science tests a hypothesis 
against other preexisting conceptual structures – if there is a burglar and they 
have a weapon…although it may have just been the house creaking…actually, it is 
most likely that the house is simply creaking. 
Dewey labels the fifth stage of the enquiry process as the “operational 
character of facts-meanings”.13 This is a functional analysis where ideas are 
operational insofar as they lead to changes in the situation and therefore the 
observable facts.14 In turn, facts are operational in terms of their influence on 
making ideas. This stage is a process of action and reaction, of observation, 
experimentation and action. As such, it is akin to the experimental stage of 
science. Ideas are acted upon and consequences are observed, creating new facts 
to be incorporated back into ideas. I’m going to get up and check the house, if only 
to put my mind at ease.  
The sixth and final phase is to distinguish between social enquiry and 
scientific enquiry. Dewey understood that there are indeed differences between 
these two modes of enquiry. For one, they have different subject matters, due to 
the difference in the problems involved respectively. This difference sets up a 
difference in the ends or objective consequences of each and it marks the point 
at which we move away from the problem/solution model.15 What they do share 
is basic logical forms and relations. In terms of subject matter, the key difference 
                                                          
 
11 Dewey, Logic, p. 110. 
12 In the context of this discussion, Dewey uses the term reasoning to refer to ratiocination or 
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force upon us. He is describing the process of enquiry as a part of a continuous feedback system 
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15 Dewey, Logic, pp. 114-5. 
 130 
is that social enquiry attempts to incorporate relevant aspects of social activities, 
traditions, occupations, interests, concerns of the groups involved, and so on. 
Social enquiry focuses on the relationship between humans and their broad 
environment, including religious, political and cultural institutions. Scientific 
enquiry, on the other hand, aims to free itself from such influences. 
In science, relations are the objects of enquiry and qualities are relegated 
to a secondary status. A good scientific experiment is one in which the ‘noise’ of 
contextual qualities are kept to a minimum. In doing so, it is hoped that 
conclusions drawn from scientific investigations are generalisable rather than 
relative to particular times and places.16  
Nevertheless, although the idea of movement and change in has made itself at home in 
the physical sciences, it has had comparatively little influence on the popular mind as the 
latter looks at religion, morals, economics, and politics. In these fields it is still supposed 
that our choice is between confusion, anarchy, and something fixed and 
immutable…ideals of fixity persist in a moving world. A philosophy of experience will 
accept at its full value the fact that social and moral existences are, like physical 
existences, in a state of continuous if obscure change.17 
  
Comparing, relating and distinguishing between social and scientific enquiry 
emphasises and accommodates aspects of social enquiry that are often sidelined 
and even disregarded in discussions about decision-making, the significance of 
which may be lost on someone who has not considered Dewey within the 
Kantian tradition. 
Kant’s concept of judgment, as outlined in his third Critique is significant 
here as it demonstrates the relation between theoretical and practical reason, or 
in Deweyan terms, between feelings and rational judgment. Kant’s theory of 
pleasure is related to communicability. Universality – in Kant’s sense – is 
expressed in terms of a comparison between one’s own judgment and the 
judgment of others and tempered by the idea of intersubjective agreement. 
Within such judgments, there is an implicit aim of moving toward consensus, 
without resting on the assumption of actual agreement, or a final solution. 
Dewey’s social enquiry formalises this process and makes it more explicit. As 
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Hildebrand describes it, Dewey’s enquiry is an active method of responding to 
problems that involve feeling, abstract analysis, and practical experimentation.18 
Dewey’s notion of enquiry includes democracy as a corollary of scientific 
or inductive reasoning under the constraints of community, not as a political 
system, but as a method of communication, of making moral judgments.19 This 
method incorporates the intellectual, reasoning judgment, particularly the 
comparative edge to judgment20 and the role of feelings of condemnation or 
approval. Emphasising in effect that reason is not an exercise to be carried out in 
an individual’s isolated head but instead embedded within a community of 
rational interactions. Dewey draws our attention not only to the way our reason 
and judgment references a network of minds, but also that Kant’s conception of 
judgment anticipates this understanding of the nature of judgment. Reason, 
judgment and communication are interdependent. For example, the very terms 
we use to think are inherited from our communities, even to the level of giving 
an account of oneself, which we can only do in terms shared by our community.21  
Deweyan moral democracy is the social embodiment of experimental 
intelligence informed by sympathy and respect for other members and the 
know-how involved in rational argumentation and inductive enquiry.22 The 
outcome of this method is presented by Dewey as an ideal democratic society 
that institutionalises rational processes, that is, feedback mechanisms for 
informing lawmakers of the consequences for all of the policies they adopt. A 
process of self and community realisation: 
It is impossible, I think, even to begin to imagine the changes that would come into life – 
personal and collective – if the idea of a plurality of interconnected meanings and 
purposes replaced that of the meaning and purpose. Search for a single, inclusive good is 
doomed to failure. Such happiness as life is capable comes from full participation of all 
our powers in the endeavour to wrest from each changing situation of experience its full 
and unique meaning.23 
 
                                                          
 
18 David L. Hildebrand, 2008, Dewey: A Beginner’s Guide, Oxford: Oneworld, p. 56. 
19 The ramifications of which will be more fully explored in 9.4. 
20 As set out in Kant’s third Critique, see section 3.4, CJ AK5: 293-294. 
21 Dewey, HNC, p.10. See also section 5.3 of this thesis. 
22 John Dewey, 1916, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, 
The Free Press: New York, pp. 89-94. Hereafter D&E. 
23 Dewey, Believe, p. 179.  
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Dewey’s process of enquiry is founded on the idea that a democratic moral life 
‘falls out of’ the method of enquiry. The method is demonstrated to have been 
incorporated into a society when institutions facilitate: (1) habits of critical, 
experimental enquiry, (2) widespread communication of the consequences of 
instituting norms, and (3) extensive sympathy so that the consequences of 
norms for everyone are treated seriously and are engaged with for assessing 
alternatives.24 The idea is that if societies improve their means of communication 
along democratic lines between citizens, between citizens and institutions and 
between institutions, then there would be a better chance that possibilities could 
be identified in the face of intractable disagreements. The emphasis is on the 
process of communication rather than on focussing on reaching a particular 
conclusion. All of his concepts are relative to this ideal: to the bettering of society 
via democratic enquiry.  
 
7.3 Moral Judgments & Warranted Assertability 
 
We are beginning to see that the inclusive theme – the intrinsic pertinence of the 
internal aspects of experience – forms the cornerstone of the importance and 
import of Dewey’s work. Gouinlock captures the idea in his discussion of 
Dewey’s philosophy of value: knowing, valuing, loving, worshipping, desiring and 
dreaming occur in nature, enquiry concerns identifying the irreducible traits of 
the nature in which such diversity of events occur.25 Or in Dewey’s own words: 
There are traits, qualities, and relations found in things experienced, in the things that 
are typically and emphatically matters of human experience, which do not appear in the 
objects of physical science; namely, such things as immediate qualities, values, ends. Are 
such things inherently relevant and important for a philosophical theory of nature? I 
have held that a philosophical empiricism must take the position that they are 
intrinsically pertinent.26 
 
Nature is the whole of what is experienced and enquiry enables us to access and 
assess the way traits of nature interact. Dewey recognised that his account 
affects the status of truth. In adherence with his pragmatist roots, practical 
consequences are treated as fundamental components of meaning and truth 
                                                          
 
24 Dewey, D&E, pp. 89-94. 
25 Gouinlock, 1972, p.6. 
26 Dewey, NE, p. 247. 
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whilst at the same time the truth of a situation is independent of our thoughts on 
it (2.2). As the end products of social enquiry, such as moral and aesthetic 
reflective judgments, remain contingent and fallible, rather than universal and 
correct, Dewey dropped use of the word truth arguing that moral judgments are 
more akin to what we are ‘warranted to assert’ at the end of an enquiry. This 
does not alter the metaphysical status of such judgments – they exist and are real 
– rather it stresses the idea that we are asking the wrong question regarding the 
basis of the judgments concerned, when we relegate them relative to the results 
of scientific enquiry.  
The question of truth is undoubtedly simpler for physical objects. Whilst 
social aspects of experience such as honesty, beauty and democracy, do not have 
the same verifiable properties as physical objects, they are, nonetheless, aspects 
of experience that can be judged, more or less sensibly, more or less rationally, 
more or less reasonably. 
The ‘truth’ is, by the definition, subject to the outcome of continued inquiries; its ‘truth’, 
if the word must be used, is provisional; as near the truth as inquiry has as yet come, a 
matter determined not by a guess at some future belief but by the care and pains with 
which inquiry has been conducted up to the present time.27 
 
This is an instrumentalist methodology where ideas and theories are treated as 
tools for deriving predictions from observational data. Ideas function as guides 
of action, as a means of control over the environment and in turn actions have 
ramifications in terms of changing the world. The value of ideas is thus in their 
demonstrable success, in their ability to go some way toward addressing a 
problem. This is a process of transforming a problematic situation through a 
practice where the “…primary object of our attempts to understand the world is 
not to describe it but to manage it.”28 Valuable ideas are thus successful ideas.  
Moral and aesthetic reflective judgments, value judgments, are not 
inherently good or bad, justified or true. Steven Fesmire offers an interesting 
account of truth that reinforces this view by connecting it back to its 
                                                          
 
27 From John Dewey’s 1939 essay Experience, Knowledge, Value: A Rejoinder, quoted in 
Hildebrand, 2008, p.60 
28 Jennifer Welchman, 2002, “Logic and Judgments of Practice” in F. Thomas Burke, D. Micah 
Hester and Robert B. Talisse (Eds), Dewey’s Logical Theory: New Studies and Interpretations, New 
York: Humanities, pp. 27-42, p. 39. 
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etymological roots.29 ‘Truth’ can be traced back to the word ‘treowth’ or ‘troth’, 
connecting truth with pledges of faithfulness, with trust. For example, when two 
people pledge their faithfulness to one another in their marriage vows, they are 
then betrothed; they are promising to be true to one another. A Deweyan 
assertion or belief is warranted (or true, if you prefer) only when it passes the 
test of enquiry, making it trustworthy. If there is reason to believe that you can 
trust it, that it will hold true in the face of ongoing experience, then it must be 
that it is faithful to the original, or to the real state of affairs of experience, as it is 
experienced. An essential part of something’s being true is its ability to be 
faithful in some respect to what it is describing. For Dewey, a moral judgment is 
warranted when the effect of making the judgment brings about a desirable 
outcome for the community and the individuals comprising it. But he qualifies 
this further. 
Dewey argues that moral and aesthetic truth is a contingent matter of 
what we are warranted to assert given our interpretations of experience. 
Enquiries aim at assessment, at examination of our theories, beliefs and ideas in 
light of experiential context through a process of criticism (deconstruction) and 
reinterpretation (reconstruction).30 Concluding that this is the only view of truth 
that we can hope for in regards to social enquiries. Any other universal or 
idealist picture of truth fails on four counts:  
First, there is no verification, no effort to test and check…second…the things of ordinary 
experience do not get enlargement and enrichment of meaning as they do when 
approached through the medium of scientific principles and reasonings…third…this 
subject-matter becomes arbitrary, aloof—what is called “abstract”…something which 
occupies a world of its own without contact with the things of ordinary experience.31 
 
There is a distinction between what is experienced as the result of a minimal 
incidental reflection and what is experienced in consequence of continued and 
regulated reflective enquiry.32 The job of reflection is to derive and refine 
products through systematic thinking and expand our understanding. 
                                                          
 
29 Fesmire, “Reconstructing Dewey Today” http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31783 Accessed 
09/03/2012 
30 A theme explored by John Dewey throughout his RIP, 1948. 
31 Dewey, EN, p. 6 
32 Dewey, EN, p. 4 
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At the heart of Dewey’s ‘truth as warranted assertability’ argument is the 
realisation that social problems are not solvable puzzles. They are not privy to 
correct answers, like logic or math problems are. Rather they are ongoing 
processes of communication that afford new opportunities for more 
investigations yielding fruit in new and enriched experiences.33  
Thus there is supplied, I think, a first-rate test of the value of any philosophy which is 
offered us: Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary 
life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous 
to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful? Or does it terminate in rendering 
the things of ordinary experience more opaque than they were before, and in depriving 
them of having in “reality” even the significance they had previously seemed to have?34 
 
The criticism, the deconstruction of ideas and constructs in the light of lived 
experience, is for the sake of reconstruction. It is, as Dewey says, a process of 
sorting the wheat from the chaff, where ideas are redeveloped so that they are 
more appropriate for our place and time.  
The only way to test moral assertions for warrantability is to reflect upon 
them in the light of lived experience. For example, there is no truth test for the 
assertion “gay marriage is a social good”. In moral enquiries, warrantability is 
ascertained by a reasoned judgment and not subject to absolute proof and 
disproof like mathematical enquiries; nor aimed at context independence like 
scientific enquiry. It is only through reflection on current lived practices and 
values of our society and culture (that is, the context), that our ideas can be 
tested. This instrumentalist approach to ideas does not disregard truth per se; 
rather it acknowledges the functional role that truth plays when making 
judgments in relation to our actions being guided by tried and successful ideas. 
Insofar as they are successful, ideas are warranted, but there is never a 
guarantee that their success is universal.  
This is not a relativist view. Just as Peirce taught us, there is a way the 
world is, independent of human opinion (2.2). Human rationality entails that we 
are capable of identifying this objectively and reasonably. What is more, the way 
the world is, is binding to anyone who is capable of appreciating the relevant 
evidence regardless of cultural/social perspectives. This is a naturalist morality, 
                                                          
 
33 Dewey, EN, p. 7 
34 Dewey, EN, p. 7 
 136 
or as Brodsky notes, a biological phenomenon that is part and parcel of being 
human: 
If…experience is identified as a function of a biological entity then it becomes obvious 
that it (1) is an organic phenomenon taking place within an environing world upon 
which it is dependent, (2) is both an active and passive affair, (3) involves numerous 
connections and continuities and thus is not merely a matter of the awareness of 
received unconnected sensa, and (4) is essentially projective and, in germ, inferential 
since it involves the anticipation of future events rather than the mere awareness of 
present and the recollection of past events…it is the business of inquiry not to transform 
the world as it is experienced into the unique and independent terms of reason but to 
resolve such problematic situations as it encounters in as secure and enduring manner 
as possible.35 
 
While individuals may hold subjective and culturally, socially, religiously specific 
constructed values, there is still a way the world is. Nonetheless, values are not 
constructed in so far as there are moral properties of experience, mind-
independent facts of a particular situation. This is mind-independence in the 
sense explained in the last chapter, where having an experience is explained and 
constituted by the language used to represent it, a language which has evolved at 
the community level. 
Traditional views maintain the division between what is and how it is 
experienced, a Platonic redundancy that starts with a reflective product as if it 
were primary, as if it were the originally ‘given’. This leads to metaphysical 
problems of explaining how the outer world can affect an internal mind and a 
debate about whether the products of reflection are real or ideal. Dewey’s 
response is to incorporate the way we experience the world into our capacity to 
reflect. Brodsky captures this well in his examination of Dewey’s 
instrumentalism: 
The burden of the position is that if reflective thought is examined as it actually functions 
then no dualism of reason and experience need emerge. That is, if we do not view inquiry 
as an attempt to proceed from the apparent to the real or as the work of a faculty which 
is essentially separate from other modes of experience and which seeks, as the idealists 
would have it, to reproduce the data of experience in the form of an ideal rational 
coherent system, but instead view it as a means of transforming experiential data which 
are confused and problematic into data which are clear and coherent then there will 
simply not emerge the gap between reason and experience.”36 
 
                                                          
 
35 G. M. Brodsky, 1969, “Absolute Idealism and John Dewey’s Instrumentalism” in Transactions of 
the Charles S. Peirce Society, 5: 1, pp. 44-62, p. 56-57. 
36 Brodsky, 1969, p. 55. 
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For example, Dewey would say that ‘wrongness’ does exist in so far as it is a real 
aspect of our experiences. Perception includes qualities, such as the displeasing 
sensation of a felt response to a situation. We perceive ‘wrongness’ as a 
qualitative aspect of our experiences (Hume). However, ‘wrongness’ is not a 
property of stealing per se, it is a perceivable quality of the experience of the 
particular situation. Is ‘wrongness’ mind independent? Yes, in so far as it is a 
salient feature of a particular situation. No, in so far as it is a humanly 
constructed value.  
 
7.4 Conclusion: Hume, Kant, Mill & Dewey 
 
The full impact of Dewey’s notion of experience and enquiry is gained by reading 
him in light of ethical theorists, Hume, Kant and Mill. Put simply, moral 
judgments are processes of rationality and the exercise of judgment (Kant), 
aligning the affective (Hume) with outcomes (Mill). Dewey’s rich description of 
experience enables him to accord affect (Hume) equal footing with the effect 
(Mill). Rational (Kantian) enquiry and judgment are then complex processes of 
identifying the problem, working out what to do and taking actions with the 
awareness that decisions have consequences that affect and bring about change 
in all involved. The fall out, in terms of emotional, psychological and actual 
outcomes, is then incorporated back into the ongoing process of assessment of 
the problem through evaluation and continued rational debate.  
The studies of Hume, Kant and Mill in the chapters above enable us to 
focus on how and why Dewey rejects the reductionist or dichotomous tendencies 
of traditional ethical theories. By outlining ethical enquiry in the light of 
empirical enquiry, reflective intelligence is used to revise judgments in light of 
actions (means) and their consequences (ends) within reasoning communities. 
As moral judgments are responses to problems that are experienced as an 
uneasiness and hesitation to an indeterminate situation that evokes a need for 
enquiry, reflection (enquiry) is needed to intellectualise the emotive qualitative 
response (Hume) to the situation, to articulate what the matter is and to identify 
possibilities for action. The goal of identifying an ultimate end (telos - Mill) or 
supreme principle that serves as THE ethical criteria (categorical imperative - 
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Kant) is adapted to the goal of identifying a method for improving social 
judgment-making. 
Hume proposed that the cultivation of the sympathetic [empathetic] 
aspect of human nature was critical to the development of efficient, constructive 
and humane societies. Dewey demonstrates that he understood the importance 
of the human affective reaction of approval or disapproval in many ways:  
Upon this view, the problem of reflective morality is to discover the basis upon which 
men unconsciously manifest approval and resentment. In making explicit what is 
implicit in the spontaneous and direct attitudes of praise and blame, reflection 
introduces consistency and system into the reactions which take place without 
thought.37 
 
Conceptual frameworks and enquiry underpin experience for Dewey. This is a 
very rational (Kantian) process that treats felt qualities as genuine features of 
the world. This understanding of experience and enquiry enables Dewey to 
derive a method that is alert to how things may strike us, without having his 
account diverted by metaphysical questions regarding the difference between 
this and the ways things are independently of mind. The moral challenge is then 
focused on how to reason well. 
While Dewey’s enquiry is conceived in terms of empirical psychology, he 
uses it in an analogous way to the way that Kant envisaged reason. Kant’s notion 
of the role of community, or the constraints of communication where reason was 
concerned, is often downplayed. Dewey, however, recognised that Kant’s a priori 
universality does have a regard for social consequences. It is worth quoting 
Dewey’s discussion of Kant’s Groundwork at length: 
The extreme and logical form in which Kant states the principle of Right as distinct from 
the Good, of Law and Duty, brings out the difficulty in all theories which separate the 
right entirely from satisfaction of desires and affections…Why may not a man go ahead 
in any line of conduct provided he is persuaded that his duty lies there?...how shall a man 
go from the idea of duty in general to that of some particular act or mode of conduct as 
dutiful?...[Kant’s] answer takes the following form: The consciousness of duty is imposed 
upon us by our moral reason. We are not mere creatures of appetite and desire, of sense 
and nature, but there is within us a rational faculty which rises above desire and nature. 
It is the essence of Reason to express itself in universal and necessary terms…ask 
ourselves if the motive of that act can be made universal without falling into self-
contradiction.38  
 
                                                          
 
37 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 257. 
38 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 240-1. 
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A few pages on, Dewey claims that this method, instead of excluding all reference 
to consequences is but a way of securing impartial and general consideration of 
consequences. It tells us to consider as widely as possible the consequences of 
acting in this way.39 We can read Dewey as interpreting Kant by way of his 
pragmatism. Doing so enables us to draw attention to the idea that in reality, if 
not in formal theory, Kant’s universality holds social consequences in high 
regard. Kant drew away from this conclusion, as it seemed to suggest that the 
moral law might be context dependent. That is, if you consider consequences, 
and given consequences may be different in different contexts, then the moral 
law cannot be a priori universal. Kant’s point was that moral law must be arrived 
at independently of consequences. However, this is not inconsistent with the 
possibility that the universal law may manifest differently in different contexts. 
Dewey did not shy away from this implication, finding in the constraints of 
community exchanges, the required stability and objectivity. For Kant, the moral 
law ‘falls out of’ reason in the same way that democracy ‘falls out of’ enquiry for 
Dewey. 
Kant discusses this very point in his 1786 essay “What does it mean to 
orient oneself in thinking?”40 Here he acknowledges that unless we are able to 
communicate our thoughts to others our thinking will stagnate. To use his 
example, banning free speech is in effect, banning free thought.41 The freedom to 
think relies upon free speech or writing, whereby one’s thoughts can be 
challenged. Hence, without a context of communication there can be no genius, 
no creativity, and no exploration. “Yet how much or how correctly would we 
think if we did not think as it were in community with others to whom we 
communicate our thoughts, and who communicate theirs with us!”42 This 
endorsement of the theoretical and practical role of reason makes Kant’s 
pragmatist leanings clear. His account of freedom treats communication as the 
root of exploration of ideas. Theoretically, reason dictates that we search for the 
                                                          
 
39 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 243. 
40 Kant, Orient, pp. 3-18 [AK 8: 134-144].  
41 Kant, Orient, p. 16 [AK 8:144] 
42 Kant, Orient, p. 16 [AK 8:144] 
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universal. This is a condition of identifying the moral law. Practically though, 
reason requires the conditions for communication and hence community.  
Mill’s influence can be seen in terms of the emphasis that Dewey placed 
on the importance of consequences in terms of who we are and what we will 
become of as individuals and societies.  
Our own theory gives both the self and consequences indispensable roles. We have 
held…that neither one can be made to be merely a means to the other. There is a circular 
arrangement. The self is not a mere means to producing consequences because the 
consequences, when of a moral kind, enter into the formation of the self and the self 
enters into them.43  
 
Dewey recognised that whenever things have a bearing on the common good, 
they assume moral import44 hence the need for mindfulness of self and 
community-realisation: 
Self-realisation may be the end in the sense of being an outcome and limit of right action, 
without being the end-in-view. The kind of self which is formed through action which is 
faithful to relations with others will be a fuller and broader self than one which is 
cultivated in isolation from or in opposition to the purposes and needs of others. In 
contrast, the kind of self which results from generous breadth of interest may be said 
alone to constitute a development and fulfillment of self…to make self-realisation a 
conscious aim might and probably would prevent full attention to those very 
relationships which bring about the wider development of self.45 
 
Understanding that conduct and consequences have a formative affect on the self 
entails the recognition of the need to have regard for the self and for others. This 
understanding is, according to Dewey, a secondary phase of a more normal and 
complete interest: regard for the welfare and integrity of the social groups of 
which we form a part.46 However, regard for self and regard for others are not 
direct motives to overt action. Rather, they should be forces, which lead us to 
think of objects and consequences that would otherwise escape notice. These 
objects and consequences then constitute the interest that is the proper motive 
of action.47  
One of the distinct features of Dewey’s account of morality, is its 
grounding in reflective experience, which incorporates the very terms of the 
debate that were the sticking point between Hume and Kant: feeling and reason. 
                                                          
 
43 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 316. 
44 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 312. 
45 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 335. 
46 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 332. 
47 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 333. 
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In response, Dewey recognises the need for reflective appraisal of conduct in 
view of its wider context and consequences, with the aim of directing future 
conduct by means of these value judgments.  
The utilitarian theory of equation of acts with consequences is as much a fiction of self-
conceit as is the assumption of a fixed transcendental world wherein moral ideals are 
eternally and immutably real. Both of them deny in effect the relevancy of time, of 
change, to morals, while time is of the essence of the moral struggle.48 
 
Deweyan engagement in a process of moral reflection takes into account the 
effects of acting and their outcomes not only in terms of tackling morally 
problematic situations, but also in terms of the impact on the moral character of 
the individual and society. This is, as Brodsky notes, a radical claim, for Dewey 
“…theory is the changing of experiential data. It is not that theory, according to 
instrumentalism, has practical implications. Rather, theory is that species of 
practice which self-consciously and self-critically transforms problematic 
experiential data into clear and coherent experiential data.”49 The external 
criteria offered by traditional moral theories – principles of right, ideals of good, 
standards for praise and blame – are treated as hypotheses for the enquiry. They 
are helpful tools for taking into account the broad context and unique 
circumstances of a situation and making decisions about actions and appraising 
the consequences of said action. Signifiers of moral progress are visible in terms 
of the outcomes and their ameliorative effects and the moral progress of 
individuals and the broader community.  
Kant warned us that feelings are useless moral compasses as they 
endlessly differ, change and fluctuate; they are therefore unreliable as grounds 
for making moral judgments.50 Kant’s commitment to the categorical imperative 
and with it the autonomy of the will, which are true and absolutely necessary as 
an a-priori proposition, reflects this. Mill recognised that communication is an 
essential part of the process of criticism and verification (as we also saw in Kant 
in relation to free speech and judgment). Dewey acknowledged this complexity 
and responded to it with a moral theory that does not make claims that dictate 
right and wrong, find fix-all solutions or dissipate disagreements. As Pappas puts 
                                                          
 
48 Dewey, HNC, p. 51. 
49 Brodsky, 1969, p. 59.  
50 Kant, GW, [AK 443:60], (Pasternack, Ed., trans. Paton), p. 58. 
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it, morality is, for Dewey “a social, creative, imaginative, emotional, hypothetical, 
and experimental process to ameliorate present situations.”51 His basic aim was 
not to find solutions to problems, but to foster problem-solving abilities 
extending it as a necessary activity for social and individual development52 – or 
self and community realisation. 
Dewey offers a comprehensive moral theory that provides a practical 
method for the cultivation of moral societies. James Campbell clarifies; this is an 
intelligent ethics that encompasses the heterogeneity of goods.    
The morality that is to grow out of this stance, intelligent or scientific ethics, will need to 
be explicitly naturalistic rather than supernatural. It will also need to turn away from 
egoism and narrow individualism. The necessity for the cooperative searching for the 
‘good’ also involves a great deal of toleration for those of differing perspectives and the 
fostering of all of these points in our social interactions and ultimately in our educational 
systems.53 
 
Dewey inherited a non-metaphysically encumbered pragmatic approach, which 
enabled him to not only expand and generalise concepts so that they are 
applicable but to also explain the social applicability of self-realisation. It seems a 
simple truism to say that actions are never isolated to the individual, that 
everything we do affects others, but the impact of such a view in terms of moral 
theory, cannot be underestimated.  
Dewey’s is a profoundly naturalistic approach: we can know what exists 
through the study of nature, where nature is understood as the whole of what is 
experienced, not just that which is other than humanity. This represents the 
crucial difference between his position and that of Hume, Kant and Mill.54  
For will, as we have seen, means, in the concrete, habits; and habits incorporate an 
environment within themselves. They are adjustments of the environment, not merely to 
it. At the same time, the environment is many, not one; hence will, disposition, is plural. 
Diversity does not in itself imply conflict, but it implies the possibility of conflict, and this 
possibility is realised in fact…Our problem is to see what objectivity signifies upon a 
naturalistic basis; how morals are objective yet secular and social. Then we may be able 
to decide in what crisis of experience morals become legitimately dependent upon 
character or self—that is, “subjective.”55 
 
                                                          
 
51 Pappas, 2008, p.301. 
52 Gouinlock, 1986, p. 52. See also section 6.3. 
53 Campbell, 1995, p. 99. 
54 Arguably Hegel held this view, although grounded in his Idealism rather than naturalism. A 
fuller discussion of the influence of Hegel and Dewey’s move away from his Hegelian roots can be 
found in section 10.2. 
55 Dewey, HNC, p. 52-3. 
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Dewey’s aim is to embed experience in realism as a manifestation of nature. This 
enables him to grant subjective, qualitative phenomenal experience equal 
standing to physical objects. His “rules without railings”56 dismisses the 
traditional view that the tracks that we follow are objectively there to be 
followed in a way that transcends the reactions and responses of participants in 
our practices.57 Disagreement thus provides opportunities – opportunities for 
societal progress through communication without coercion.  
The understanding of two key Deweyan notions, namely experience and 
enquiry, provides us with the theoretical tools to discuss contemporary related 
debates in moral philosophy in the ensuing chapters. Chapter eight, on 
cognitivism and non-cognitivism and chapter nine, on pluralism and monism, 
examine two contemporary debates about the character of moral disagreement 
before setting out contemporary theories of pragmatic proceduralism in chapter 
ten. The penultimate chapter, eleven, turns the framework provided by Dewey 
and tests its applicability to actual moral disputes – as opposed to idealized 
hypotheticals – through a case study analysis. We will see that his proceduralist 
account, particularly his characterisation of ethical disputes and his response of 
enquiry as a tool for an instrumental theory of moral judgment, does offer us a 
useful method for engaging with disagreement. 
                                                          
 
56 “Rules without railings” paraphrases a metaphor used by McDowell: “rules as rails”. His 
discussion of the point can be found in Chapter 10, “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following” of 
McDowell, 1998, pp.198-218, in particular pp. 207-08.  
57 McDowell, 1998, p. 207. 
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8. Cognitivism & Non-Cognitivism 
 
What makes moral judgments difficult is the tenacity of moral disagreement. It is 
not contentious to assert that there are moral disagreements and that such 
conflicts make moral judgments challenging and problematic. What is difficult is 
to clarify the character of persistent, seemingly intractable and pervasive moral 
disagreements. This has lead to much debate about what the relevant features of 
moral judgments are. Some claim they must be objective, authoritative, universal 
and impartial. Others assert that in the absence of moral facts, moral judgments 
are subjective – the best we can hope for is that they are demonstrative of having 
traversed well-informed opinions that go beyond individual feelings. In response 
to this seeming impasse, Dewey offers a process-driven, rather than solution-
driven, view of judgments of value. This signals a move away from both the 
desire-driven non-cognitivist view that denies truth on the one hand, and the 
fact-finding cognitivist view that treats solutions as truth-apt correct answers on 
the other. The purpose of this chapter and the following is to begin to tease out 
the multifaceted and nuanced problem of what moral disagreement is, in order 
to motivate the need for the pragmatic proceduralist account, which is provided 
in chapter ten. This and the following chapter also demonstrate how 
interpretations of Dewey’s ethics can by led astray when they are not grounded 
in the history of ideas as presented in this thesis. 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
Often cited examples of persistent disagreement about ethical issues such as 
abortion, stem cell research or gay marriage are prime examples of the 
complexity of moral problems. For example, we can assert that the cornerstone 
of the abortion disagreement seems to be terminological. Even though both sides 
of the debate source scientific evidence to support their moral judgments, their 
assumptions and conclusions are vastly divergent. Pro-lifers rely on the presence 
of DNA as evidence for ‘humanness’ as soon as the zygote is formed. In response 
the pro-choicer concedes that while the zygote is human, ‘personhood’, or what 
it means to be human, is absent. In this particular case, differences in terms 
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reveal differences in many underlying assumptions about, for example, 
responsibility and purpose, the depth and divisiveness of which would seem to 
be intractable.  
I argue that because moral disagreements are not defined in terms of a 
lack of information, disputant limitations, irrationality, foolishness, or cultural 
differences, it is often difficult, if not impossible to come to agreement. On the 
one hand, traditional cognitive views of moral judgments as statements of moral 
facts, such as ‘abortion is right’ or ‘killing journalists is wrong’ fail to capture the 
complexity of the debates and in doing so, underestimate the tenacity of moral 
disagreement. On the other hand, non-cognitivist conclusions, such as there are 
no moral facts or properties, or that moral facts and properties are relative, for 
example, overestimate the corrosiveness of disagreement. Dewey recognised this 
complexity and responded to it by developing a moral theory that does not aim 
to dictate right and wrong. By locating Dewey as responding to aspects of Hume, 
Kant and Mill regarding the nature of moral judgment, we can better understand 
his methodology for tackling moral disagreement. Dewey’s basic aim was not 
construed in terms of finding solutions to problems, but rather to fostering 
problem-solving abilities. 
In order to investigate the role that moral facts and cultural differences 
play in disagreement, section 8.2 looks at the contemporary debate regarding 
cognitivism and non-cognitivism. On the one hand we have the cognitivists, such 
as Michael Smith and Russ Shafer-Landau, who on the grounds of objectivity, 
deny the intractability of disagreement all together. Underpinning this position is 
the metaphysical claim that there is a discoverable correct answer. Some 
cognitivists argue that all moral disagreements are just apparent, that in fact at 
least one side of the disagreement are not engaged in moral judgments at all but 
are making a self-interested one, which by definition for these cognitivists, is not 
a moral judgment. Other cognitivists identify irrationality as the source of 
disagreement arguing that once all sides are cognisant of all the facts, and are 
able to exercise reason appropriately, consensus is eventually achieved.  
On the other hand, non-cognitivists, such as Alfred Jules Ayer and John 
Leslie Mackie accept the intractability of disagreement by denying objectivity. 
For the non-cognitivist, disagreements are intractable and inevitable simply 
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because there are multiple cultures with multiple values that clash. This leads 
them to conclude that there is no single right answer to be identified – moral 
judgments are relative, subjective or emotive. Following Dewey, (who in this 
case is better understood through the ideas of John McDowell1 who arguably 
owes much to him), I argue in section 8.3 that we cannot fully describe the world 
in terms of properties without any reference to the way that they affect us. This 
means that we can avoid the cognitivist’s treatment of the subjective as a 
subversive eroder of moral facts and the non-cognitivist’s denial of objectivism 
that leaves them in the weak position of some form of moral relativism. The 
conclusion (8.4) summarises the value of Dewey’s notions of experience and 
enquiry in terms of releasing us from the cognitivist and non-cognitivist’s 
ensnarement in the bifurcation of the objective and subjective. 
 
8.2 Moral Disagreement: the Cognitivist vs. Non-Cognitivist 
 
The problem of the persistence of moral disagreement underscores a much more 
general debate about the metaphysical character of morality, raising questions 
about the nature of moral properties and their objectivity or subjectivity. On the 
one hand the abortion example above might suggest that there is no reason to 
think that moral problems admit of objective solutions. It might also suggest that 
differences in culture or religious beliefs lead to interminable differences in 
perspective, which in turn leads to differences in moral judgments and seemingly 
intractable disagreements. Mackie’s “Argument from Relativity” cites such 
“radical” differences in moral judgments as evidence for the idea that it is 
difficult to treat those judgments as apprehensions of objective truths.2 In 
contrast, the prevalence of property description in the cognitivist camp, leads to 
claims that moral statements express beliefs that are apt for truth or falsity. The 
cognitivist limits the complex of experience to property descriptions alone, 
abjuring affective qualities inextricably linked to objective properties.  
                                                          
 
1 See, for example: McDowell, 1983 and 1998. 
2 John Leslie Mackie, 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, New York: Hamondworth, p. 36. 
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Dewey’s proceduralism can be understood as denying the metaphysics 
from which these arguments emerge. His response is to circumvent the 
metaphysical debate by accepting that it is, as he puts it, yet another redundant 
hangover of the “false psychology of an isolated self”.3 In response, he brings the 
consensus aim of the cognitivist together with the motivational resources of the 
non-cognitivist. The former fuels our convictions in terms of principles and the 
latter accommodates feelings, attitudes and outlooks. The cognitivist’s call for 
convergence as the best outcome of a process of enquiry is employed solely as an 
aim of thin agreement (10.3) not necessarily in actuality, but the possibility of it 
directs the process of enquiry and communication. On this view, there is an 
assumption that the deliberative process will eventually iron out disagreements 
only insofar as this assumption motivates us to continue engaging in 
communication regarding perceived problems and their possible solutions. First, 
we turn to the non-cognitivists and cognitivists in order to be clear about the 
terms of the debate. 
 At the extreme end of the non-cognitivist side, we find the expressivism of 
A. J. Ayer and as mentioned earlier, the emotivism of J.L. Mackie. In Language, 
Truth and Knowledge.4 Ayer’s expressivist “boo/hoorah” theory of ethics is 
grounded in non-cognitivist metaphysics: moral statements such as “stealing is 
wrong” cannot be empirically verified, as there are no moral facts to be known.5 
Ayer is claiming that because moral judgments do not correspond to something 
in the world that can be empirically verified, they are meaningless statements 
that are void of content. If a statement does have meaning, then it should be able 
to be verified for its truth or falsity, but wrongness is not something that we can 
discover.6 Ayer concludes that ‘wrongness’ is therefore nothing more than an 
expression of our emotional response to a situation. All that moral statements do 
is express an attitude. So “stealing is wrong” simply expresses the attitude 
“Stealing, boo!”  
                                                          
 
3 Dewey, HNC, p. 57. 
4 Alfred Jules Ayer, 1955, (1936), Language, Truth, and Logic, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd. 
5 Ayer, 1936, p. 108. 
6 Recall Hume’s problem of induction, which recognised that moral statements are neither 
matters of fact nor relations of ideas (3.2). 
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It is important to note that Ayer’s expressivism is different to 
subjectivism, a view that we will look at momentarily in regard to Mackie’s error 
theory. The subjectivist can hold that moral judgments are about feelings of 
approval or disapproval that a particular person or group feels towards an 
action. Such responses, according to the subjectivist, can be truth apt because 
they have content; the badness of an act triggers a feeling of disapproval, which 
is directed toward that act. In contrast, Ayer’s expressivism holds that rather 
than being descriptions that arouse feelings of approval or disapproval directed 
at relevant events, expressions of “boo” or “hoorah” are simply attitudes without 
rational foundations. Attitudes, in Ayer’s taxonomy, are feelings that a person 
has about an event and feelings are the kind of things about which we cannot be 
held responsible. So, for example, my distress about force-feeding ducks to make 
foie gras bears no weight as a judgment, such as “foie gras is bad”. My response 
cannot be considered a judgment, as the badness is nothing more than an 
attitude – “foie gras, boo!” This forces Ayer to admit that moral values are 
grounded in nothing other than impressions.  
Whilst Ayer recognises that attitudes can be generalised and standardised 
into a social set of norms of rightness and wrongness, he does not acknowledge 
the normative implications of this very possibility. Another problem for Ayer’s 
expressivism is that it cannot account for the idea that moral judgments look like 
assertions and as such they look as though they should be truth evaluable. 
Returning to the question of the character of disagreement will help to elucidate 
this point. Ayer’s somewhat unsatisfactory response to the reality that there are 
often disputes about moral judgments, is to assert that these disputes are either 
not genuine, or that the disagreement reflects confusion about relevant aspects 
of the situation. Mackie’s emotivist error theory offers a possible way out for 
Ayer by awarding subjective responses, or feelings, primary place in moral 
decisions.  
Mackie admits that while moral decisions look like assertions and it does 
seem that moral value is a “part of the fabric of the world”7 it is actually an 
illusion. Whilst they look like beliefs that should therefore be truth-apt, they are 
                                                          
 
7 Mackie, 1977, p. 15. 
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actually nothing more than subjectively defined standards, hence not judgments 
as such. Mackie begins with the empirical observation that there is a lot of 
variation in moral views and that moral disagreements often look as though they 
are intractable. He argues that the best way to explain this is by understanding 
that moral judgments reflect adherence to and participation in different ways of 
life.8 Morals are relative to culture thus disagreements result from the 
subjectivity of values. This is what Mackie calls The Argument from Relativity: 
from the observable factual anthropological description that there are different 
moral beliefs across different cultures that lead to radically different moral 
judgments and disagreements, he argues that there can be no objectivity of 
values.9 He is careful to point out that unlike scientific endeavours, actual 
variations in moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they 
reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions of 
objective values.10 Thus disagreement about moral codes reflects people’s 
adherence to and participation in different ways of life, whereas disagreements 
about scientific matters are due to problems with evidence.11  
Like Ayer, Mackie’s non-cognitivism is grounded in moral scepticism. 
Both deny the possibility of moral knowledge on the grounds of a lack of 
objective values, where for moral values to be objective, they must be real 
qualities in the world, where ‘real’, is conceived according to foundational 
empiricism. Mackie does not deny that we can make objective judgments about 
subjective values. For example, we can judge ‘A to be braver than B’, however 
this is only possible because we have already established inter-subjectively 
defined standards against which we make objective evaluations.12 Mackie’s 
ultimate aim is to demonstrate that the whole idea of striving for 
universalisability in morality is mistaken.13 There can be no objective moral 
values because there are far too many different values and moral codes between 
                                                          
 
8 Mackie, 1977, p. 36. 
9 Mackie, 1977, Part 1, Section 1, Subsection 8, pp. 36-38. The Argument from Relativity is often 
referred to as The Argument from Disagreement; the latter perhaps better capturing the root of 
the problem. 
10 Mackie, 1977, p. 37. 
11 Mackie, 1977, p. 36. 
12 Mackie, 1977, p. 36-7. 
13 Mackie, 1977, p. 37. 
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and within cultures – any general principles for which widespread acceptance 
could be claimed, may still arouse irresolvably different responses in others.14 
Intractable disagreement is simply a reflection of this.  
By comparison, the key premise of the cognitivist position is that moral 
statements express beliefs that are truth apt and by extension, solution apt. As 
Smith states, moral questions have correct answers, which are made correct by 
objective moral facts and moreover, by engaging in moral argument, we can 
discover what these objective moral facts are.15 The cognitivist therefore has an 
expectation that after enough of the right sort of argument, reflection and 
discussion, there will eventually be some kind of agreement, perhaps involving 
compromise, but agreement nonetheless.16 How then, do cognitivists respond to 
the persistence of disagreement over issues such as abortion and gay marriage? 
Will all disagreements eventually be ironed out over time through deliberative 
persistence? Shafer-Landau explains that for the cognitivist, disagreement is not 
evidence for the non-cognitivist claim that there is no fact of the matter. Rather, 
disagreement indicates a fault of at least one of the interlocutors: a lack of 
information, a deliberative error, or some irrational emotional response that 
stands as a barrier to moral convergence.17  
Shafer-Landau’s assertion that most disagreement can be accounted for 
by insufficient knowledge and imperfect deliberation supports Smith’s thesis in 
The Moral Problem, which generated a raft of responses that were then published 
in a 1997 issue of Ethics.18 The cognitivist intuition that disagreement itself 
presupposes a belief that someone is in error, that they do not have all the 
                                                          
 
14 Mackie, 1977, p. 38. 
15 Michael Smith, 1994, The Moral Problem, Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. p. 9, cf. 13. This is a 
realist position based on a correspondence theory of truth. The metaphysics of correspondence 
is very important to the cognitivist position, as it demands that the truth or falsity of a moral 
statement can be determined by how it relates to the world. If a moral statement actually 
describes or corresponds with the world then the cognitivist can claim that moral judgments will 
eventually converge – everyone will agree on the moral facts. 
16 Smith, 1994, p. 6. 
17 Russ Shafer-Landau, 1994, “Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism and Moral 
Indeterminacy” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 2, pp. 331-344, p. 331. 
18 See in particular: David Brink, 1997, “Moral Motivation” in Ethics, 108: 1, pp. 4-32; David Copp, 
1997, “Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem” in Ethics, 108: 1, pp. 
33-54; Geoffrey Sayer-McCord, 1997, “The Metaethical Problem” in Ethics, 108: 1, pp. 55-83; 
Smith’s response: Michael Smith, 1997, “In Defense of “The Moral Problem”: A Reply to Brink, 
Copp, and Sayre-McCord” in Ethics, 108: 1, pp. 84-119. 
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available facts and that once they do a solution will be discovered, seems 
legitimate. This is certainly an accurate description of how we approach 
disagreement. However, if Mackie is right, if moral judgments do not involve 
‘objective truths’ in the way that cognitivists want them to, then perhaps 
intractable disagreements do provide evidence for the non-cognitivist position: 
there are underlying clashes of attitudes that cannot be reasoned away. The 
worry with the non-cognitivist position is that if it is taken to its extreme, then 
we end up in a highly unsatisfactory relativist position where assertions such as 
‘Murder is wrong’ hold no weight beyond that of opinion or weaker still, Ayer’s 
sense of attitude.  
One advantage of the cognitivist position is that their response can 
frankly deny the subjectivity that leads to cultural relativity. So, in regards to a 
cultural practice such as female genital mutilation, the cognitivist would simply 
say that the culture is wrong; the practice is immoral and they are violating 
universal objective principles concerning avoidance of doing harm and causing 
suffering. Cheryl Misak argues that the pragmatist, the ‘deliberative democrat’, 
must be a cognitivist by the very fact that communication and engagement with 
others involves believing, asserting and arguing: 
We do assert, we do believe, we do engage with others, we do take disagreement to 
matter…It is not just that we take ourselves to aim at something more than personal 
justification and community-wide justification. We do aim at something more and could 
not even make the attempt to stop.19  
 
I think that whilst the cognitivist idea that moral arguments are rationally 
solvable is enticing, their account of objectivity guaranteeing the eventuation of 
convergence on the right answer through consensus is weakened by the 
empirical fact of persistent disagreement.20 At the other end of the scale, the 
relativism of the non-cognitivist position is unsatisfactory. Morality must be 
more than mere subjective or emotional responses, cultural differences or 
                                                          
 
19 Cheryl Misak, 2004, “Making Disagreement Matter: Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy” 
in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 18: 1, pp. 9-22, p. 19. 
20 As John Doris and Stephen Stich point out, there is a striking lack of convergence even after 
protracted argument on many moral issues – abortion and capital punishment, for example. John 
M. Doris and Stephen P. Stich, 2005, “As a Matter of Fact: Empirical Perspectives on Ethics” in 
Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (Ed’s.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 114-152, p. 131. 
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individual perspectives. After all, some individual and cultural practices, such as 
violence and killing in the name of religion, are incontrovertibly morally 
reprehensible.  
As we saw with the slavery example, in the introduction to the thesis, 
there seems to be no question about the immorality of slavery. However there 
are morally questionable practices, such as child labour that we directly benefit 
from and as such, persist regardless of our moral condemnation of economic 
slavery. The cognitivist expectation that there will be a single solution that solves 
the problem of economic slavery not only seems overly optimistic but also 
trivialises the complexity of the problem. On the other hand, surely the non-
cognitivist would not be comfortable with reducing the wrongness of child 
labour to a matter of perspective or hinging such judgments on the production of 
bad feelings. The cognitivist offers us more resources for defending principles or 
a position, but is weak in terms of explaining the source of motivation for doing 
anything about it, for taking action. The advantage of the non-cognitivist 
approach is that it taps into our feelings, however, whilst it is strong on 
motivation, it is weak on universalisable reasons for being moral, which is a gap 
that the cognitivist can fill.  
Both approaches leave something out. The cognitivist’s insistence on 
identifying solutions is unable to give an adequate account of the persistence of 
disagreements. It cannot be denied that disagreement persists even in accounts 
of hypothetical disagreement among idealized agents who are fully informed and 
perfectly rational. Traditional cognitive accounts that assert that there is a 
cognitive defect on the part of one of the interlocutors lurking somewhere deep 
down that will eventually be discovered, seems to be nothing more than an 
untestable hypothesis.21  Regarding the non-cognitivists’ insistence on a lack of 
objectivity, this view leaves them unable to adequately account for agreements 
and consensus when it does occur. This in turn incapacitates the possibility of 
action, regardless of whether general disagreements persist. What’s more, non-
cognitivist claims of wrongness in regards to morally reprehensible acts such as 
                                                          
 
21 Shafer-Landau, 1994, p. 332. 
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slavery seem weak and insubstantial, as they are unable to be universally 
applied.  
The cognitivist/non-cognitivist debate hinges on the metaphysical 
problems of the disjunctive exclusion of objectivism or subjectivism. The 
problem of the persistence of moral disagreement is troubling for both views. 
Applied to this debate, we can argue that both sides are simply asking the wrong 
question regarding the basis of the judgments concerned. The cognitivist and 
non-cognitivist are too restrictive and rigid in their treatment of objectivity 
leading them to falsely question the reality of affective subjective qualities of our 
experience. In contrast, Dewey’s position takes the metaphysical status of moral 
judgments for granted – they exist and are real – they are the qualitative traits of 
experience that can be discerned and judged through social enquiry (chapter 
seven). We cannot isolate the world from our experience of it. We cannot remove 
our experiencing selves. Dewey’s approach allows him to formulate a pragmatic 
process of problematisation (6.3), where the normative or prescriptive is 
constrained by descriptive considerations.  
 
8.3 Pragmatism: Morality Without Metaphysics 
 
A contemporary account that resonates with the Deweyan account presented in 
this thesis is presented in John McDowell’s “Aesthetic value, objectivity, and the 
fabric of the world”.22 McDowell rebuffs Mackie’s non-cognitivist position with 
the observation that he treats the thesis that ‘value is in the world’ as 
interchangeable with the thesis that ‘value is objective’.23 In other words, 
Mackie’s implied doctrine that whatever is part of the world is objective, forces 
him into the misconstrual that we can fully describe the world in terms of 
properties, without any reference to the way that they affect us.  
It would be as if we tried to construct a conception of amusingness which was fully 
intelligible otherwise than in terms of the characteristic human responses to what is 
amusing, but which nevertheless contrived somehow to retain the “phenomenal” aspect 
of amusingness as we experience it in those responses.24 
 
                                                          
 
22 McDowell, 1983. 
23 McDowell, 1983, p. 2. 
24 McDowell, 1983, p. 4. 
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McDowell argues that the problem for Mackie’s explanation is that he equates 
disagreement with differences in valuations between or within communities.25 
Mackie also claims that the fact that there is variation in valuings is “‘more 
readily explained by the hypothesis that they [the valuings] reflect ways of life 
than by the hypothesis that they reflect perceptions…of objective values.’”26 
McDowell’s (and arguably Dewey’s before him) point is that we cannot separate 
our capacity to feel from how we perceive and conceive the world.  
McDowell argues that we cannot remove the subjective from the way we 
perceive the world because we cannot transcend our conception of the world, of 
reality. We can, following Kant, conceive of the world more or less rationally, 
more or less reasonably, but we cannot remove subjectivity from perception. The 
claim that we can conceive of the world objectively, where objectivity refers to 
the world as it stands independently of observers, is nothing more than, as 
Dewey put it, a myth perpetuated by the “Quest for Certainty”,27 a hangover of 
being caught staring at the wall of Plato’s cave. McDowell concurs: to monopolise 
the ‘reality’ side of the distinction between reality and appearance depends on 
the possibility of extending it so as to become the absolute conception. That is, 
extending it so as to embrace and explain the particular points of view it 
transcends.28 The idea of a view from nowhere is incoherent.29 
The seeds of McDowell’s position can be seen in Dewey. The aim of 
Dewey’s method of ‘enquiry into experience’ was to accommodate the subjective 
within perception, as an inextricable part of how we understand the world. 
Dewey railed against the idea that the objective could be stripped free of the 
subjective. He recognised that we, human organisms, perceive the world. We 
cannot simply remove subjectivity from our observations, from our experience 
of the world.30 Notably, this does not, as the cognitivist would assume, land us in 
a quagmire of relativism, or perspectivism, or a questionable reality. 
                                                          
 
25 McDowell, 1983, p. 3. 
26 McDowell, 1983, p. 3. Quoting Mackie, 1977, p. 37. 
27 A poignant theme for Dewey that led him to write an entire book: John Dewey, 1929, The Quest 
For Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action, New York: Balch & Company. 
28 McDowell, 1983, p. 9. Quoting Williams, 1978, pp. 245-6. 
29 McDowell, 1983, p. 6. 
30 For the relation of perception to experience see 5.3 of this thesis. 
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It is pointless to chafe at the fact that what we believe is what we believe. We can justify 
beliefs we hold about how things are only by appealing to what are in fact further beliefs 
we hold about how things are; but it would be a mistake to let this tend to undermine 
our confidence in the beliefs, or in their possession of a subject-matter largely 
independent of themselves – our confidence that we have reality more or less within our 
cognitive grasp.31 
  
McDowell argues that the problem for the non-cognitivist conception of values is 
that it mistakenly demands independence between how things are and how they 
strike us. The conception “how things really are is how things are in 
themselves”32 leads to extensions where “secondary qualities, as we experience 
them are not genuine features of reality.”33 This is a mistake, according to 
McDowell. 
Whilst McDowell argues that this is a mistake, it is important to note that 
he does not go as far as Dewey. McDowell offers an internalist explanation about 
moral motivation via rationalism, which leaves out attitudes altogether: moral 
duties can be intrinsically motivational without the need of pro-attitudes.34 This 
position arguably reflects the fear first hailed by Kant: morality must be a set of 
necessary characteristics and behaviours that we are able to control, rather than 
a matter of mood or whim. McDowell is arguing against non-cognitivism from a 
firmly cognitivist position.35 Dewey, on the other hand, recognises that if we are 
to stress that our perception of ‘how things really are’ cannot be isolated from 
how we conceive things to be, then we recognise that the cognitive and non-
cognitive, subjective and objective, cannot be bifurcated in a way that forces us 
to choose one or the other.  
One way of conceiving Dewey’s position is that it is not a matter of 
cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism, but rather cognitivism and non-cognitivism. For 
example, we have senses that equip us with abilities such as colour discernment 
and we have affective and attitudinal propensities that equip us with the ability 
to morally and aesthetically evaluate experiences.36 The crucial advantage of 
                                                          
 
31 McDowell, 1983, p. 14. 
32 McDowell, 1998, p. 198. 
33 McDowell, 1998, p. 199.  
34 Brink, 1997, p. 6. 
35 Brink offers an excellent summary of contemporary philosophers and their positions in his 
reply to Michael Smith. Brink, 1997, pp. 6-7. 
36 McDowell, 1998, p. 199.  
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understanding experience in this way is that it is able to bring together the non-
cognitive aspect of moral judgments that Mackie discusses in terms of social 
norms, with the cognitive aspect that Smith discusses in terms of convergence 
through reasonable exchanges. Mediation between the two is the responsibility 
of the community, the public arena.37 Dewey is entitled to this more nuanced 
view because he anticipated what is now de rigueur in philosophy of mind 
positions such as embodied cognition. Cognition involves a network, which 
extends beyond the individual isolated mind.38  
 Traditional cognitivism suggests that the tracks we follow are objectively 
there to be followed, in a way that transcends the reactions and responses of 
participants in our practices.39 While to some degree precedent and cultural 
tradition provides tracks to follow, ongoing moral disagreements around such 
topics as abortion and gay marriage indicate that the reactions and responses of 
participants cannot be dismissed and disregarded. Dewey’s proceduralist 
account of moral judgment attempts to treat conflict and disagreement as 
opportunities for societal progress through communication without coercion. By 
engaging with disagreement, the reactions and responses of participants offer 
valuable insights into the problem and the identification of possible solutions. 
Tracks can be laid down anew. 
McDowell reminds us that it is an illusory desire for security that is the 
driving force behind the traditional position. This is not to deny that this is a 
well-based worry. Social harmony demands that if there is going to be grounds 
for alleviating all our self-interests to some extent then there has to be some way 
to come to agreement or at least identify some shared values. But, as Stanley 
Cavell points out, there is no insurance, no guarantee that our practices will keep 
in line independently from our responses and reactions – nothing ensures that 
this will take place.40 Both the cognitivist and non-cognitivist fail to see the far-
                                                          
 
37 This idea will be further explained through contemporary case studies of moral disagreement 
in chapter ten. 
38 McDowell, 1998, pp.207-08.  
39 McDowell, 1998, p. 207. 
40 Stanley Cavell, 2002, p. 52. 
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reaching ramifications of this: there is no independent Platonic perspective and 




When subsequent moral philosophers overlook Dewey’s conception of 
experience, they miss the crucial contribution he makes to moral theory. The 
naïve antirealism of the non-cognitivist dismisses the role of objectivity 
altogether. On the other hand, the naivety of the cognitivist is evidenced by their 
submission to the thesis that the world is fully describable in terms of properties 
without any reference to how the world affects us. This narrow view of 
objectivity cuts off the experiencer from experience, or simply treats experience 
as idiosyncratic.41 Dewey’s ‘enquiry into experience’ demonstrates that the 
cognitivist’s insistence that moral judgments are eventually going to converge on 
the answer is equally as naïve as the non-cognitivist’s insistence that there are 
no answers at all. 
Notably, Dewey goes further than McDowell (who identifies as a 
cognitivist) and sidesteps the division altogether. This is achieved by addressing 
the role of habit, impulse and intelligence against the background argument that 
the function of judgments of value is to guide conduct. The problem with getting 
caught up in metaphysics is that we are led astray, away from the real work that 
distinctions of cognitive and non-cognitive, objective and subjective, for example, 
can do. On the one hand, as McDowell explains, the illusion is the misconception 
of the mathematical case; the idea that provable correctness characterises 
exercises of reason in which it is, as it were, automatically compelling. On the 
other hand it can be argued that the illusion is the idea that attitudinal responses 
amount to nothing more than attitudinal stances that lead to exclamations of 
‘boo’ or ’hoorah’ (in Ayer’s case) or culturally relative subjective feelings (in 
Mackie’s case), neither of which are rationally explicable.  
                                                          
 
41 Dewey’s percept theory of perception, provides the theoretical framework for this position 
(5.3). 
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Dewey’s proceduralism recognises that any system of belief, desire and 
purpose is inextricably influenced by the interaction of biological aptitudes with 
a social environment. The problem with the traditional view that is prolonged in 
many of the current debates, is that they treat subject matter, and the reason 
brought to bear upon it, as a corollary of the state of experiencing. In contrast, 
according to Dewey, values and the judgments we make on the basis of them 
(valuings as Dewey would say) are very much characteristic responses to the 
world in which humans figure where the rational basis is comprised of the 
constraints of giving and asking for reasons (as Smith might argue). Moral 
judgments are evaluations of our experiences of the world, evaluations based on 
a world where reality is a flurry of facts and values, but nonetheless both 
objective and perhaps inter-subjective in the sense that they are not personal, 
idiosyncratic or whimsical.  
The problem with traditional metaphysical positions is that they lead to 
dichotomies: external or internal, objective or subjective; cognitive or non-
cognitive; plural or monist. In contrast, Dewey shows us that the orientation and 
mental processes represented by these terms cannot be separated as each is an 
aspect of how we perceive and conceive the world and therefore the way the 
world is – there is a grey scale. Ethical theories must be able to account for as 
Cavell puts it, “all the whirl of an organism”42: the external and internal, objective 
and subjective; cognitive and non-cognitive; plural and monist; properties and 
qualities of experience. 
I have attempted to revisit Dewey’s relevance to the present by setting his 
ideas within a broader historical context than he is normally located in the 
Pragmatist literature. When Dewey is understood historically in relation to 
Hume, Kant and Mill, his notion of a rationally grounded feeling as expressed 
through his idea of experience structured and made possible by concepts, is 
better appreciated and understood.  He provides a groundwork that draws on 
the idea of evolving norms (Hume), conceptualised experience (Kant) and a 
mind, which extends into a community of giving and asking for reasons 
(Mill).  This re-positioning of Dewey, more clearly reveals his account in a way 
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that highlights his relevance to the present, as I have demonstrated here and will 
continue in the next and final chapters.  
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9. Monism & Pluralism 
 
This chapter offers a pragmatist response to a second contemporary debate that 
concerns moral judgment, namely, whether or not the possibility of moral 
disagreement supports any particular theory of value. Value pluralists assert that 
there are many different moral values. For example, value may be placed upon 
pleasure, or duty, or cooperation as ultimate ends in any particular moral 
judgment. In contrast, value monists argue that there is one fundamental 
overarching value that guides all moral decisions, such as, for example, 
happiness. There are two main schools of thought in the debate: foundationalist 
and decision proceduralist. The former is a metaphysical position that aims to 
pin down the nature of values and so either supports monism or pluralism as 
exhaustive and exclusive categories. The latter is a general decision procedural 
stance that employs pluralism to capture the diversity of values and monism to 
identify and instantiate an overarching value that guides decision procedures. 
Both accommodate the possibility of moral disagreement, although the former 
treats disagreement either as a sign of error or alternatively as an irresolvable 
conflict, whereas the latter treats disagreement as the catalyst of moral progress. 




Dewey’s method of engaging with ethical problems and making moral 
judgments, is driven by concern for who or what we as individuals or societies 
could become. He focuses directly on problems of decision-making, action and 
communication: on how to deal with and respond to disagreements and the 
conflicts that ensue from them. This focus is built on the back of his conception of 
‘experience’, where sentience is not separated from how we perceive and 
conceive the world. This allows him to focus his attention on how morality is 
possible in a sentient world. His account posits that whilst an overarching 
monistic aim such as amelioration of a problematic situation or individual and 
community eudemonia may indeed guide our deliberations (social enquiries), 
given the complexity and diversity of individual, cultural, societal, and political 
values at stake, the most that can be hoped for is to find ways to proceed. As we 
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saw in the previous chapter, there is no cognitivist objective single correct 
answer to be found, nor are decisions based on subjective, idiosyncratic or 
personal preferences, desires or feelings, for Dewey. This treatment of values as 
affective and yet objective, mind independent qualities of experience enables 
him to sidestep the divisive metaphysical position of foundationalism. The 
instantiation of an overarching monistic value for practical purposes, such as the 
identification of a general goal or a common interest, indicates that decision 
procedural monism, which Dewey defends, is important to his account. Drawing 
from his conception of experience and enquiry (chapters six and seven), Dewey’s 
account of social enquiry demonstrates that the decision proceduralist view has 
greater explanatory power than foundationalism. 
The Deweyan picture, which is arguably indirectly substantiated by 
McDowell (chapter eight), transcends the metaphysical dispute and turns to the 
more practical problems of decision-making, action and communication. The 
terms of the debate are then employed as communication tools. A broadly 
pluralist stance toward values is central to the method or procedure of enquiry, 
but what ‘falls out of’ such an enquiry is an over-arching value such as toleration 
of diversity within a democratic life. On this account, values are reasoned 
attitudes, a kind of objective subjectivity arrived at through enquiry (chapter 
eight). The proceduralist account employs pluralism and monism as useful terms 
of description that give insight into the dynamics of disagreements (plural values 
clashing) and provide hope for minimal agreement by identifying a common 
interest (monist end), such as community well being.  
Section 9.2 sets out the foundational account of value pluralism and 
monism. The following section, 9.3, argues that the proceduralist treatment 
allows the metaphysical status of values to remain unclear (or redundant, as 
Dewey would have it), and then extracts important lessons from the debate to 
build an account of the underlying problems at play in moral disagreements and 
conflicts. In the previous chapter, we saw that the cognitivist identified the aim 
of agreement, of consensus and convergence at the end of the right sort of 
argument, reflection and discussion, as important. I argue here that this aim is 
reflected in the proceduralist’s identification of a broadly monistic goal. For the 
proceduralist, it is through the pluralistic informed process of enquiry that an 
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overarching monistic value ‘falls out’. This leads to the concluding section 9.4, 
which argues that procedural pluralism makes room for the part that multiplicity 
plays in terms of compounding the complexity of disagreements. This reflects the 
non-cognitivist demand that the reality of cultural diversity entails value 
differences at individual and community levels.  
 
9.2 Foundational Pluralism and Monism 
 
Value pluralism is the view that there are many different moral values. Value 
monism is the view that there is one fundamental overarching value that guides 
all moral decisions.  There are two main approaches:  foundationalist and 
proceduralist. The foundationalist questions the nature of values by focusing on 
ascertaining whether values are metaphysically plural or monist. The 
proceduralist account is more general, employing the terms for pragmatic 
purposes, such as identification of conflicting values in a moral disagreement. 
The proceduralist account utilises value pluralism to capture the diversity of 
values and value monism to identify and instantiate an overarching value that 
guides decision procedures.  
The foundational debate focuses on the metaphysics of values: what is the 
nature of values? Isaiah Berlin, who is arguably the father of the position, offers a 
naturalistic account.1 According to Berlin, concepts and categories, including 
normative ones such as values, are a very important, natural part of what it is to 
be human, however, they are not discoverable in the same way as scientific 
concepts and categories, such as the laws of physics are, for example. Values are 
very much an essential element of human nature, but unlike physical laws, 
normative laws are created as responses to experiences.2 He concludes that 
values are necessarily plural, precisely because human nature is so varied. As 
Berlin states: “These collisions of values are of the essence of what they are and 
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what we are.”3 This is just the way it is. The world that we know and understand 
is a world where some conflicts remain unsolved. Thus, in so far as there is no 
general procedure for resolving conflicts of value, disagreements are 
incommensurable. Berlin applies his thesis of incommensurability to moral 
judgment, arguing that morality does not need to be reduced to an unvarying 
essence in order to have descriptive and normative force. Values are ‘objective’ 
in so far as they are facts about the people who hold them. 
 Traces of Dewey can be seen here. While Dewey would concur that values 
are objective and natural, that they are indeed an intrinsic aspect of human 
nature, he and Berlin diverge at the ‘meta’ level. Dewey’s account of value is 
predicated on an inclusive theory of experience that aims to render all types of 
experience intelligible. Berlin’s account, in contrast, stops metaphysically short. 
Nonetheless, when analysing the character of disagreement, there are several 
points of convergence. Both Berlin and Dewey would agree that in terms of 
capturing the complexity of moral situations and judgment making, it is 
inadequate to simply set out a list of propositions and test their validity. They 
would also argue that we cannot know a priori which value is more important or 
most important and that there are many genuine values that may come into 
conflict with one another, conflicts that cannot be reduced to a 
misunderstanding or a lack of rationality. They diverge metaphysically. Dewey 
takes descriptions of disagreement as his starting point. Seemingly interminable 
and intractable disagreements are evidence of the existence of plural values 
clashing and that there is, therefore, no single, right answer to be discovered. 
Hence, decision-making procedures must be equipped to accommodate plurality. 
But we are getting ahead of ourselves and must return to explicating 
foundational accounts of pluralism and monism.  
One idea shared by foundational pluralists, as opposed to foundational 
monists, is that diversity of values indicates that disagreement is not simply the 
result of some or all of the parties being ignorant. Both views grant that 
disagreements about the legality of gay marriage, for example, occur between 
intelligent and rational people who are aware of the various positions and what 
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they entail. Bernard Williams responds by arguing that these kinds of deep 
disagreements reflect the lack of conceptual homogeneity that exists between 
individuals, societies and culture.4 Such differences are a fact of our moral 
landscape precisely because plural incommensurable values exist. The problem 
is that this foundational pluralism implies that there is no common basis from 
which to measure values and if this is so, then we are left with no way to 
compare values, rendering judgment making vacuous.  
Fred D’Agostino argues that values are indeed plural precisely because 
they are incommensurable and incomparable. According to D’Agostino this is 
evidenced by difficulties in achieving consensus about how we should live, a 
difficulty that is due to the irreducible plurality of dimensions of choice.5 Values 
are incommensurable because there is no common, “good-making” property, 
which can be identified and pursued. The foundational pluralist thus takes the 
existence of plural values that do indeed clash – hence ongoing disagreements – 
as evidence of there being no common factor. This renders plural values 
impossible to measure against one another and therefore incomparable. There 
exist plural values that have qualitative differences in terms of the goods that 
they produce, but these qualitative differences are incomparable. To use his 
example: a qualitative difference between environmental and economic goods 
renders comparison, ranking and measurement impossible.6 This difficulty, they 
argue, of comparing the merits of different values, ranking them and choosing 
between them, is evidence of foundational value pluralism.  
The foundational pluralist draws three conclusions. Firstly, the reality of 
disagreement, of what they see as intractable clashes of values, is the basis of the 
foundational pluralists conclusion that there exist many values. Secondly, that 
values are apparently incommensurable is taken as the basis of their argument 
that there is no common factor that is shared by competing values. Thirdly, that 
incommensurability or the qualitative differences between values, renders 
                                                          
 
4 Bernard Williams, 1995, ‘Truth in Ethics’, Ratio, VIII: 3, pp. 227-242, pp. 239-240. 
5 Fred D’Agostino, 2003, Incommensurability and Commensuration: The Common Denominator, 
Hampshire, England: Ashgate, pp. 429-431. 
6 A point that is addressed and overcome in Case Study 3 (section 11.4). 
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comparisons impossible.7 Michael Stocker explains incomparability in terms of a 
failure of substitutivity – one good is no substitute for another.8 The emphasis is 
on the difference in the qualities of the values themselves. Different values have 
qualities that the other lacks in an important way, so they are no substitute for 
each other. Again, conflicts between environmental and economic goods are a 
good example of incomparability. The problem is that if there exist plural values 
that are incommensurable and incomparable then surely there is no point in 
attempting to find consensus, for consensus is not possible.9  
As Axel Honneth observes, the reality of moral judgment is that there are 
often times when there are two equally viable alternatives, that embody various 
values and goods, the realisation of which are mutually exclusive.10 John Kekes 
concurs when he cites Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, arguing that 
morality makes different types of claims on moral agents, such as claims of 
duties, rights, virtues, personal ideals, the general welfare, conceptions of the 
good life, and so on.11 He concludes that this alone, provides evidence for the 
pluralist assertion that there are qualitative differences between types of goods 
that are not reducible to each other.  
The struggle is not between a good which is clear to him and something else which 
attracts him but which he knows to be wrong. It is between values each of which is an 
undoubted good in its place but which now get in each other’s way. He is forced to reflect 
in order to come to a decision.12 
                                                          
 
7 Stocker’s example of the qualitative difference between sensual pleasures such as lying on a 
beach and intellectual pleasures such as discussing philosophy is reminiscent of Mill’s 
demarcation between higher and lower pleasures (4.2). The point is that choices between goods 
are due to different sorts of goods, not just different sources of one sort of good. Michael Stocker, 
1990, Plural and Conflicting Values, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 169. 
8 Stocker, 1990, p. 165. 
9 Robert B. Talisse and Scott F. Aikin, 2005, ‘Still Searching for a Pragmatist Pluralism’ in 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 41: 1, pp. 145-160, p.145. Hereafter 2005B. This 
paper is a response to the responses to their original paper: Robert B. Talisse and Scott F. Aikin, 
2005, “Why Pragmatists Cannot Be Pluralists” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 41: 
1, pp. 101-118. Hereafter 2005A. Responses: Michael Eldridge, 2005, “Why a Pragmatist May Be a 
Pluralist” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 41: 1, pp. 119-122; Henry Jackman, 2005, 
“Jamesian Pluralism and Moral Conflict” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 41: 1, pp. 
123-128; Cheryl Misak, 2005, “Pragmatism and Pluralism” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society, 41: 1, pp. 129-135; Michael Sullivan & John Lysaker, 2005, “You Talking to Me?” in 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 41: 1, pp. 137-141. 
10 Axel Honneth, 1998, “Between Proceduralism and Teleology: An Unresolved Conflict in 
Dewey’s Moral Theory” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 34: 3, pp. 689-711, p. 696. 
11 John Kekes, 1992, “Pluralism and Conflict in Morality” in The Journal of Value Inquiry, 26, pp. 
37-50, p. 37. 
12 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 162. 
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Plural values exist and they have qualitative differences. This renders them 
incommensurable there is no single measure: there is no one property of value at 
the most basic level, no property of ‘goodness’. This in turn has the knock on 
effect of making comparisons, ranking and by extension, evaluation of options, 
difficult. In so far as this is a useful distinction in terms of its explanatory power, 
the proceduralist indirectly agrees. Incomparability, a lack of substitutivity and 
qualitative differences are evidence of why moral disagreements are so 
persistent and seemingly intractable. In contrast, these qualitative differences do 
not render comparison impossible, for the proceduralist. They simply indicate 
that exercising judgment is going to be complex and difficult and arguing 
contrary to this is simply begging the question. 
In “Value Pluralism: Some Problems”, Peter Schaber offers a defense of 
foundational monism that responds to this pluralist conundrum. Schaber argues 
that the mere assertion that there are many prudential and moral values does 
not rule monists out of the picture. Monists are able to account for this 
multiplicity of values by asserting that they all contribute to a fundamental, 
overarching value, such as happiness or promotion of community well being.13 
Schaber discusses Ruth Chang’s pluralist argument for incomparability as 
evidence for siding with monism. Like many pluralists, Chang focuses on finding 
examples where two possibilities are incomparable, enabling her to take the 
position that such disagreements leave us bereft of being able to say what is 
morally good or what we ought to do in such cases.14 The pluralist is worried 
that if we cannot rank values because they are incomparable and if we cannot 
choose both, then we cannot determine which is more valuable. This means that 
we have to make a decision without having reasons to prefer one option over 
another. Thus all resolutions of value conflicts are arbitrary, in as much as there 
is no reason to prefer one value over and above another value.15 But does the 
                                                          
 
13 Peter Schaber, 1999, “Value Pluralism: Some Problems” in The Journal of Value Inquiry, 33, pp. 
71-78, p. 71. 
14 Ruth Chang, 1997, “Introduction” in Ruth Chang (Ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability, 
and Practical Reason, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p. 9. 
15 Schaber, 1999, p. 76. 
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instantiation of an overarching monistic value, such as eudemonia, pleasure or 
happiness, assist us in any way? Schaber thinks that it does.   
Schaber notes that one benefit of instantiating an overarching monistic 
value is that it enables comparisons to be made in morally complex and difficult 
situations. He argues that having any sort of guiding value minimally allows us to 
compare possibilities against it, so that we can identify not solutions, but 
resolutions:  
There could be a vague ordering among the options, which is possible because 
“goodness” allows for vagueness…Where the values of different options are roughly 
equal we do not seem to have a correct solution with regard to what should or ought to 
be done. But there may be a correct resolution, even so.16 
 
Schaber’s idea is that if two actions are equally viable then comparison with a 
higher value, such as the good of the community, may help an individual resolve 
to do one action over another. There is no expectation that the problem will be 
solved and dissolved, only that an action will be taken; and that that action will 
be correct to the degree that it contributes to the well being of a community. 
Undoubtedly the decision proceduralist would agree. The instantiation of an 
overarching value certainly does make the possibility of comparison and choice 
more probable. 
Hilary Putnam rejects foundational monism on these grounds, identifying 
its deductive method as the source of its failure.17 Putnam cites solution driven 
views as the problem: the very words solution and problem may be leading us 
astray—ethical problems are not like scientific problems, they do not often have 
“solutions” in the sense that scientific problems do.18 The scientific problem-
solution metaphor that the monist approach is embedded in fails because of the 
emphasis it places on the existence of one right, identifiable answer that attains 
outcomes that reflect the overarching monistic value. This has the knock on 
effect of either displacing disagreement, or representing it as involving an error 
of some kind. That is, if a single solution is not identified, then we as humans 
have failed and are either irrational or lazy deliberators, giving up before a 
solution has been found. In contrast, Putnam proposes that we replace the 
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17 Putnam, 1990, p. 181. 
18 Putnam, 1990, p. 181. 
 168 
problem-solution model with an adjudicatory model based on a metaphor from 
the law. In doing so, he also rejects foundational pluralism. 
Reminiscent of Dewey’s process of social enquiry, Putnam’s adjudication 
model aims to engage both sides in communication that is not aimed at solving 
the problem in any predetermined way. Instead, the aim is engagement in the 
process itself, where no end point is stipulated. The idea is that regardless of 
whether or not common ground is established, opposing sides, are at least 
pressured to think of more compelling reasons for their positions. The dynamic 
is to seek consensus through the identification of shared or common terms of 
reference amongst the pool of disparity. Finding similarities, or points of 
confluence through shared terms, offers a way to progress without either side 
needing to abandon their own principles or values. By sharing terms of 
reference, I mean agreeing as to what is in the mix, what is at stake and to some 
degree, what makes the particular context what it is. This view is able to take 
into account the complex reality of moral judgments without explaining away 
disagreement as being due to irrationality or human shortcomings. The 
inadvertent objective is a new and modified understanding of the issue at hand 
and the other side’s position, which allows for the possibility to better cope with 
the conflict. Reminiscent of Dewey, Putnam in effect changes the emphasis from 
finding solutions to finding common ground. 
Dewey’s process of enquiry identifies the priorities of a community, 
within the context of addressing a problem. The broad overarching monistic 
value reflects a common interest by accommodating the manifestation of values 
in different ways at both societal and individual levels. Dewey’s conception of an 
overarching value is not made explicit as such and can be clearly distinguished 
from foundational monism. For example, one problem with a monistic value is 
that it is so ambiguous that it is vacuous. It seems obvious that we all aim to live 
some sort of a good life and Aristotle’s eudemonia is quite possibly the best 
descriptor of such a life (5.2). As Pappas reminds us, this is not an “either-or” 
metaphysical dilemma: “The pragmatist holds that our realm of live options is 
not limited to the extremes of either there being an absolute standard or end to 
our lifes [sic] or its being the case that “everything goes,” either there being 
unchanging truths or that what we should believe is matter of taste and 
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convention.”19 The pragmatist understands that “both the precarious and the 
stable are general traits of reality and one should be faithful to both.”20 The 
problem is that if we require metaphysical explanations, in this case about the 
nature of values, then the debate becomes ensnared in arguments about whether 
or not values are plural or monist. The pragmatist generalisation of the debate 
incorporates both for practical purposes. The clashing of different values is a 
useful way of understanding why disagreements are often so entrenched and 
interminable. The instantiation of a monistic general aim aids decision-making 
procedures. So, while Dewey rejects foundationalism about values, he retains the 
distinction between pluralism and monism, but unifies them as two sides of the 
value coin. 
 
9.3 Pragmatic Pluralism & Monism 
 
The pragmatist’s generalist description of pluralism captures the complexity of 
moral situations. Disagreements aren’t simply matters about which we are 
confused, where we do not know what we want, or we do not know how to 
achieve a desired end. This is why Putnam argued for the need for an 
adjudication model rather than a problem-solution model at the evaluative level. 
Ethical questions and answers are reasonable or unreasonable, better or worse, 
under an evaluative method that… 
…redirects the understanding of what it is to think morally, such that decision-making is 
no longer merely rule driven activity but rather involves the ongoing dynamic interplay 
between rule development and rule application; and that offers an alternative way to 
view the moral situation that undercuts the dichotomies inherent in these traditional 
theories, the dichotomies of rights vs. community interests, of consequences vs. actions, 
and relativism vs. absolutism.”21 [And monism vs. pluralism]. 
 
Plural values do not entail that all value claims are equal, after all not everyone’s 
beliefs, opinions, or perspectives are equally viable. What is of interest is the 
legitimacy of the conflict itself. As Dewey puts it: “…the elimination of conflict 
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is…a hopeless and self-contradictory ideal.”22 Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin deny 
pragmatists this position and claim that pragmatists must be monists as 
pluralism denies one or both of the following essential aspects of pragmatic 
practice: (1) conflicts are resolvable by intelligent means, and (2) it is better to 
resolve conflicts intelligently than to let them stand.23 Their argument rests on 
the idea that foundational pluralists must view enquiry as in principle completely 
useless, in regard to certain moral conflicts.  
As seen in the last section, the pluralist’s commitment to 
incommensurability and incomparability leaves them in a difficult position, 
where no single outcome or solution is identifiable. This lack of measurement 
and failure of substitutivity, Talisse & Aikin argue, voids the idea of consensus, 
thus rendering attempts to find a solution futile.24 They conclude that 
foundational pluralists are committed in principle to disengage from enquiry. 
Talisse & Aikin base this conclusion on the idea that disagreements about values 
demonstrate that there exist plural values that are not consistent with each 
other and are therefore incomparable and incommensurable, so it is 
unreasonable to expect moral consensus. In other words, they take a 
foundational approach to the metaphysics of values. This in turn facilitates their 
conclusion that as the pluralist has no moral reason to adopt any view over 
another, they must disengage from enquiry altogether.25 From here Talisse & 
Aikin are then able to argue that the pragmatist’s in principle commitment to the 
process of enquiry is incompatible with the foundational pluralist’s in principle 
commitment to disengagement from enquiry, therefore pragmatists must be 
monists.26 
Talisse & Aikin are making two claims, based on a foundational account of 
pluralism and monism (or deep pluralism as they call it). First that pluralism, or 
at least incommensurability, entails that enquiry is in principle useless. Second 
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that the pragmatist’s commitment to enquiry means that they cannot be 
pluralists. Their argument is based on the idea that there is an internal 
contradiction in pragmatism between rational resolvability, that is, a 
commitment to enquiry on the one hand and non-resolvability, hence 
disengagement from enquiry, on the other. I concur with Talisse and Aikin, 
pragmatists are not foundational pluralists. However, nor are they foundational 
monists.  
Pragmatists are not asking questions about the nature of values at all. 
The pragmatic proceduralist account uses pluralism to account for cultural 
diversity and monism to identify and instantiate an overarching value that 
guides decision procedures. The terms are employed to capture the experience 
of moral life. Talisse & Aikin recognise this when they describe what they think 
pragmatists mean by pluralism. They write: “...by ‘pluralism’ pragmatists 
typically mean a principled commitment to admirable habits of openness, 
inclusion, tolerance, anti-hegemony, and experimentalism in all aspects of moral, 
political, and intellectual life.”27 The problem with this position, according to 
Talisse & Aikin, is that it is not a pluralist position. Further, given the reality of 
conflict, pragmatists must oppose views commonly known as pluralism. “We 
today confront a social, political and moral landscape that invites analyses 
according to which deep and pressing conflicts are the manifestation of 
incommensurable world views and as such are beyond intelligent or rational 
amelioration.”28 Fundamental to Talisse & Aikin’s position is the idea that the 
pragmatists’ commitment to amelioration entails that they must oppose 
pluralism, or else accept that such disagreements mark the end of rational 
debate. 
Talisse & Aikin’s conclusion, that foundational pluralism necessitates the 
termination of rational debate, reflects a real but unfounded fear reaction to 
pluralism: if values are plural, where plural means that they are 
incommensurable and incomparable, then rational discourse is pointless. 
Michael Stocker captures this fear when he makes the observation that many 
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now hold that there is no possibility of sound choice between a liberal and an 
out-and-out religious conception of a good social life. At best there are 
compromises, unsatisfactory to all sides; at worst, there is coercion.29 This is a 
well-founded fear. Stocker argues that if values really are different, if there is 
plurality, then there can be no sound way to compare them, and thus no sound 
way to make judgments about situations that involve plural values.30 This is 
certainly something to be fearful of, for if we accept that societies have plural 
conceptions of the good then there is no possibility of reasoned social choice and 
action. This is why Schaber argues (9.2) that we must aim for foundational 
monism. It is also exactly why pragmatists abandon the metaphysics that the 
foundational debate is grounded in and instead argue for the procedural view 
that incorporates aspects of both pluralism and monism.   
The point of Dewey’s account is that it focuses on the process, rather than 
the metaphysics of the values themselves. The proceduralist starts out with a 
conception of communication, not values. Communication is understood as 
grounded in or conditioned on, ‘enquiry into experience’. Values ‘fall out of’ the 
enquiry process, when conducted in a community, that is, where each member is 
an equal participant who can give and ask for reasons.31 Dewey focuses on the 
nature of ‘enquiry into experience’ relevant to morality rather than specific ends 
or values. The plurality of values is merely a catalyst for Dewey, which is not 
incompatible with there being commonly held objectives which might take on 
different hues in different contexts. 
Talisse & Aikin accuse the pragmatists of employing pluralism as a 
blanket term for their admirable commitment to noble moral, political and 
intellectual habits. While I agree that pragmatists do hold such commitments, I 
do not think that this captures the way that pragmatic proceduralists employ the 
pluralist and monist terms. Like the cognitivist, the proceduralist aims to engage 
                                                          
 
29 Michael Stocker, 1990, p. 165. 
30 Michael Stocker, 1990, p. 166. 
31 A popular term coined by Wilfred Sellars in Wilfred S. Sellars, 1997, (1956), Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press and often used by, for example: 
Robert Brandom, 2000, “Facts, Norms and Normative Facts: A Reply to Habermas”, European 
Journal of Philosophy, 8: 3, pp. 356-374 and Jürgen Habermas, 2000, “From Kant to Hegel: On 
Robert Brandom’s Pragmatic Philosophy of Language”, European Journal of Philosophy, 8: 3, pp. 
322-355. 
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in enquiry with the broad expectation that after enough of the right sort of 
argument, reflection and discussion, there will eventually emerge some kind of 
agreed action, perhaps involving compromise or resignation. Nonetheless, the 
enquiry involved is crucial for progress. Unlike the cognitivist, the pragmatist 
does not view these agreements as statements of belief that are apt for truth or 
falsity. Moral judgments are not ‘correct answers’. They are identified 
possibilities that point toward the best way to begin to resolve the problematic 
situation, or at least begin to re-instate equilibrium in the community. They are 
what we are warranted to assert (7.4). For the proceduralist, genuine agreement, 
resolution or absolute monism, would lead to stagnation and moral torpor. 
Talisse & Aikin do, to some extent, capture the Deweyan pragmatist in 
their discussion of two types of pragmatists. The first is the ‘meaning 
pragmatist’, who translates cases of theoretical disagreement into a tractable 
practical vocabulary. The second, Deweyan type, is the ‘enquiry pragmatist’, who 
finds that it is not the meaning of terms or theories that drives the tension 
between competing conceptions of the good, but a lack of criteria for judgment. 
They argue that because the ‘enquiry pragmatist’ does not have an adequate 
criterion for judgment, they must limit their aims to researching positive 
resolutions, rather than actually resolving conflicts.32 To some extent, this 
reflects the proceduralist position that I have been outlining, however it falls 
short in its appreciation of the impact the process itself has on disagreement. 
The proceduralist employs the pluralist and monist terms to capture the 
experience of moral life. Putting aside the question of the metaphysical nature of 
values turns the spotlight away from questions of existence and toward 
practicalities. What is unambiguous is that our moral experiences involve many 
values and that identifying and instantiating a broad monistic aim assists with 
decision-making. From a practical perspective, working under the premise of 
pluralism helps to explain, understand and elucidate methods for tackling 
clashes of value and the disagreements that ensue from them. Instantiation of an 
overarching monistic aim as an achievable general end offers an opportunity to 
identify broad goals and in doing so find some grounds of cohesion and clarity. A 
                                                          
 
32 Talisse & Aikin, 2005A, pp. 105-106. 
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value (overarching monistic aim) is uncovered through the application of a 
procedure of weighing competing interests (plural values) within a ‘community 
of enquiry’, of giving and asking for reasons. The identified value, or common 
interest, be it harmony, happiness, cooperation, the health of the local 
environment, and so on, ‘falls out of’ the exchange. Unlike the foundationalist 
account, the values themselves are not the starting point, rather they are arrived 
at through the process of trying to negotiate competing interests, that is, 
employing induction within a ‘community of enquiry’.  
Rogene Buchholz and Sandra Rosenthal explain that Dewey’s notions of 
experience and enquiry provide a conceptual framework that offers an 
intertwined understanding of self, community, and values in a way that brings 
out the inextricably linked dynamic interrelation of these components.33 The 
result is the recognition that values are plural because as humans, we are unable 
to assign priority to one basic value, nor arrange them in any rigid hierarchy.34 
The essential benefit of this proceduralist account is that it leaves space for 
ongoing disagreement – something which is a reality of our complex moral lives. 
Shifting the focus away from the metaphysics enables the proceduralist to focus 
on the practical problem of how to cope with moral disagreement, with clashes 
of judgment and value.  
This is a broad consequentialism in many respects. Consideration of 
affective outcomes has implications in terms of character development for both 
the self and society. Dewey recognised that choices have both affective and 
effective consequences in terms of the self and the society. The role of self-
realisation that Mill recognised (5.5) is extended to a concern for community-
realisation. 
Consequently, it is proper to say that in choosing this object rather than that, one is in 
reality choosing what kind of person or self one is going to be. Superficially, the 
deliberation which terminates in choice is concerned with weighing the values of 
particular ends. Below the surface, it is a process of discovering what sort of being a 
person most wants to become.35 
 
                                                          
 
33 Buchholz & Rosenthal, 1996, p. 266. 
34 Buchholz & Rosenthal, 1996, p. 270. 
35 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 317. 
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Dewey argued that concern for self and community realisation is a far more 
valuable thing to keep in mind when making moral decisions, than a broad 
monistic value such as happiness. Living a moral life is a complex process of 
making decisions, which must be cognisant of practical effects of actions and the 
affects they will have in terms of character of the self and society. Morality is 




Although a somewhat cumbersome task, Dewey’s method does reflect the 
complexity of moral life. By focusing on process rather than specific ends, or 
‘right’ answers, or single fix-all solutions, Dewey offers a proceduralist account 
that treats moral judgments as our best attempts to respond to complex 
problems that involve all that it is to be a sentient organism interacting with a 
complex world. Axel Honneth notes that Dewey manages…  
…to avoid handing the ethical question over to an uncontrollable pluralism [by adopting] 
the proceduralist course that Kant, by reason of the same considerations, recommended 
for the question of the morally right: Moral theory is to be conceived of as a “generalized 
extension” or “reflective form” of the ethical deliberation “an individual engages in when 
he attempts to find general principles which shall direct and justify his conduct.”36  
 
There is a sense then, in which Dewey does not reject the role of reason in Kant’s 
moral theory, but rather shows how while it answers Hume, it is only directed to 
a workable manifestation in practice by Mill’s recognition of the role of a 
community in allowing individuals to realise their morality. Dewey spells out 
how this would work and in turn, what kind of grounding it implies. This view of 
Dewey is only possible within the context of the historical tracing of ideas from 
Hume to Kant to Mill as set out in this thesis. 
Dewey offers a method for engaging with plural values and making moral 
evaluations. His acceptance of conflict as a necessary aspect of morality is an 
acceptance that moral collisions, even if unavoidable, can be softened, claims can 
be balanced and compromises reached. Disagreements reflect the lack of 
conceptual homogeneity that exists between individuals, societies and culture. 
                                                          
 
36 Honneth, 1998, p. 698, quoting Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 163. 
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These differences are a fact of our moral landscape. While the plurality of values 
does make communication difficult, it does not render participants inactive. One 
clearly has convictions regarding one’s values and system of belief but one 
recognises the need to entertain the possibility that foreign systems of belief 
have equal merit. This may or may not result in being swayed towards a different 
set of values. A commitment to approach enquiry in the spirit of communication 
rather than coercion is needed.37 Foundational accounts of pluralism and 
monism preclude this kind of cooperation and motivation, which are a condition 
of communication, on issues pertaining to value between those holding different 
values. 
No ethical theory can gloss over the complexity, plurality, changeability, 
and uniqueness of our moral lives, the values involved and the differences of 
those who participate in it. Attempts to determine and apply the right action 
prior to and across situations are an overestimation due in part to an 
oversimplified view of moral experience. What makes pluralism attractive is that 
it can account for the complexity and conflict that is part of our moral 
experiences. If values are plural, then choices between them will certainly be 
complex. This complexity is reflected in our experiences of making moral 
judgments. Decisions about what to do are not simple puzzles, where one value 
clearly outweighs another and calculations allow us to arrive at the answer. 
Pragmatic dedication to habits of inclusiveness, non-repressiveness, toleration, 
open-mindedness, experimentalism, anti-dogmatism, diversity, and so on, 
signals that the plurality of values is recognised, even if they are instantiated 
under a monistic umbrella such as betterment of society.  
The monistic aims of earlier theorists are easily identifiable: Aristotle 
identified eudemonia, Hume tranquility, Kant approximation to the moral law, 
and Mill higher pleasure. While an overarching monistic aim such as 
amelioration of a problematic situation or eudemonia may indeed guide a 
Deweyan moral deliberation, given the complexity and diversity of individual, 
                                                          
 
37 This idea is explained in terms of Benjamin Gregg’s thin agreement, in particular his 
demarcation between identity values vs. common interests in 9.2. Benjamin Gregg, 2002, 
“Proceduralism Reconceived: Political Conflict Resolution under Conditions of Moral Pluralism” 
in Theory and Society, 31: 6, pp. 741-766, p. 754. 
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cultural, political and social values at stake, the most we can hope for is finding 
ways to proceed. This is not simply recognising that there are many possible 
ways of achieving the one end; it is that there are many values, which are valued 
differently. While there is no single objective solution to be found, at the same 
time, decisions cannot be based on subjective, idiosyncratic or personal 
preferences, desires or feelings. This is why Dewey identifies taste as one of the 
most important aspects of moral cultivation.38 Taste, as Dewey notes, far from 
being that about which one cannot argue, is one of the most important things to 
argue about. The cultivation of taste is the cultivation of the correct infusion of 
valuings with evaluations, with a sense of the valuable.39  
                                                          
 
38 Due to conceptual and word limits I am unable to investigate this topic further, however much 
has and could be said about the role of ‘taste’ in Dewey’s work. Particularly relevant to future 
work would be an investigation of the connections between Kant’s, 1790, Critique of the Power of 
Judgment and Dewey’s, 1934,  Art as Experience. Some relevant contemporary work on Dewey’s 
notion of ‘taste’ and moral aesthetics are: Scott Stroud, 2011, John Dewey and the Artful Life: 
Pragmatism, Aesthetics, and Morality, Penn State University Press: University Park; Alexander 
Thomas, 1998, “The Art of Life: Dewey's Aesthetics,” in Larry Hickman (Ed.) Reading Dewey, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 1–22; Alexander Thomas, 1999, “John Dewey and the 
Aesthetics of Human Existence,” in Sandra Rosenthal (Ed.) Classical American Pragmatism: Its 
Contemporary Vitality, Urbana Champaign: University of Illinois Press, pp. 160–173. 
39 Buchholz & Rosenthal, 1996, p. 271. 
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10. Pragmatic Proceduralism 
 
Dewey’s moral theory was a response to the reality of moral problems, the 
complexity of moral conflict and disagreement, and the effects of such conflicts 
on the self and society. He outlines a method of social enquiry that offers moral 
guidance but also offers a philosophical answer to how a reason can be 
motivating or conversely, an attitude can be rationally grounded. I have argued 
that Dewey’s proceduralist theory achieves this by bringing the motivational 
resources of the non-cognitivist together with the consensus aim of the 
cognitivist. The latter is fuelled by convictions for our principles and the former 
is fuelled largely by affective responses, both social and self interested. Social 
enquiries motivated by the pervasiveness of pluralistic values are aimed at the 
possibility of monistic ends such as convergence regarding courses of action to 
be taken. Insofar as there are many public and private, cultural and individual 
preferences, belief systems and therefore values, social enquiry necessarily 
involves context sensitive adjudication between plural values. It is the way 
disagreement is conceived and responded to that defines a moral community for 
Dewey, rather than adherence to a shared system of belief or self interested 




Dewey’s pragmatic proceduralism marks a dramatic shift in the way we think 
about moral theory. His ethics has been represented here as a proceduralist 
account of moral judgment which focuses on processes rather than end points. 
Dewey argued that reflection prompted by disagreement is central to this 
proceduralist account as it is instrumental to modifying unsocial predispositions. 
Just as scientific theories are revised in the light of new evidence, moral theories 
are revised and developed in response to conflicts between ends, 
responsibilities, rights, duties and principals.1 For Dewey, a condition of the 
                                                          
 
1 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 175. 
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possibility of morality is a capacity for reflection and the context, which would 
prompt it. 
Moral theory can (i) generalize the types of moral conflicts which arise, thus enabling a 
perplexed and doubtful individual to clarify his own particular problem by placing it in a 
larger context; it can (ii) state the leading ways in which such problems have been 
intellectually dealt with by those who have thought upon such matters; it can (iii) render 
personal reflection more systematic and enlightened, suggesting alternatives that might 
otherwise be overlooked, and stimulating greater consistency in judgment.2 
 
In effect the reflective process involves transformation of theory into practice, 
into an intelligent method of engagement with moral problems, so that values do 
not stagnate and lose cultural significance. In situations where different desires 
compete and in which incompatible courses of action seem to be morally 
justified, the process can seem more like a mediation process.3 Even when an 
individual carries out the deliberation, the judgment one makes inadvertently 
considers what one would consider others would judge. It always has a 
comparative edge. 
Dewey’s social enquiry identifies a community of shared terms as the 
condition of intersubjective agreement. Community and communication are 
therefore an important part in the realisation of an individual’s and community’s 
moral capacities and choices. Dewey understood enquiry as a process of 
continued re-evaluation, whose outcomes are a testable and observable aspect of 
the psychology of social obligation and its influence on individual desires and 
preferences. Dewey’s acceptance of the plurality of values and the role they play 
in terms of moral disagreement is testament to this. Nonetheless he also 
recognised the dynamic of a community attempting to identify a common 
interest, a monist guiding value, if you would. This dynamic guides the response 
to disagreement. Without the possibility of disagreement, our principles would 
languish and our affective responses would remain idiosyncratic.4  
Pragmatic proceduralism treats ethics as an opportunity for individual 
and societal self-realisation. Moral disagreements mark opportunities for 
engagement, change and progress toward more cohesive societies. This 
optimistic view of the role of moral disagreement has not escaped criticism. 
                                                          
 
2 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 175. 
3 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 173. 
4 A point made by Mill in On Liberty, 1910, pp. 122-23 and discussed at 5.4. 
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Section 10.2 outlines one such criticism from Axel Honneth who argues that 
Dewey’s optimism demonstrates an underestimation of the potential 
incompatibility of individual interests. According to Honneth, Dewey attempts to 
incorporate the orientation toward community-wellbeing into the parameters of 
rationally weighing future ends in life, and this Honneth rejects as just too 
optimistic.5 I respond by arguing that such criticisms misunderstand Dewey. 
Section 10.3 compares Benjamin Gregg’s account of normatively thin 
proceduralism to Dewey’s account, as represented in this thesis. Although not 
founded on Deweyan theory, Gregg’s account captures many aspects of Dewey’s 
social enquiry, but falls short in terms of the democratic implications of Dewey’s 
account (10.4). The chapter concludes with a general summary of the overall 
implications of the historical and theoretical path that the thesis has traversed 
(10.5), leaving us in good steed to apply Dewey’s pragmatic proceduralism to 




Honneth argues that while Dewey’s proceduralism is a valiant attempt to bring 
Aristotelian virtue theory together with the universal duties of Kantian theory, 
the end result falls short in terms of stipulating how to prioritise and weigh 
virtues against moral obligation. This problem, of balancing moral ends of social 
harmony with preordained moral rules is, according to Honneth, the unresolved 
conflict in Dewey’s moral theory. Presenting Dewey’s theory as a pragmatist 
evaluative method that is a corollary to Humean sentimentalism, Kantian 
universality and Millsian consequentialism offers us an answer to this conflict 
and allows us to respond to Honneth’s criticisms: Dewey’s proceduralism is able 
to do more than just synthesise virtue and deontic theory, it is also 
consequentialist in a pragmatic mode. The result is a proceduralism that allows 
Dewey to balance moral principles with the moral ends of social harmony.  
                                                          
 
5 Honneth, 1998, pp. 693-694. 
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Honneth takes a more traditional historical approach, attributing Dewey’s 
idea of personal self-realisation to his early Hegelianism.6 Honneth identifies 
Hegel’s influence in terms of “an intersubjectivity-theoretic concept of self-
realization” that provides the normative framework for Dewey’s intersubjective 
process of assuming social obligations.7  
A concept of morality can do justice to the psychological presuppositions of human 
subjects only if it does not permit a gap to emerge between moral demands and personal 
ends; every formulation of a moral point of view must therefore be composed in such a 
way that it does not impose duties or demands on human beings from without but can 
make these obligations comprehensible as immanent aspects of a good life.  
 
According to Honneth, Dewey’s interest in attempting to reconcile 
Aristotelianism and Kantianism was spurred on by a conviction that was a 
determining factor for him already in his early Hegelian period. In contrast, my 
tracing of Dewey’s historical trajectory identifies the foundations of this 
psychological account in Kant’s moral self, which is orientated in a sensuous 
world, as is presented in the third Critique. This has enabled me to arrive at a 
similar conclusion without Hegel, whose influence on Dewey has been much 
contested.8 It is a similar conclusion but has different implications when 
understood in light of Hume, Kant and Mill. Importantly, the historical trajectory 
behind the conclusion in my account brings different implications to the fore, 
compared to Honneth’s interpretation. 
Explanations of the historical foundations of Dewey’s proceduralism can 
be proffered without referencing his early Hegelianism – an influence that he 
                                                          
 
6 A view that James Good discusses and attributes to Morton White’s The Origins of Dewey’s 
Instrumentalism. James A. Good, 2006, “John Dewey’s “Permanent Hegelian Deposit” and the 
Exigencies of War”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 44: 2, pp. 293-313. Morton White, 1943, 
The Origins of Dewey’s Instrumentalism, New York: Columbia University Press.  
7 Honneth, 1998, p. 690. Although not directly pertinent to our discussion, it is interesting that 
Honneth identifies the Hegelian idea that personal self-realisation is only possible via the 
intersubjective process of assuming social obligations, as the root of Dewey’s concern for self and 
societal-realisation. According to Honneth, Hegel’s intersubjectivity-theoretic concept of self-
realisation provides the normative framework within which the ethical orientation toward the 
good life is to be integrated in a single model with moral obligations to the social community 
(Honneth, 1998, p. 690). Hence, according to Honneth, Hegel thought that self-realisation, the 
socialization of one’s self in line with socially identified intersubjective norms was sufficient for 
the establishment of moral societies. Again, according to Honneth, Dewey’s incorporation of Kant 
enabled him to extend Hegel’s goal, adding a prescriptive procedure that helps us find the most 
rational possibilities through reflective deliberation (Honneth, 1998, p. 699). 
8 Good, 2006, p. 293. 
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himself rebuts in the early 20th century.9 Honneth criticises Dewey’s moral 
theory for not being able to stipulate how to prioritise and weigh moral 
obligation against virtues. This problem can be overcome if we accept that Kant’s 
account for the moral self when understood in the light of the third Critique 
includes a relationship between moral goodness and what constitutes the realm 
of ends. This makes sense of the relation between pluralism and monism and 
explains how moral ends can be weighed against moral obligations in Dewey. 
Dewey offers a social model of character development, where harmonious and 
stable characters are evidenced by their ability to weigh ends that are judged to 
satisfy desire AND the claims of right and duty, which inhibit desire.10 That is, 
virtues require an end in order to emerge. And so do moral rules.  
Honneth argues that Dewey pursues the goal of attaining an appropriate 
determination of the rational resolution of moral conflicts by attempting to 
combine the most valuable insights from the Aristotelian and Kantian traditions 
in a relation of complementarity.11 This means that the practical role of Dewey’s 
moral theory is to outline the orientation points of a reflective procedure whose 
implementation makes it possible for subjects to identify shared ends and 
means. Honneth describes this aspect of Dewey’s conception of morality as 
“contra-Kantian”12 but this description is based on an assumption that the 
relationship between moral goodness and what constitutes the realm of ends is 
one of independence in Kant. Following Paul Guyer (4.4), I offered an alternative 
to this position with an argument for interdependence. My alternative 
understanding is useful as it explains the connection between reason and desire 
in a Humean vein whilst also providing an explanation of Kantian moral 
motivation. The categorical imperative emerges from reason as a deep 
underlying end, to which we are committed. Positing dependence between 
                                                          
 
9 See the first four chapters of John Dewey, 1903, Studies in Logical Theory, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, pp. 1-85. While Dewey never speaks directly of Hegel, it is clear that Hegel’s 
transcendentalism is rejected along with Dewey’s rejection of absolutism. Good, 2006, pp. 293-
294. Perhaps the Hegelian lineage of Dewey is only supported if one limits their interpretations 
to his early and middle works, such as: James Scott Johnston, 2006, “Dewey’s Critique of Kant” in 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 42: 4, pp. 518-551, p. 545. My focus on Dewey’s later 
works moves us away from such views. 
10 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 257. 
11 Honneth, 1998, p. 690. 
12 Honneth, 1998, p. 691. 
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goodness and an end as a legacy of Kantian ethics provides us with a response to 
Honneth’s argument.  
Dewey’s process of enquiry (7.2) treats ideas as instruments. Treating 
ethical disputes as occasions for ethical progress in virtue of the enquiry to 
which they give rise leaves open the question as to how an end comes to be 
shared. This question is answered by intersubjective agreement, which involves 
both the prioritising and the identification of ends.  
There is difference between esteem and estimation, between prizing and appraising. To 
esteem is to prize, hold dear, admire, approve; to estimate is to measure in intellectual 
fashion. One is direct, spontaneous; the other is reflex, reflective. We esteem before we 
estimate, and estimation comes in to consider whether and to what extent something is 
worthy of esteem. Is the object one which we should admire?...Does it have qualities 
which justify our holding it dear?13 
 
The process of intersubjective agreement refers as much to our affective 
responses as to the outcomes of our judgments. The crucial point, for Dewey, is 
that it is the process shaped by these aims, which is important due to the 
scoialising or civilising impact on all concerned, regardless of actual agreement 
being reached. 
Dewey thinks of these issues always in terms of what difference a 
particular way of conceiving an issue has on practice. According to Dewey, the 
qualities (non-cognitive aspects) of acts are felt, just as one feels with the hands 
the qualities of roughness and smoothness in objects, before one has an 
inducement to deliberate or material with which to deliberate.14 The crucial 
focus for morality must therefore be the cultivation of the ability to marry, 
through intelligent reflection, the colours of feelings with moral judgments, lest 
morality never influence behaviour.  
Wherever we strongly hate or love, we tend to predicate directly a lovely and loving, a 
hateful and hating being. Without emotional behavior, all human being would be for us 
only animated automatons. Consequently all actions which call out lively esteem or 
disfavor are perceived as acts of persons: we do not make a distinction in such cases 
between the doer and the deed. A noble act signifies a noble person; a mean act a mean 
person.15  
 
Hume, Kant and Mill are clearly evident. As Dewey himself states, it is only 
through sympathy, that the cold calculation of utilitarianism and the formal law 
                                                          
 
13 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, pp. 290-1. 
14 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 296. 
15 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 297. 
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of Kant are transported into vital and moving realities.16 Ethical intelligence 
requires us to not only take standards into account when judging, (referred to 
above as the comparative edge of judgment), but to also revise and improve our 
standards in light of the interests of the society and all members within it. Dewey 
thus treats ideals and moral principles not as fixed, remote goals, nor as vague 
emotional inspirations.17 Dewey defines morality in terms of the conditions for a 
moral community and concludes that this is a matter of the kind of 
communication that characterises an ethical enquiry. 
This outline of Dewey’s procedural account allows us to respond to 
Honneth’s criticism of Dewey. By limiting his Deweyan account to the 
importance of the contribution of universal duties [Kant] and how they are 
embedded in the context of personality formation, ends in life and value 
orientations [Aristotle], Honneth is left with the problem of how Deweyan 
deliberations can weigh moral goods. As he states: “If moral obligations are given 
unconditional priority, then we are again approaching the Kantian position; if, on 
the other hand, the question of weighing is left normatively unanswered, then 
the problem of social disharmony and ethical unsustainability arises.”18 Honneth 
is left with this gap because he overlooks the consequentialist and above all 
pragmatic aspects of Dewey’s theory in terms of the broader implications of self 
and community realisation, namely, the value of the act of participation itself as 
an expression of our sociable selves.  
For Dewey, the answer is equal participation. The process of ‘enquiry into 
experience’, when exercising induction under the constraints required of 
communicability in a systematic fashion, is the key. As Honneth reminds us, 
Dewey wants to distinguish a particular procedural form normatively, which 
serves to guide and orient us in our daily lives.19 However, Honneth neglects 
significant aspects of Dewey’s account. He ignores Dewey’s contention that 
ethically intelligent decisions are only so defined in so far as they are responsive 
to the needs of others. Furthermore, a decision is intelligent only if it recognises 
                                                          
 
16 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 298. 
17 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 301. 
18 Honneth, 1998, p. 703. 
19 Honneth, 1998, p. 699. 
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and questions the redundancy of outmoded or un-useful custom and habit. 
Benjamin Gregg’s account of ‘thin proceduralism’ incorporates this aspect of 
Dewey’s account and builds on our response to Honneth.20 However, as we will 
see, even Gregg’s account lacks a crucial emphasis on experience as defined by 
terms shared by a community, without which Dewey’s account would appear 
incomplete. 
 
10.3 Thin Proceduralism 
 
Dewey understood that engaging in ethics through a process of reflection 
enables revision and growth in the face of ever changing conflicts between ends, 
responsibilities, rights, duties and principals.21 He thus shifts the task of moral 
theory away identifying definite precepts, rules, definitive injunctions and 
prohibitions toward conflict identification and resolution. No ends or absolute 
values are identified prior to enquiry. The idea is grounded in the 
acknowledgment that plurality of values is at the root of disagreement. While no 
end is stipulated, an overarching aim of amelioration guides enquiries. 
Acceptance of these two features changes the method and aim of engagement 
with moral problems. The pragmatist does not need to address whether moral 
disagreements are necessarily ultimately solvable (cognitivism), nor whether 
they reflect insurmountable differences in affective responses (non-cognitivism). 
Instead, the pragmatist, in realising the community based nature of the 
possibility of individual experience (chapter six), posits ‘enquiry into experience’ 
as the relevant structure which overtakes for them, redundant oppositions 
between cognition and affective responses. 
The overall aim is decision-making momentum, based on processes of 
enquiry that identify rational possibilities for action. Ideas are agreed upon if 
they are deemed instrumental, that is, they minimally begin to address the 
problem. Gregg labels this ameliorative aim of proceduralism ‘thin agreement’.22 
How is even minimal agreement possible if individual values are different and 
                                                          
 
20 Gregg, 2002.  
21 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 175. 
22 Gregg, 2002, pp. 743-764. 
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conflicting? Gregg argues that while differences in identity-based values, such as 
those based on ethnicity, sexuality, gender or religious beliefs may never be 
ironed out – we can find some agreement in terms of general interests. The aim 
of ‘thin proceduralism’ is to find common interests (thinly monistic aims) that 
guide the process of identification of courses of action based on general interests, 
while leaving personal integrity, values and identity unaffected. The goal of the 
procedure is mutual accommodation rather than substantive agreement.23  
Gregg recognises that accommodation of conflict places limits on the 
scope of thin proceduralism. Firstly, no end, value or solution is identified prior 
to enquiry – or expected as an outcome of enquiry. The only thing that enquiries 
have to start with is the identification of a problem and the aim of thin 
agreement. Secondly, enquiries are not out to rank values or change individual 
values. The thinness of the process enables participants to hold onto their 
individual values but agree to participate in finding common interests.  
The normative thinness of thin proceduralism does not mean the absence of all 
normativity; thinness is not neutrality, nor is it indeterminacy. Proceduralism must be 
sufficiently thick, normatively, to generate answers to difficult questions about the good, 
the right, and the just. Yet it must be sufficiently thin to appeal to people who disagree 
about the nature of the good, the right, and the just.24 
 
Gregg presupposes that difference, divisiveness and local loyalties are not 
merely contingent and ultimately surmountable features of human existence, but 
are permanent if shifting, unavoidable if malleable. Normative thinness 
facilitates thin agreement. 
Theoretically, Gregg positions his account as a response to John Rawls’ 
and Jürgen Habermas’25 proceduralist accounts, however he is careful to 
differentiate his normatively thin proceduralism from theirs. According to Gregg, 
both Rawls and Habermas are constrained by the universal validity requirement 
                                                          
 
23 Gregg, 2002, p. 763. 
24 Gregg, 2002, p. 744. 
25 See in particular Rawls’s reworking of Justice as Fairness to accommodate pluralism in John 
Rawls, 1993, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press and Habermas, 1984. 
With more time and space, a fruitful comparison between Dewey, Habermas and Rawls could be 
made. For example, in response to universality and rationality, Habermas offers a naturalistic, 
‘post-metaphysical’ account of practices of communication, discourse and enquiry. It could also 
be argued that Rawls rejects the very idea of a coercive social-moral integration, after all he 
recognises a notion of civic friendship based on universal respect for persons as free rational 
beings by focusing on the maintenance of a stable society that respects basic human equalities 
while tolerating difference.  
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of their accounts of morality, as universality requires that norms are capable of 
being shared by everyone.26 The problem with such views, as Gregg sees it, is 
that they are aiming for social integration, where everyone eventually converges 
on a shared moral viewpoint and therefore similar political and normative 
convictions, psychological dispositions, and need-structures.27 Setting aside the 
fact that Habermas does not postulate eventual convergence as suggested here 
and that it could be argued that Rawls rejects the idea also and so putting to one 
side the validity of his criticism of Rawls and Habermas, what we can garner 
from his argument is the importance of normative thinness.  
Thin agreement is achievable when outcomes are embraced based on 
their rationale, not their content. This can be accomplished if the focus is on 
participants’ interests rather than their identities. As Gregg argues, in democratic 
societies a great deal of political agreement is possible only as compromise. 
Given the intensely normative nature of many identities, compromise over 
(some) interests is likely to be more possible than compromise over (some) 
identities.28 Gregg recognises that the incommensurability of individual values 
and preferences can only be responded to by employing thin proceduralist 
techniques such as ‘balancing’ the interests of individual members with those of 
the group, or ‘bracketing’ differences, or reducing normative complexity.29 
Normative commitments and viewpoints are treated as generalisable interests 
that can be calibrated sufficiently for weighing, comparing, and making trade-
offs. Procedural legitimacy replaces the search for rightness. Underpinning this is 
the idea that enquiry will lead to beliefs and viewpoints that are informed and 
rational, rather than simply a matter of unreflected upon preferences.30  
By pursuing a modus vivendi in the sense of mutual accommodation 
rather than agreement on substantive matters, the process itself must remain 
fallibilistic and always open to challenge and possible revision.31 Gregg notes 
that like Habermas’ epistemic proceduralism, or ‘discourse ethics’, thin 
                                                          
 
26 Gregg, 2002, p. 747. 
27 Gregg, 2002, p. 747. Reminiscent of the earlier conclusions we drew re cognitivism (7.3). 
28 Gregg, 2002, p. 755. 
29 Gregg, 2002, p. 758. 
30 Gregg, 2002, p. 761. 
31 Gregg, 2002, p. 763. 
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proceduralism endorses the idea of collective reasonableness emerging out of 
the operation of the democratic process of enquiry.32 Gregg sees his view as 
different from Habermas in that his thin proceduralism is not seeking 
substantive agreement among participants, although arguably neither is 
Habermas’ Discourse Ethics nor Rawls’ social contract theory. In any case, for 
Gregg, the focus is on accommodation of difference. It is sufficiently normatively 
thin so as to allow people who disagree about the nature of the just, good, and 
right to generate answers to difficult questions. This reflects the rational 
instrumentalism found in Dewey, where the exercise of reason incorporates 
instrumental concerns. Changing the focus away from agreement and toward 
accommodation of difference, including Humean style differences in moral 
sentiments, enables thin proceduralism to bear diversity.  
The attraction of Gregg’s account of thin proceduralism is its’ focus on 
thin normativity, which in turn enables the accommodation of disagreement. The 
process of finding thin intersubjective agreement centres on identifying a 
monistic common interest without impact on identity values. So, while a 
disagreement may at some level involve clashing identity values, they are 
sidelined in the interests of communication. Emphasis is placed on the process 
itself. Honneth and John Farrell indirectly corroborate this view when they argue 
that Dewey’s method is a kind of democratic will-formation that does not rely on 
citizen’s virtues, but on morally justified procedures.33 According to Honneth and 
Farrell, and here Honneth moves beyond the conclusion of his sole authored 
paper of the same year, it is the change of focus from traditional conceptions of 
virtue ethics, which enables Dewey to avoid the moral stand-offs that 
foundational pluralists find themselves in. The problem for the foundational 
pluralist is decision inertia. For if values cannot be ranked or compared because 
they are incommensurable, then moral judgments are rendered vacuous (9.2). 
Pluralism, as construed by Dewey, on the other hand, sidesteps this problem by 
focusing on morally justified procedures. Leaving room for identity values to go 
                                                          
 
32 Gregg, 2002, p. 748. 
33 Axel Honneth & John M. M. Farrell, 1998, “Democracy as Reflexive Will Cooperation: John 
Dewey and the Theory of Democracy Today” in Political Theory, 26: 6, pp. 763-783, p. 763.  
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unchallenged facilitates a process that is more likely to succeed at identifying 
and evaluating possibilities and making way for decision-making.  
Robert Talisse explains that the (foundational) pluralist’s difficulty with 
these kinds of moral stand-offs is due to an agent’s choices in the hard cases 
reflecting not only a judgment or an assessment, but also an expression of the 
agent's moral standpoint (their identity values), which are, on the pluralist view, 
not susceptible to moral criticism.34 The (foundational) pluralist’s denial of 
overarching aims (common interests) means that they exclude themselves from 
participation:  
…liberal views…which place public discourse at the core of proper democratic practice 
are at least implicitly committed to the idea that sincere debate over deep moral 
disagreements could yield reasoned agreement, or at least need not necessarily bottom-
out in a stand-off between incommensurable standpoints. In short, the discourse-based 
forms of liberalism to which many contemporary pluralists are committed are premised 
on the possibility of Dworkinian integrity among our deepest values. But it is this 
possibility which pluralism denies.35 
 
Gregg’s normatively thin proceduralism supports the possibility of amelioration 
by assigning participants individual “expressions of moral standpoints”36, a 
secondary role to the overall aim of identifying common interests that can then 
form the foundation for thin agreement. Talisse points out that Ronald Dworkin 
describes this in terms of a ‘common ground’ in the form of a highly abstract 
conception of human dignity shared by all.37  
According to Talisse, Dworkin’s aim is to make this common ground 
explicit so that he can demonstrate that our political divides represent different 
interpretations and understandings of the same moral commitments.38 Here 
again we see echoes of the social integration aims that Gregg identifies in Rawls 
and arguably mistakenly in Habermas. Dewey’s proceduralism, on the other 
hand, has no call for social integration, as such, social enquiry involves people 
engaged in conflict dissolution regardless of whether decisions will solve or 
dissipate disagreements. The focus is on process without expectation of deep 
                                                          
 
34 Robert B. Talisse, 2011, “Value Pluralism and Liberal Politics” in Ethic Theory Moral & Practice, 
14, pp. 87-100, p. 98. 
35 Talisse, 2011, p. 99. 
36 Or as Talisse, calls them, expressions of the agent’s moral standpoint (2011, p. 99). 
37 Ronald Dworkin, 2006, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 9. 
38 Talisse, 2011, p. 99. 
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consensus or substantial agreement.39 The commitment instead is to discovery 
and progress, which in the moral context might be, for example, tolerance and 
understanding. 
 Regardless of Dworkin’s call for finding commonalities between moral 
and political commitments, we can see that Talisse, pace Dworkin, reaches the 
same conclusion that we reached pace Dewey and Gregg: we must differentiate 
between proceeding from shared moral commitments and commitment to the 
possibility of uncovering or forging common moral ground. This is what sets 
Dewey apart from his predecessors, whose focus was on identifying shared 
values, universal rules or a common aim prior to engagement in rational 
deliberation. In contrast, Dewey focused on a method of enquiry, a rationally 
grounded process that begins with the identification of a problem and ends in 
the discovering of ideas. This requires some commitment on behalf of 
participants, but it is a willingness to cooperate borne of their sociability. Thin 
agreements emerge through the process of communication. A democratic 
relation between participants ‘falls out of’ communication, properly so called, 
according to Dewey.  
While Gregg’s position is not Deweyan, it certainly reflects Deweyan 
social enquiry. Gregg’s normatively thin agreement implicitly reflects an 
understanding of the way that Dewey rejected the treatment of virtue ethics, 
deontology and consequentialism as exclusive and exhaustive 
categories.  Instead, Dewey saw in each of these positions some merit and his 
response is in some respects accurately represented by Gregg’s thin 
proceduralism. Gregg's account of thin proceduralism reflects the pragmatic 
proceduralist account of the relationship between experience and enquiry found 
in Dewey (discussed in chapters six & seven). Dewey himself states that the 
sociability of the method is more fundamental than the following of principles or 
reaching decisions:   
The facts…bear upon false statements of the nature of the problems at issue; they do not in 
any way resolve the actual and important conflicts which exist…What do exist are conflicts 
between some individuals and some arrangements in social life; between groups and 
classes of individuals; between nations and races; between old traditions…and new ways 
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of thinking and acting…No general theory about the individual and social can settle 
conflicts or even point out the way in which they could be resolved.40 
 
It might be argued that the goal of Deweyan deliberation is respect because not 
actually reaching agreement is not a failure of the process. It is the process itself 
that sets the conditions for community. Dewey supports pursuing enquiry with a 
spirit of “willingness to reexamine and if necessary to revise current convictions, 
even if that course entails the effort to change by concerted effort existing 
institutions, and to direct existing tendencies to new ends.”41 This cultivational 
aspect, of self and community realisation demonstrates that Dewey is concerned 
with outlining a social morality that highlights the relationship between social 
life and character, but the latter only emerges in the context of social life. While 
Gregg’s thin agreement captures the normative goal of accommodation of 
difference in Dewey’s proceduralism, it fails to fully appreciate Dewey’s broader 
educative goals. A crucial aspect of this was Dewey’s realisation that experience 
itself could be cultivated by social norms. 
  
10.4 Self and Societal Realisation 
 
Dewey’s theoretical position begins with the idea that desire is intrinsic to the 
nature of humanity, that humans have wants that are pursued in forms of 
purposes, plans, aims and so on, and that humans need to live together in 
societies to realise fully their humanity. The combination of these aspects, 
coupled with our natural Humean capacities to approve and disapprove, 
empathise and resent, enables Dewey to conclude that moral conceptions and 
processes grow out of the very conditions of human life itself.42 Thus any ideas 
about “common good” (monistic aims) are predicated on the very idea of 
community, of a willingness to share, participate and work together to achieve 
well functioning democratic societies: 
…the democratic ideal poses, rather than solves, the great problem: How to harmonize 
the development of each individual with the maintenance of a social state in which the 
activities of one will contribute to the good of all the others. It expresses a postulate in 
                                                          
 
40 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 359.  
41 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 366, (their italics). 
42 Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 343. 
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the sense of a demand to be realised: That each individual shall have the opportunity for 
release, expression, fulfillment, of his distinctive capacities, and that the outcome shall 
further the establishment of a fund of shared values.43 
 
Pragmatic proceduralism is not claiming to be a solution that will iron out 
disagreement. The suggestion is only that it is a hopeful method of tackling moral 
problems thereby providing the methodological framework for well functioning 
societies.  
The aim of reflection, of enquiry, is to identify non-moral individual 
desires that have the potential of being transformed through reflection into 
moral desires, that is, of becoming society’s desirables. As individual desires 
form the bedrock of what is to be deemed morally desirable, the emphasis must 
be on the development of ethical intelligence in all individuals. Objects have 
moral value when they make a difference in the self, as determining what one 
will be, instead of merely what one will have. Moral deliberation deals not with 
quantity of value but with quality.44 Gregg’s thin proceduralism provides an 
account of normativity that captures the immediate goal of Dewey’s social 
enquiry but falls short in terms of explaining these broader cultivation goals.  
Throughout his life, Dewey was very concerned with the role that 
education can play in establishing democratic social (as opposed to political) life. 
Grounded in his notions of experience and enquiry, Dewey's progressive 
educational philosophy encourages the learner to reconstruct their experience 
through experimental intelligence.45 He proposes that sound educational 
experiences involve both continuity and interaction between the learner and 
what is learned.46 Two basic premises underwrite this position. One, that 
education is intelligently conducted upon the basis of experience and two, that 
we prefer democratic and humane conditions to autocratic and harsh ones.47 
Echoing Mill’s account of the higher pleasures, Dewey attributes this preference 
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New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers, hereafter E&E.  
46 Dewey, E&E, p. 10. 
47 Dewey, E&E, p. 10. 
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for democracy to natural preferences for freedom, decency and kindness over 
repression, coercion and force, a preference for the satisfaction of achievement 
and striving rather than dull, pleasure of mere appetite.48  
Dewey argued that the overall aim of education should be to encourage 
balanced conduct through the cultivation of intelligent, rational, reflective 
citizens who have fostered deliberative skills and can thus control their actions 
and reactions.  
The ideal aim of education is creation of self control…Impulses and desires that are not 
ordered by intelligence are under the control of accidental circumstances.…A person 
whose conduct is controlled in this way has at most only the illusion of freedom. Actually 
he is directed by forces over which he has no command.49 
  
Dewey’s ideal was to educate societies in the task of problem identification and 
engagement through a process of self-critical enquiry. This task of revision, of re-
evaluation of beliefs in light of new evidence, was conceived as society’s ethical 
and educational goal. On the one hand, Dewey’s enquiry is a democratic process 
of decision-making that holds the preliminary aim of thin agreement. On the 
other, it is a social theory of self and community realisation. 
Robert Westbrook explains the relationship between democracy and 
education in Dewey in terms of three important premises.50 First, Dewey 
understood democracy as an ethical ideal, rather than a political movement. 
Second, he thought that the essence of democracy was participation and third he 
thought that democracy as a decision procedure was akin to the scientific 
method. Democracy as an ethical ideal is encapsulated by Dewey’s method of 
enquiry, which aims for “...freedom to frame purposes and to execute or carry 
into effect purposes so framed.”51 Through the instantiation of intellectual 
freedom under the constraints of communicability, democracy ‘falls out of’ 
experienced reason, out of intelligent, rational communities of ‘enquiry into 
experience’.   
                                                          
 
48 Dewey, E&E, pp. 34-35. 
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50 The ensuing discussion is taken from Robert B. Westbrook, 1991, John Dewey and American 




51 Dewey, E&E, p. 67. 
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Dewey advocated for education, which would allow each of us to be active 
and participatory in making decisions that shape our lives. This idea is 
predicated on the premise that we have a natural preference for self-
determination tempered by sociability. Dewey’s educational philosophy thus has 
broad social aims that involve educating children in freedom to question and 
reconstruct societal norms through ‘communities of enquiry’. Hence, the broader 
goal of his method of enquiry is to cultivate moral individuals and societies 
through critical awareness of moral decision-making.  
Notably, Dewey’s aim was not to create virtuous characters, as, for 
example, the Ancient Greek and Chinese philosophers argued. Rather he aimed at 
outlining a method for living a moral life. This rejection of relying on virtue has 
been shown recently to be empirically cogent. As John Doris and Stephen Stich 
argue, empirical studies in psychology demonstrate that virtue ethics is 
unsupported. For example, the Aristotelian conception of traits as robust 
dispositions that lead to trait-relevant behaviour across a wide variety of trait-
relevant situations is radically empirically unsupported.52 The conception of 
character that virtue ethics presupposes is empirically inadequate, not just in 
terms of how insubstantial the situational influences effecting troubling moral 
failures seem to be, but that people are readily induced to fail such ideals of 
fortitude and virtue.53 
 Gregg’s account of thin proceduralism captures one aspect of Dewey’s 
enquiry in terms of normatively thin agreement but ignores the broader 
cultivational aspect. This may be because Dewey’s idealisation of the human 
condition in terms of self and community realisation, has been much criticised 
and led to the ostracism of Dewey and his writing for many years.54 Nevertheless, 
it marks an important point of difference that is worthy of attention. When 
understood as a unified theory, Dewey’s conception of education, enquiry and 
experience offer an idealisation of the moral life, according to his critics. 
However, the relevant point is this. The grounds of morality are in the very act of 
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enquiry (reason) when it engages the individual’s experience (feeling) in the 
context of a community (inter-subjectivity). Communication is the normative 
constraint. The common ground cultivated is tenuous and constantly evolving. 




Communication is predicated on getting it right and consensus. Our language is 
structured in this way. We attempt to achieve veracity and reach agreement, that 
is, these aims drive the process. But communication occurs whether or not these 
aims are actually achieved. Dewey argued that the attainment of any form of 
moral progress is through genuine, full participatory enquiry rather than 
achieving actual agreement on a specific topic.   
The moral function of law and institutions, as well as of freedom of inquiry and 
expression, is in last analysis educative. Their final test is what they do to awaken 
curiosity and inquiry in worthy directions; what they do to render men and women 
more sensitive to beauty and truth; more disposed to act in creative ways; more skilled 
in voluntary cooperation.55 
 
By not positioning Dewey within the relevant aspects of the traditions of Hume, 
Kant and Mill, contemporary Deweyan scholars, such as Honneth and Talisse 
cannot fully appreciate the point of Dewey’s proceduralism. Dewey puts as much 
emphasis on enquiry as Kant put on reason. It is ‘enquiry into experience’ that 
ensures our motivational selves are engaged (aka Hume). It is a ‘community of 
enquiry’ that ensures the rational rather than idiosyncratic is to the fore (aka 
Mill). In effect, his very terms are better understood in light of these theorists. In 
contrast, Honneth and Talisse evaluate Dewey within the analytic contemporary 
position whose alternatives are the very positions Dewey seeks to overcome: 
objective and subjective, cognitive and non-cognitive, plural and monist, for 
example. This distorts where they place the emphasis in their interpretation. 
When one keeps Hume’s cultivation of sentiments to social norms in the 
frame and remembers that Kant’s a priori universality better equips one to grasp 
the idea of ideal ends rather than actual ends, as in the case of consensus where 
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Dewey is concerned, a better understanding of Dewey’s proceduralism is 
possible.  The principle of consensus for Dewey drives the process regardless of 
whether it is actually achieved. Adding Mill as a precursor to Dewey, we can 
better appreciate the role of community exchanges in terms of being crucial to 
grounding the constraints of consensus. Once one recognises Dewey’s 
indebtedness to this tradition, as setting out the terms of reference and the 
problems consequent upon them, which Dewey set out to solve, one better 
understands Dewey’s proceduralism. The theorists discussed in this chapter who 
fail to understand Dewey’s proceduralism, do so because they have not 
considered Dewey’s position in the light of certain key ideas found in Hume, Kant 
and Mill, which I argue, set the terms of reference for Dewey’s ethics. 
In order to more fully understand Dewey’s theory of reflective morality, 
the penultimate chapter offers three contemporary case studies as exemplars of 
what is and what is not a Deweyan ‘community of enquiry’. The first case 
demonstrates immorality by Dewey’s account (after Mill) because there is no 
space for community exchanges, only conformity. The second case study 
demonstrates a fledgling community, where there is a fork in the road, which 
prompts enquiry. The third case study shows a successful Deweyan account of 
‘community of enquiry’ in action. These cases are very different from cases often 
presented in analytic ethics classrooms, which are typically thought experiments 
that involve hypothetical disagreement among idealised agents who are fully 
informed and perfectly rational. In contrast, the ensuing case studies are not 




11. Three Case Studies 
  
Through assessment of the social circumstances from which different moral 
responses emerge, we can see Dewey’s system of ethics operating in practice. 
The aspect of Dewey’s theory demonstrated in this chapter is his advocacy of a 
shift from promoting particular moral views to emphasising process. In this 
respect he continues in the direction of Mill’s utilitarianism, but arguably under 
the overarching constraints of Hume’s sentimentalist and Kant’s rationalist 
views on the way the sociability of humankind is manifested in taste and 
rationality, (and a common sense). Dewey emphasised the need for ethics to 
address the bigger questions regarding how we should live as individuals-in-
communities. He concluded that well-functioning societies, eudemonic 
communities, consist of individuals who participate in communicative processes, 




This thesis acknowledges and honours Dewey’s pragmatist roots before re-
situating him within a different theoretical timeline via Hume, Kant and Mill. The 
importance of plugging into feelings as motivators and contributors to moral 
judgment is taken from Hume. A pragmatic account of Kant’s unification of 
theory and practice, sentimentalism and rationalism, pure and practical reason, 
which also draws upon his notion of judgment in the third Critique, becomes the 
background to Dewey’s non-metaphysically burdened conception of experience 
and enquiry. Reading Mill’s Utilitarianism in light of his political philosophy as 
elucidated in On Liberty emphasises the role of consequences, in terms of 
cultivation of individual and societal character. The outcome is a robust account 
of pragmatic proceduralism. 
The ensuing three sections outline three case studies involving moral 
disagreement. The purpose is not to provide evidence of the applicability of 
Dewey’s pragmatic proceduralism, but rather to demonstrate its explanatory 
power. Applying Dewey’s theory to three actual ethical problems assists us to 
not only flesh out the process of disagreement and amelioration but also to 
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better appreciate the value of both. The first case study (11.2) focuses on the 
fundamentalist Christian organisation, the Westboro Baptist Church (hereafter 
WBC).  This sectarian case is used to investigate the applicability of normatively 
thin pragmatic proceduralism to extremist positions. WBC’s leaders refuse to 
discuss, debate or question their own actions (not to mention their beliefs) and 
they claim that this is justified because they are following the direct 
commandments of God. By Dewey’s account, as they do not engage in the space 
of reasons within the context of their society, they are immune to the critiques 
offered by their contemporaries and peers. This locates them outside of the 
moral arena. Interviews with two recent defectors provides the evidence for 
asserting that this is their position and demonstrates that the absolutism of the 
WBC forbids disagreement altogether, thereby preventing the possibility of 
genuine communication, enquiry and any chance of amelioration. The example 
demonstrates that without the possibility of disagreement, there is no 
community in Dewey’s terms, and hence no opportunity for morality.  
The second case study (11.3) focuses on a disagreement that recently 
played out in the Australian media over whether the comedian and writer Chris 
Lilley’s Australian Broadcasting Corporation (hereafter ABC) television series 
Jonah from Tonga was racist. It is an interesting case as while both sides agree on 
the non-moral facts and are able to present rational, well-reasoned arguments, 
they are still unable to reach a consensus. The third case study (11.4) offers a 
brief overview of the complex, multifaceted and persistent environmental and 
commercial ethical problems of the Murray Darling Basin (hereafter MDB), an 
important water resource in Australia. The MDB is a rich habitat for flora and 
fauna and a major resource in terms of hydroelectric power generation, 
irrigation, domestic, industrial and stock water supply, recreation and leisure 
and so on. In this case, a shared (monistic) agreement about the value of the 
river to the whole of Australia has been identified and is employed as a guide for 
decision-making processes. However, as ‘value of the river’ means very different 
things to different groups, disagreement persists. The practical question of how 
to proceed in the face of plural values, be they commercial or economic, public or 
private, local or governmental, remains. This case study highlights the relevance 
of Dewey, who reminds us of the importance of conflict in terms of instigating 
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societal change and progress through communication and negotiation. Section 
11.5 concludes the chapter, drawing attention to the aspects of Dewey’s account 
highlighted by the case studies. 
 
11.2 Case 1: The Westboro Baptist Church 
 
Pastor Fred Phelps established the WBC, a multigenerational church group based 
in Topeka, Kansas, in 1955. In their official statement, they claim that they 
“adhere to the teachings of the bible, preach against all form of sin (e.g. 
fornication, adultery, sodomy) and insist that the sovereignty of God and the 
doctrines of grace be taught and expounded publicly to all men.”1 The WBC 
engages in daily sidewalk demonstrations that oppose… 
…the homosexual lifestyle of soul damning, nation-destroying filth. We display large, 
colorful signs containing Bible words and sentiments, including: GOD HATES FAGS, FAGS 
HATE GOD, AIDS CURES FAGS, THANK GOD FOR AIDS, FAGS BURN IN HELL, GOD IS NOT 
MOCKED, FAGS ARE NATURE FREAKS, GOD GAVE FAGS UP, NO SPECIAL LAWS FOR 
FAGS, FAGS DOOM NATIONS, THANK GOD FOR DEAD SOLDIERS, FAG TROOPS, GOD 
BLEW UP THE TROOPS, GOD HATES AMERICA, AMERICA IS DOOMED, THE WORLD IS 
DOOMED, and so on.2  
 
Between 1991 and 2014, the WBC conducted 52,684 demonstrations, including 
demonstrations at “homosexual parades”, the funerals of “impenitent sodomites 
(like Matthew Shepard)” and more than 400 military funerals of American 
troops.3 The WBC rationale is that the legalization of homosexuality in the U.S. 
brought on the righteous judgment of God whose retribution is to kill U.S. 
soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. They cite America’s 2003 Supreme Court ruling 
“that we must respect sodomy”4 as an expression of evil whose supporters they 
feel themselves called upon to vilify. 
 The members of the WBC believe themselves to be guided by the supreme 
authority of God on all normative matters and reject engaging in any form of 
reasoning or debate on any matter. They repeatedly state, on the website and in 
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documentaries5 that they have no interest in debating their beliefs with anyone. 
As the WBC represents the word of God, no further justification is needed. Their 
messages are often insulting, vitriolic and are designed to offend. For example, 
on the home page of their www.godhatesfags.com website they provide a 
running tally of the number of  “people whom God has cast into hell since you 
loaded this page” and the value they place on the opinions of others: “0 - 
nanoseconds of sleep that WBC members lose over your opinions and 
feeeeellllliiiiiings.”6  
The now 40-member church is made up largely by Fred Phelps’ own 
family, which consists of 13 children, 54 grandchildren, and 7 great-
grandchildren. Since 2004, over 20 members, mostly family, have left the church 
and ostensibly his family.7 The most prominent recent family members to leave 
the group were Fred Phelps’ granddaughters Megan and Grace Phelps-Roper in 
2013. In an interview with author and journalist Jeff Chu at the 2014 Level 
Ground Film Festival, Megan Phelps-Roper talks in detail about why she and her 
cousin Grace left, citing internal inconsistency and changes in eldership that led 
to structural changes in the church as the main reasons.8  
The realisation that there were internal inconsistencies, between the 
actions of the WBC and the biblical word of God, became apparent to Megan in 
the spring of 2009 through a twitter exchange with blogger and creator of 
Jewlicious.com, David Abitbol, over the sign “Death Penalty for Fags”.9 David 
pointed out that while Leviticus does condemn sodomites to the death penalty, it 
also condemns adulterers and fornicators to the same punishment. Further, the 
                                                          
 
5 Such as: Louis Theroux, 2007, “The Most Hated Family in America” on BBC TV, YouTube. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9mi1RX7Ttg Accessed 05/2014 and Louis Theroux, 2011, 
“America's Most Hated Family in Crisis” on BBC TV, YouTube. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mMIJpWwX68Q Accessed 05/2014. 
 
6 Op. Cit. 
7 Arnett, Dugan, 21/11/2012, "Megan Phelps-Roper of Westboro Baptist Church: An heir to hate" 
in Kansas City Star. http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article299767/Megan-Phelps-
Roper-of-Westboro-Baptist-Church-An-heir-to-hate.html Accessed 22nd October 2014. 
8 Jeff Chu, 2014, Megan Phelps-Roper at the 2014 Level Ground Film Festival, Pasadena, California. 
http://vimeo.com/90865308 Accessed 20/10/2014. 
9 The ensuing description, unless otherwise stated, is from: Megan Phelps, transcribed from Chu, 
2014, interview: http://vimeo.com/90865308 
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bible and in particular Jesus of the New Testament10 preaches forgiveness and 
the chance for everyone to be given the chance to repent. Megan realised that the 
church was only advocating the death penalty as a fitting punishment for 
homosexuals, not adulterers and fornicators. When she raised this point with the 
board of elders, they justified it with the reasoning that “you cannot repent of 
something that you are proud of; there are no adulterous pride parades.”11 While 
this initially seemed consistent, Megan realised that if you repent of something, 
then you are no longer proud of it. So, by logical reasoning, a homosexual should 
be given the same opportunity to repent as an adulterer or fornicator. What is 
more, death means that there is no chance of repentance, which directly 
contradicts the life of forgiveness that Jesus advocates. Megan’s realisations are 
of particular import as they demonstrate that she had not lost complete control 
over her rational mind and will. 
Whenever she raised these concerns, Megan was told to toe the party line; 
we must be of the same mind; and if everybody else in our group is saying it then 
it must be right. She realised that their answer was always: “We’re right, you’re 
wrong. Accept it.”  
At WBC you cannot disagree. There is no appropriate disagreement. If you bring 
something up, everybody else has decided that they are right about it and then you have 
to believe that it’s right. You have to go along with it. And you certainly can’t say, ok well 
you can believe that and I'm going to believe this. Because you’d be outa there, like, you 
can’t push.12 
 
It took Megan and Grace four years to eventually leave the church. Megan cites 
cognitive dissonance, the compartmentalisation of conflicting beliefs coupled 
with a lifetime of indoctrination, particularly the reinforcement that nobody but 
the WBC had the truth, as the reasons for it taking so long. The final straw came 
in the form of internal structural changes that led to a change in the way that 
concerns were addressed.  
Previously, a board of elders would meet and individual members could 
raise their concerns for detailed discussion with them. Even though these 
meetings were not conducted in the context of an open group of members, 
                                                          
 
10 The irony of this being pointed out to her by a Jewish man and thus non-believer in the New 
Testament was not lost on Megan. 
11 Megan Phelps, transcribed from Chu, 2014, interview: http://vimeo.com/90865308 
12 Megan Phelps, transcribed from Chu, 2014, interview: http://vimeo.com/90865308 
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nonetheless it did appear to introduce some possibility of genuine advancement 
in thought, an opportunity for genuine arguments deserving of a genuine 
response. But with the ageing and ailing of Pastor Fred Phelps and his eventual 
excommunication in 2013, the eldership board was deposed and grievances 
were to be taken up with direct familial elders.13 Already marred by dogmatism, 
the church’s eradication of the board marked a dictatorial shift in the 
organisation. Megan’s direct familial elder was her father, who dismissed her 
concerns and told her to toe the church’s line. Unable to convince her father of 
the legitimacy of her worries, she was left with no other avenue to follow. By this 
stage, the things that they were worried about had become worse not better, and 
thinking about the future made them realise that they had to leave. Transcribed 
from Megan’s account: “I’ll spend my days here and doing these things and trying 
to make everything fit into this perfect box, having all the answers but really 
having all these little doubts…these little things that were not little things, they 
were big things.”14 
 Since leaving, Megan and Grace have recognised that the church actions 
that they participated in, which they had thought were a good thing – they 
thought they were helping people – were actually hurting a lot of people.  
We thought it was changing our neighbour and it wasn’t. It was hurting people and there 
was so much more room and questioning than we were ever allowed. They don’t believe 
in interpretation at all. They don’t even believe that people can read the same words and 
come out with a different idea. They don’t believe that that’s legitimately possible…that 
was the point at which it became less terrifying to leave and more terrifying to stay…we 
are struggling but we know that we want to ‘do good’, not sure what that is yet, but…‘do 
good’ is what life is about…I can’t go back and change anything. I can only change what I 
do from here on.15 
 
This case study highlights the importance of disagreement in terms of 
engagement in communication and argument. The WBC asserts that they have 
access to the word of God and that as their actions are in accord with God’s word, 
                                                          
 
13 While the church confirms that Pastor Fred Phelps was excommunicated the details of why are 
sketchy. See, for example, Daniel Burke, 25/03/2014, “Westboro church founder Fred Phelps 
dies” in CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/20/us/westboro-church-founder-dead/ Accessed 
28/10/2014, or Jan Biles and Steve Fry, 16/03/2014 “WBC spokesman said Fred Phelps Sr. was 
‘healthy’ a month before he entered hospice” in cjonline.com. http://cjonline.com/news/2014-
03-16/wbc-spokesman-said-fred-phelps-sr-was-healthy-month-he-entered-hospice Accessed 
28/10/2014. 
14 Megan Phelps, transcribed from Chu, 2014, interview: http://vimeo.com/90865308 
15 Megan Phelps, transcribed from Chu, 2014, interview: http://vimeo.com/90865308 
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they are exempt from compromise with the broader community and from 
engaging in any form of justification.  
The denial of disagreement enables the WBC to isolate itself from internal 
and external criticism. Two dimensions emerge: the im/morality of the social 
impact of their actions and the im/morality of the internal organisation. The 
WBC’s internal rejection of disagreement provides the bedrock for not 
participating in external criticism. By rejecting the possibility of disagreement 
amongst its members, the WBC isolates itself from any possibility of negotiation 
internally by denying anything other than wholesale agreement. Either you 
conform to ‘the truth’ as it is revealed through the word of God or you leave. This 
is then extended to the way they engage with external communities – we are 
right and you are damned. 
 Recent questions about the viability and structure of the church following 
the death of Pastor Fred Phelps in March 2014 have been met with similar 
defiance and non-cooperation. In the official statement issued by the church in 
response to this matter, they state: "Listen carefully; there are no power 
struggles in the Westboro Baptist Church, and there is no human intercessor – 
we serve no man, and no hierarchy, only the Lord Jesus Christ."”16 Commenting 
on who is the leader of the WBC, church spokesman, Steve Drain said: “The 
church of Jesus Christ doesn’t have a head…the Lord Jesus Christ is our head.”17 
Eight unnamed elders lead the congregation. 
Somewhat ironically, it is the denial of disagreement that pushes many 
members out of the church. Megan and Grace could no longer envision a future in 
a community that refused to address their questions about how the church 
interpreted and enacted the word of God. The very thing that the WBC denies, 
namely legitimate interpretation, undermines the stability of the future of the 
church.   
…that questioning proved difficult, due to the strict interpretation of scripture that Mr. 
Phelps…insists WBC members adhere to. “It was always very much all-or-nothing,” 
Megan explains. “The way the church presents it is, there’s the WBC and the rest of the 
world. And the rest of the world is evil. The WBC is the only place in the world in our 
                                                          
 
16 Daniel Burke, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/20/us/westboro-church-founder-dead/ 
17 Biles and Fry, 2014, http://cjonline.com/news/2014-03-16/wbc-spokesman-said-fred-phelps-
sr-was-healthy-month-he-entered-hospice  
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generation that is telling the truth of God. Over time, those little things built up, and 
there were so many of them. Once you step out of it for a second, and you’re out of that 
vacuum, things change.”…When they were with the WBC, “You feel like you know 
everything,” Megan says. “you know what’s right and wrong.” But now, Grace says, “We 
can be sure of nothing.”18 
  
Engagement with disagreement through a need to question the church’s 
interpretation of scripture, forced the two women to re-evaluate the legitimacy 
of the values into which they had been indoctrinated. This led to dramatic 
changes, which have left them somewhat bewildered. They acknowledge that 
leaving the group which operated on the basis of dogma, came at the expense of 
certainty and family.  
 The two dimensions of internal processes and external impact, combined 
with the relationship between them, marks the WBC as having removed itself 
from the broader societal moral arena. This self-isolation is purposive and 
fruitful insofar as it enables WBC leaders to reign supreme. Gregg summarises 
the effects of such dogmatism: 
Thus, communities that reject the very possibility of disagreement among their members 
will refuse participation in a social order organized along thin proceduralism. Thin 
proceduralism can work for groups in contention, but only if they are not fanatic or 
absolutist. Not fanatic or absolutist is the concession, for example, that means and ends 
can stand in normatively problematic relation to each other.19 
 
In 10.3 we learnt that thin agreement is only possible if participants in a 
disagreement are willing to put aside their identity based values and find 
common interests as goals for thin agreement. The WBC aims to indoctrinate the 
young so that they grow into a system of dogma and toe the church’s line, rather 
than having the opportunity to cultivate judgment. By elevating themselves to be 
the sole holders of divine knowledge, the WBC isolates itself from engaging in 
consultation, argument or discussion. In effect it operates like a unit of dogma 
rather than a community. As such, while the WBC thinks they are holding the 
high moral ground, by Dewey’s account they do not hold moral ground at all. 
They are simply setting down rules of attitude and conduct imposed without 
allowing and facilitating enquiry.  
                                                          
 
18 Matthew Hays, 28/10/2013, “Granddaughters of an infamous homophobic U.S. pastor find 
grace in Montreal” in Special to The Globe and Mail. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/after-break-from-westboro-baptists-sisters-
find-new-freedom-in-montreal/article15130964/ Accessed 24/10/2014. 
19 Gregg, 2002, p. 765. 
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11.3 Case 2: Chris Lilley’s Jonah from Tonga 
 
A 2014 ABC television series, Jonah from Tonga, written by Australian comedian 
Chris Lilley, has reignited public debate about racism in Australia. The 
mokumentary’s central character, Jonah Takulua is an unmanageable and 
rebellious 14-year-old boy of Tongan descent who first appeared in Lilley’s 
previous 2007 series Summer Heights High. Played by Chris Lilley, who is not of 
Tongan descent, the story of Jonah unfolds in the schoolyard. A survey of two 
responses to the first episode of the six episode series demonstrates that the 
show has created much division. For example, on the one hand, Lilley’s work is 
dismissed for perpetuating racist agendas and creating stereotypes. On this 
interpretation, Lilley’s impersonation of a Tongan teenager is an example of 
‘brownfacing’. Brownfacing is a racist depiction of persons of colour on par with 
the minstrel theatrical makeup ‘blackfacing’ of the 19th century. It is considered 
racially offensive because it is seen as a stereotypical caricature of people of 
colour. On the other hand, Lilley’s work is applauded by others as cutting edge, 
hard-hitting comedy that challenges racist stereotyping existing in Australian 
society. This side dismisses the accusation of ‘brownfacing’. Citing Lilley’s 
previous characters such as a teenage girl, a black American rapper and a 
grandmother, supporters assert that he is a satirist and amateur sociologist who 
uses his comedic genius to question and challenge societal assumptions and 
force us into some healthy introspection. 
In his article, Jonah from Tonga: genius or racist?20 TV critic Giles Hardie 
argues that Lilley is a comedic genius who operates on the edge of racism 
without ever succumbing.  
There is…a world of difference in the hair’s breadth that lies between such mimcry and 
genuine satire. One is a social putdown, the other a social comment. It is a semantic 
distinction, but a vital one, and one that must be earned – but one that must also be 
recognised.21  
 
                                                          
 





Hardie’s argument rests on a demarcation between mimicry and satire, claiming 
that Lilley’s work is clearly located in the latter. His justification for this claim is 
that Lilley does not make patronising and deeply concerning observations of 
Tongan culture. Lilley’s aim is to make people laugh at societal norms rather 
than make people think “aren’t those coloured people funny”. Hardie admits, that 
to “surf that line is incredibly dangerous” but maintains that Lilley does not cross 
it. Hardie also rejects the charge of ‘brownfacing’. He quotes Rick Kalowski, the 
ABC’s head of comedy, to justify his stance:  
“Jonah From Tonga plays with stereotypes, but it’s doing so to make an observation 
about the narrow-minded attitudes expressed by some of its characters, including 
Jonah’s own. Indeed, prejudice by and against Jonah is clearly shown to be at the root of 
the problems he faces in the series.”22  
 
Hardie argues that the show can be indemnified from being labelled racist as it 
plays on the cultural traits and responses to a variety of ethnicities. He argues 
that Jonah from Tonga is not creating the stereotype; rather Lilley is “challenging 
an existing one that is found in society. The comedy then emphasises how wrong 
it is.”23 Hardie treats the disagreement as due to interpretation, where criticism 
of Lilley is based on misunderstanding his comedic genius. “It is fantastic that 
people are accusing this show of being racist, because that is exactly the way to 
start the relevant and important conversation.”24  
Blackface in a white nation25 is a response from Maori writer Morgan 
Godfrey. Godfrey’s primary argument is that any kind of ‘blacking up’ is racist. 
The problem is that in addition to Lilley wearing brown makeup, he also wears 
fake curls, a fake tatatau, uses a fob accent and adopts what he thinks are 
Polynesian mannerisms. Godfrey argues that the latter is racially cross-dressing, 
which is as offensive as ‘blacking up’ or ‘brownfacing’.  
Australia has a comedy problem if a guy who dresses in blackface, brownface and 
yellowface is considered a ‘genius’. In what other country could a comedian earn a pass, 
let alone praise, for resurrecting minstrelsy? Not many, if any.26  
 





25 Morgan Godfrey, 12/05/14, “Blackface in a white nation” in Overland. 
http://overland.org.au/2014/05/blackface-in-a-white-nation/ Accessed 13/05/14. 
26 Ibid. 
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Godfrey does not deny that Lilley is a good satirist, but argues that acting out 
stereotypes risks reinforcing them. Some people who watch the show will view it 
as confirming their racist stereotypes about Polynesian communities, others will 
view it as Lilley presumably intends, as a critique of stereotypes.  
Prominent Tongan community member Meliama Fifita believes the former is true…To 
ridicule Australian racism Lilley has to show it. [But] The method – brownface – 
overcomes the message about Australian racism.27  
 
Godfrey maintains that his response is not a case of over-sensitivity and political 
correctness gone mad:  
I, for one, am sick of being told it’s ‘just a joke’, ‘you’re too sensitive’ and ‘get off your PC 
high horse’. The implication is that being offended is something disadvantaged people do 
while joking around is something that people with privilege do.”28  
 
Godfrey identifies the way that we perceive racism as the core of the problem. He 
explains that many  
…white Australians would think a charge of racism requires an intention to be a racist. 
However, many people of colour look at racist impact. On the first view Lilley can’t be 
perpetuating racism because he doesn’t intend to be racist. On the second view Lilley is 
perpetuating racism because brownface has an impact that is racist.29  
 
Godfrey thus summarises the disagreement as being due to a difference of focus. 
If we view Jonah from Tonga with Lilley’s intention in mind then we can conclude 
that it has successfully negotiated the fine line between mimicry and genius. If 
we focus on the impacts of his brownfacing on the group of people he portrays, 
then his actions have contributed to the perpetuation of racist stereotypes.    
In August 2014, Jarom Vaha’i, a Tongan-American, unsuccessfully started 
a Change.org petition against HBO running the show in the U.S.30 Vaha’i argues 
that it’s not just the brown facing that is offensive; it is also that Lilley 
misrepresents Tongan culture. Executive Director of the National Tongan 
American Society O. Fahina Tavake-Pasi points out that the character’s swearing, 
graffiti, rude gestures and disrespect for elders would not be tolerated in any 
Tongan community – and that if Lilley had been more accurate in his portrayal, it 
may not have been so offensive: “it’s offensive that a white guy who knows 





30 Emily Orley, 8/8/2014, “The Brownface Controversy Surrounding “Jonah From Tonga”” in 
BuzzFeed, http://www.buzzfeed.com/emilyorley/the-brownface-controversy-surrounding-
jonah-from-tonga#fz5utf Accessed 22/08/2014. 
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nothing about the community tries to be funny with it, and it’s not funny. It’s just 
ignorance.”31 While Chris Lilley has not directly contributed to the current 
debate, he does defend his research process in one interview: “I try to make my 
shows really accurate… I get to know the families and I think if they watch it and 
see how accurate it is, then it’s going to be funny for everyone.”32   
This is not the first time that Lilley has faced accusations of racist 
stereotyping. In a 2011 interview with American magazine Vulture, Lilley 
admitted that blackface was a “big deal” (that is, unacceptable) “even in 
Australia”.33 At the time HBO were about to screen his show Angry Boys, which 
features several ‘blackface’ characters whom he plays, such as a Japanese mother 
and a black rapper called S’Mouse. In the interview his defense centres on the 
idea that he has always played multiple characters, pushed boundaries and tried 
new things. He acknowledges that Australians understand the historical 
significance of blackface, but thinks that his character (S’Mouse) is more than 
just a blackface joke. Lilley asserts that the joke isn’t the blackfacing, but the 
characters:  
It's kind of funny that there's only certain races that it's an issue — yes, it's that history 
with blackface — but, I don't know. There's no comparison. I think it's a bit stupid that 
you would shut yourself off to being able to do that.34 
 
Unlike his previous series, Jonah from Tonga was a “ratings disaster” for the 
show’s producers ABC, BBC and HBO.35 Initial plans to tour the series in 
Australian cinemas followed by a Q&A with Chris Lilley, were cancelled and the 
show’s website, which promoted the tour, was removed.36 This case study is 
interesting as it demonstrates a disagreement in process. The disagreement is 
perpetuated by a lack of consensus about what constitutes racism and whether 
                                                          
 
31 Ibid. 
32 Emma Soren, 07/08/2014, “Becoming 'Jonah from Tonga' with Chris Lilley” in Splitsider, 
http://splitsider.com/2014/08/becoming-jonah-from-tonga-with-chris-lilley/ Accessed 
22/08/2104. 
33 Jean Bentley, 12/29/2011, “Chris Lilley on Angry Boys, the Blackface Taboo, and Laughing at 
His Own Jokes” in Vulture. http://www.vulture.com/2011/12/chris-lilley-on-angry-boys-the-
blackface-taboo-and-laughing-at-his-own-jokes.html Accessed 22/08/2014. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Amanda Meade, 15/05/2014, “Chris Lilley tastes ratings disaster as just 287,000 viewers tune 
in” in theguardian.com. http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/may/15/chris-lilley-tastes-
ratings-disaster-as-just-287000-viewers-tune-in Accessed 29/10/2014. 
36 http://www.jonahfromtonga.com.au  
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Lilley’s portrayal is mimicry or satire. While consensus has not yet been reached, 
the ongoing interaction between the two views does demonstrate that both sides 
are engaged in a communicative process. The show’s failure in terms of ratings 
does indicate that the general populace does not support the show.  
This is a case of proceduralism in progress, of rational toing and froing 
between identity values (ethnicity and racism, for example) and general 
interests (satire and social commentary verses humour and entertainment at a 
minority group’s expense, for example). In terms of Gregg’s thin proceduralism, 
there is a lack of normative consensus in regards to what constitutes racism. The 
lack of normative consensus indicates the need to identify thin norms, or 
common interests, in order to better understand the other’s position.37 The 
problem then seems to be one of isolating or ranking them. Which is more 
significant, artistic expression or developing ongoing positive stereotypes 
concerning a minority group? However, neither side defended free speech over 
respect to racial minorities. The desired end for the defending side reflected the 
same end as the opposing side. Both defended their positions on the basis of 
facilitating a non-racist community. That is, neither side of the debate is saying 
that racism is fine – so there is thin agreement. Both sides hold this value 
regarding respecting all races and they are both respectful of Chris Lilley’s 
comedic genius. This provides them with a common ground, a shared interest, 
from which to engage in the disagreement.  
On the one hand, one limit of thin proceduralism is highlighted by this 
case study. Normative thinness is successful insofar it facilitates communication, 
thereby opening the way for the discovering of common ground from which thin 
agreements can be established. However, as the success of the process relies on 
the sidelining of identity values and the dismissal of the possibility of substantial 
agreement, processes can stagnate. In this case, the two sides seem to have 
reached a stalemate, where they continue to view the conflict differently and 
retain competing narratives. While there is no likelihood of substantial 
agreement over whether or not Jonah from Tonga is racist, currently in sight, it 
will be interesting to see what Chris Lilley does next – whether or not he 
                                                          
 
37 Gregg, 2002, p. 748. 
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continues to exploit the medium of ‘brownfacing’ and ‘blackfacing’ – or whether 
the community eventually decides that these are not genuine forms of satire. 
On the other hand, in particularly hard cases of conflict that have, for 
example, a fundamental difference in identity values at their core, such as 
religious beliefs, it is this very limit that facilitates thin agreement. Thin 
agreements – such as a desire to end violence – have, in places such as Northern 
Ireland, fostered the continuance of fragile peace agreements since the late 
1990’s. Tensions remain within the devolved government and between the 
unionist and nationalist communities.38 Broader issues such as the need to 
address ongoing sectarian sticking points, fully grappling with Northern 
Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed “dealing with the past”), curbing 
remaining dissident activity, and fostering economic development, still persist.39 
However, in this case a long history of excluding people from equal participation 
based on their religion and race, has left a legacy that impacts still on the 
possibility of community; and the kind of communication required of a 
‘community of enquiry’. 
The explanatory power of Dewey’s account is to suggest that it is these 
sorts of disagreements that offer opportunities for change, lest norms and values 
remain static. Dewey goes beyond finding common ground. The ideal democratic 
moral life uses enquiry to externalise these attitudes and values, allowing them 
to become the objects of debate and thereby opening the possibility for cultural 
and moral development. This debate is in the moral realm in Dewey’s terms. On 
one level, this is why Dewey’s particular brand of proceduralism is relevant. In 
identifying problems and finding common interests, we live morally enriched 
lives.  
 
11.4 Case 3: Murray Darling Basin  
 
                                                          
 
38 Kristin Archick, 11/03/2015, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process”, prepared for 




The Murray Darling Basin (MDB) is a large area that spans five states in eastern 
Australia. The many rivers of the basin are a valuable resource for irrigation, 
industrial use and domestic supply. Though for different reasons, the economic 
and social importance of the Murray makes its health a primary concern for all of 
Australia. However, the water supply and ecological health of the river has been 
adversely affected due to a number of factors: many years of drought (2002-
2012); waterlogging and salinization resulting from irrigation and clearing of red 
gum forests and reed beds; livestock grazing on river banks; industrial, storm 
water, pesticide and sewage pollution; and growing recreation and tourism 
activities.40 In response to these widespread water supply problems, in 2008 the 
Australian Commonwealth Government established the Murray-Darling Basin 
Authority (MDBA), a single body responsible for overseeing water resource 
planning in the MDB. The current…  
Murray–Darling Basin Agreement aims to 'promote and co-ordinate effective planning 
and management for the equitable, efficient and sustainable use of the water and other 
natural resources of the Murray-Darling Basin, including by implementing arrangements 
agreed between the Contracting Governments to give effect to the Basin Plan, the Water 
Act and State water entitlements.'41  
 
The MDBA uses scientific and research expertise to inform their work. They also 
consult with a number of local committees that advise on community issues in 
the Basin and provide regional community views on the Basin Plan.  
Aboriginal people on cultural and natural resource management issues in the Basin, 
primarily working with the Murray Lower Darling Rivers Indigenous Nations and the 
Northern Murray–Darling Basin Aboriginal Nation…regularly liaise with state and 
regional committees and agencies including 13 Catchment Management Authorities, 8 
Local Land Services and Natural Resource Management Boards throughout the 
Basin…[who in turn]…work directly with their local communities to restore and improve 
natural resources. We liaise with the Murray Darling Association that represents more 
than 90 local government municipalities in the Basin, in addition to working directly 
with many of the Local Councils.42 
 
The establishment of the MDBA is acknowledgement that effective action 
requires collaboration between Commonwealth, Local and State governments 
and local communities.   






42 http://www.mdba.gov.au/what-we-do/working-with-others Accessed 01/06/2014. 
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The vastness of the area combined with its multiple and diverse value on 
both a local and national level means that the health of the MDB is one of 
Australia's biggest environmental, economic and social problems. There is no 
disagreement between government bodies and the community about the 
urgency of the water crisis. Everyone agrees that current usage must change in 
order to facilitate the Murray River’s health and sustainability. However, 
competing interests between environmental sustainability and commercial 
viability persist. While positing the overall health of the river as the overarching 
monistic value is a good start, the issue is compounded by the multiplicity of 
stakeholders, who hold conflicting public and private interests. Disagreement 
persists, on how to achieve the health of the river and what kind of benefits to us 
is the true objective of the exercise. Multiple incompatible values at the general 
interest level compete with each other. Rice growers clash with fruit growers, 
environmentalist groups clash with commercial developers and industry, cattle 
farmers clash with grape growers and wine makers clash with still others, to 
name a few.  
Since the MDBA was set up, government agencies have used community 
consultation as a way to investigate individual and public interests, exploit local 
knowledge, collect scientific evidence and weigh possibilities. These 
consultations have had mixed success. While in some areas individuals and 
communities have been able to express their concerns, voice their opinions and 
be heard, in others many people feel that the government is simply paying lip 
service to their views and that the consultation process has not had much 
influence at the decision making level. Even if we grant this, we can see that 
there has been some progress over the last seven years that has contributed to 
advancing the health of the river, in turn boosting local morale by dispelling 
feelings of futility in the face of such a huge crisis.  
In South Australia, the Murray Mouth, Coorong and Lower Lakes area is 
one of Australia's most important wetland areas. In 1985 the Commonwealth 
Government designated the site as a “Wetland of International Importance under 
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the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands.”43 Actions up river have the potential to 
have a significant impact on these areas that are of… 
National Environmental Significance including: wetlands of international importance; 
listed ecological communities; listed threatened bird species; listed threatened plant 
species; listed migratory species; and listed fish species.44  
 
The problem is that the driving forces up river are largely economic, whereas the 
driving forces down river are largely environmental. On top of this there are 
political associations to be considered. While everyone agrees that there is a 
crisis and a balance between competing economic and environmental values 
needs to be found, the complexity of the problem makes reconciliation and 
consensus between these conflicting values difficult and probably not solvable in 
the near future.  
As a member of this Lower Lakes community, I participated in many 
government consultations over the years. While disagreement over the balance 
between environmental and economic outcomes continues, ongoing community 
consultations, local meetings and schemes such as the Community Nurseries 
Network’s re-vegetation program that is run through The Lakes Hub in Milang, 
have made a visible difference to the Lower Lakes community and the river that 
sustains it. The Lakes Hub is an initiative of the Milang and District Community 
Association Inc. and is part of the South Australian Government’s Murray 
Futures program, funded by the Australian Government’s Water for the 
Future initiative.45 The resulting project is believed to be one of the largest 
restoration projects of its kind in the world, with more than 500,000 plants of 
180 different local native species propagated and planted in 2013.46  
As well as providing a conduit for consultation, the Lakes Hub encourages 
people to become involved in environmental restoration projects such as water, 
soil and fish monitoring, participating in revegetation, producing seedlings, 
saving turtles and so on. The variety of projects, working on many different 
issues that affect many different members of the community has led to some 
                                                          
 
43 http://www.environment.gov.au/resource/coorong-and-lakes-alexandrina-and-albert-
ramsar-wetland-fact-sheet Accessed 04/06/2014. 
44 http://www.environment.gov.au/resource/coorong-and-lakes-alexandrina-and-albert-
ramsar-wetland-fact-sheet Accessed 04/06/2014. 
45 http://lakeshub.com/about/ Accessed 25/07/2014. 
46 Statistics garnered from: http://lakeshub.com Accessed 25/07/2014. 
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cohesion and reconciliation between competing interests and rendered formerly 
fragile relationships robust. Of particular import is the rejuvenation of respect 
and self worth within local indigenous groups whose wealth of local knowledge 
has proven to be instrumental to the decision making process. Conflicts between 
competing economic, environmental and social interests have been tempered 
over time by the overarching aim of the one thing that all community members 
agree upon - the health of the Murray.  
While incompatible values, such as those between industry, agriculture 
and environment, entail that disagreement persists; thin agreements have 
enabled ongoing courses of action to emerge. As an ongoing process, successful 
outcomes, in terms of sustainable agricultural practices and environmental 
regeneration accumulate and emerge over time. This demonstrates that thin 
agreement is a potent catalyst for effective agency of a community. Dewey 
argued that engaging in ethical problems through a process of reflection enables 
self and societal revision and growth in the face of ever changing conflicts 
between ends, responsibilities, rights, duties and principals. Isolating identity 
values from the process enables participants to find thin agreements based on 
rational identification of shared interests. These Murray-Darling projects and 
collaborations are examples of the kinds of cooperation, participation and 
willingness to compromise that thin agreement can motivate from all 
participants. Ongoing consultation and commitment between stakeholders has 
produced an enduring method of identifying shared interests and ways of 
achieving them over a seven-year period, resulting in a project that is one of the 
largest restoration projects of its kind in the world – officially acknowledged by 
the United Nations Association of Australia when it named the Goolwa to 
Wellington Local Action Planning Association Inc. as the 2014 winners of the 





                                                          
 
47 http://www.unaavictoria.org.au/awards-programs/world-environment-day-awards/winners-
finalists/ Accessed 21/11/2014. 
 215 
Dewey argued that it is the very complexity of moral problems and judgment 
making, the weighing of conflicting values and making decisions, which 
necessitates a ‘community of enquiry’. Without careful, rationally grounded 
decision-making procedures, disagreements can halt decision-making and 
ultimately action-taking. Dewey’s proceduralism is a theory of practice that 
responds to the reality and complexity of living an ethical life and is reflected in 
my own experience of participating in a community facing an ethical crisis. As 
discussed above, often difficult and wrought with disagreement, the complex 
public meetings I attended eventually led to possibilities for action. Steered by 
minimal consensus, thin agreements were attained, projects were undertaken 
and the local environment, economy and community began to thrive. I realised 
that I was observing a Deweyan community in action.  
The overarching concern for the health of the river drove most of the 
project planning and tempered the oft-fractious process of reaching decisions 
that always involved compromise. Underlying these processes was an 
expectation that the decisions would be fair, carefully thought through and well 
intentioned. Many different and clashing individual, environmental and 
commercial values needed to be weighed before decisions could be made. Quite 
often, disagreement over these competing and conflicting values stalled the 
process and stalemates would ensue. But, with enough rational deliberation, 
compromises were sought, made and decisions about what to do were agreed 
upon and implemented. Theory met practice.  
Most of the public meetings focused on scientific and commercial 
proposals that weighed ideas on how to benefit the regeneration of the 
environment against the need to support commercial interests and small 
businesses. Many of these decisions led to the establishment of local projects, for 
example, regenerating the shoreline ecosystem. What was underestimated were 
the broader social benefits, an aspect that Dewey theorised about in terms of self 
and societal realisation. For instance, an unforseen outcome of the crisis has 
been the realisation that the health of the river impacts on the health of the 
community. When the river is flourishing, the community flourishes, 
environmentally, commercially and socially.  
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The social benefits that emerged, in terms of a stronger and more 
cohesive community, were mostly unanticipated and have proven to be the 
cohesive force needed when making difficult decisions. One early example of this 
was the putting up of fences along the lakeside in order to block cattle from 
accessing the environmentally delicate shoreline. Many (initially grumpy) 
farmers, citing historical precedence and cost, were resistant. Scientists and 
environmentalists insisted that it was absolutely necessary as the cattle’s hooves 
did irreparable damage to the delicate lakeside ecosystem, which had knock-on 
effects for the turtle, bird and fish populations. After many months of sometimes 
quite heated meetings, a compromise was reached. The farmers agreed to the 
fencing on the condition that the government funded the project. Not only did 
the project generate new jobs and skills, it also brought together members of the 
community, such as indigenous and non-indigenous, agricultural and 
environmental, who had not formerly associated with each other. Like a ripple 
effect, the social ramifications of such projects were unforseen and incidental. 
Decisions for action were only made after much well informed, rational, 
and often heated deliberation. The environmental crisis and the conflicts that 
arose out of it transformed the social fabric of the community and became 
opportunities for change and growth. While in theory Dewey’s optimism seems 
naïve, my own experience of living in a community, that found cohesion in the 
face of difficult and compromising decisions time and time again, demonstrates 
in practice that full participation in rational decision-making procedures 
(enquiry) within a community, form the basis of self and societal progress.  
The purpose of this chapter has been to present three actual cases of 
persistent disagreement in order to demonstrate the explanatory power of 
Dewey’s theory when applied to such cases. The analysis shows that the success 
of the procedural account hinges not only on the process itself, but also on the 
willingness of participants to participate. Although this seems somewhat 
obvious, it highlights an important aspect of Dewey’s broader theory and 
educative aims. Dewey thought that systemically exercised rationality leads to 
respect for others, which in turn leads to the cultivation of self and society. 
Democracy ‘falls out of’ rational deliberation on moral matters when a 
community of diverse interests is addressed in order to serve our sociability. We 
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all have self-interests,48 but we can recognise that individual values can hamper 
rational deliberation. Dewey thought that a genuine ‘community of enquiry’ 
draws us away from the self-interest that thwarts rationality. Pursuing common 
interests such as equality, justice, societal and individual eudemonia and so on, 
requires individuals, institutions and societies to engage in critical assessment 
and argument. Dewey offers an optimistic view of moral conflicts by treating 
them as opportunities for engagement in processes of individual and societal 
change. In doing this, he summons his philosophical framework, directing 
philosophical enquiry into morality away from the binaries or dichotomies 
related to sentiment and reason. Dewey’s enquiry-into-experience is both a 
practical solution and a philosophical one. 
                                                          
 
48 Or identity values as Gregg calls them (10.3). 
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12. The Good, The Right & The Exigencies of Life 
 
This thesis has reconfigured the structure of ethical engagement by showing how 
John Dewey’s pragmatic proceduralism answered problems that arose in the 
development of ideas as represented through David Hume, Immanuel Kant and 
John Stuart Mill. I demonstrate that by concentrating on the process at the 
practical level in the manner of Hume and Mill, rather than universals per se, 
Dewey was able to sidestep the metaphysical problems presented by Kant. By 
focussing in particular on the relation between disagreement and motivation to 
act, Dewey was able to progress beyond the dichotomies found in Hume between 
sentiment and reason, and in Mill between individual and community. Dewey’s 
conception of ‘enquiry into experience’ facilitated a method of evaluation and 
valuing that circumvented questions about the nature of values and turned 
instead to identifying a method of communication and decision-making that did 
not require participants to share a system of belief. Viewing Dewey in light of 
these theorists, reinforces his conception of experience, which includes 
experiencing, (subjectivity and intersubjectivity) and rejects the reductionist or 
dichotomous tendencies of traditional moral theories. His move away from 
conceptual exclusivity (a conceptual framework only available to those born into 
a community) facilitates a notion of experience according to which experience is 
not an irreducible aspect of mind and sensing, but rather susceptible to 
acculturation. For Dewey, experience incorporates the rational and sentimental, 
the objective and subjective, theory and practice, and cognitive and non-
cognitive.  
Dewey argued that moral judgments come into focus more clearly when 
they are conceived as responses to problems that are experienced as an 
uneasiness and hesitation to a situation, evoking the need for enquiry. Dewey 
places reflection (enquiry) as central to what constitutes a moral judgment. This 
can be seen as a response to Hume’s sentimentalism. Dewey in effect puts Kant’s 
categorical imperative, when understood as a tool for identifying goods that are 
interdependent with the realm of ends, to work. Both the goal of identifying a 
Kantian supreme principle that serves as THE ethical criterion and Mill’s goal of 
identifying an ultimate end are adapted to accommodate the conditions 
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presented by a multi-cultured society. Dewey bases his thesis on the 
understanding that both feeling and reason are part of the self’s expressive 
impulses, which in turn, influence what are deemed the relevant premises in any 
decision making process. The outcome is a theory of ethical enquiry outlined in 
the light of empirical enquiry, where reflective intelligence is used to revise 
judgments in light of actions (means) and their consequences (ends) within 
reasoning communities.  
Whilst not denying the inheritance of his pragmatist forebears, Peirce and 
James, the historical timeline of this thesis sheds new light on Deweyan concepts. 
I have argued that the central role of feeling and attitude in Hume’s 
understanding of moral motivation and ends, and the prominence of reason in 
Kant’s, are, as we saw in chapter six, relevant to Dewey’s conception of 
experience. I then argued that it is possible to view Mill as an earlier forerunner 
to Dewey’s conception of the relationship between theory and practice. In terms 
of moral disagreement, by motivating us to make decisions on moral issues, 
feeling is the compass for Hume. Dewey would agree to the extent that 
disagreements about what is valuable, particularly clashes over personal identity 
values, are painful and emotionally charged. However, Dewey did not conceive 
such feelings as irrational. Benjamin Gregg’s idea that such values can be put to 
one side in the interests of finding common ground, is an appealing and practical 
response. However, for Dewey, feelings are accommodated as an important 
aspect of judgment making, but the process of community enquiry provides the 
context in which they are mediated against broader community interests.  
Our pragmatist reading of Kant led us to the conclusion that respect for 
the moral law ‘falls out of’ reason. Kant argued that both the rationalist and 
empiricist mistakenly assume that we can know things, as they are in 
themselves, independent of the conditions of our experience of them. He 
responded with a metaphysical account of truth, the synthetic a priori, which 
accommodates both. Dewey can be seen as having continued this project. Neo-
Kantians such as John McDowell reinforce and develop this aspect of Kant’s 
theory when they argue that sentience cannot be removed from sapience. 
By reading Mill’s utilitarian theory in light of his theory of liberty, we 
were able to highlight this important, often overlooked aspect of Mill: we revise 
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moral norms on the basis of intellectual reflection on actions and their 
consequences, in terms of the effects on the self and society in general. Arguably, 
Dewey expands upon Mill’s distinction between low and high pleasures when he 
distinguishes between what is valued immediately in impulse and unreflective 
habit, as compared to what is valued reflectively. As with other distinctions we 
have encountered, Dewey always avoids separating them categorically in 
practice. This unification of unreflective and reflective value represents a 
naturalistic account of our highly sensitive capacity for awareness of 
incompatible preferences. Our experience of a state of unsettledness initiates 
reflection and the need for deliberative choice. 
Dewey’s moral theory is an attempt to capture ethics as an art of living in 
a complex and multi-cultural world. His inclusive conception of experience 
captures the actual, the way the world is, and the felt, the way we react to the 
world. This view is based on a theory of perception that recognises that 
experience involves our experience of it. It is important to remember that this is 
not a theory of the hard problem of consciousness. Dewey is not trying to explain 
the metaphysical or epistemological foundations of subjective experience, the 
‘what’ or ‘where’ of experience. Rather, he is accepting that because perception 
involves experiencing the experience, the subjective is an integral part of facts. 
This is a biological, not a metaphysical, starting point where both the objective 
and subjective are essential aspects of the way we perceive the world and 
therefore the way the world is. 
Through an expansion of Kant’s bridging of the sentimentalism/ 
rationalism structure, Dewey’s theory amalgamates theory and practice, the 
ideal and real. His notion of moral life as community enquiry is presented both as 
an ideal and as a practice. As an ideal, democracy ‘falls out of’ rational enquiry. 
As a practice or method, it exercises induction under the constraints of 
community interests and hence communicability. The ultimate claim is that a 
moral life gives rise to democracy. Dewey does more than offer a description of 
rational deliberation; he proposes that participation in such endeavours within a 
community is a natural part of what it is to be human due to our sociability. 
Furthermore, humans develop their capacity for intelligent action through 
participation in community via rational deliberation and decision-making. In 
 221 
turn, democracy is presented as a condition of moral life where there is genuine 
scope for disagreement, and representation. 
The cognitivist argues that with enough of the right sort of rational 
debate, solutions will be found and problems will be solved. However, this 
position seems somewhat naïve when faced with such difficult and fraught 
disagreements such as those that arise during an environmental crisis. The 
cognitivist treats disagreement as a solvable problem, as if the answer is out 
there waiting to be discovered. This underestimates the complexity of 
disagreement. Admittedly the source of some disagreements can be pinned 
down to a lack of rationality, or misinformation, or self-interest of some sort, but 
as the Murray Darling Basin case study demonstrates, some disagreements are 
grounded in genuine difference – of aims, values, opinion and preferences, such 
as short-term economic versus long-term environmental, for example. 
Proceduralists advocate for enquiries, for debate and argument, for the weighing 
of values and negotiating outcomes, with the hope that they will at least find 
better ways of understanding the positions involved. From this general 
understanding, it is hoped that possibilities for action will be identified, that at 
least thin agreements will be made. 
Seemingly interminable conflicts and disagreements over values, is 
evidence of the complexity and difficulty of making moral evaluations. 
Theoretically, we can see this problem reflected in the foundational pluralist’s 
identification of incommensurability and incomparability as key features of 
interminable moral disagreement, leading them to give up on consensus 
altogether. The foundational monist responds by instantiating an overarching 
monistic value against which comparisons can be made but which rapidly 
becomes so vague that it is vacuous. The problem for the foundational pluralist is 
that if disagreements are interminable, then deliberation is rendered vacuous 
and futile. The problem for the foundational monist is that the overarching value, 
such as happiness or wellbeing, for example, is so broad that it is meaningless. 
The pragmatist argues that regardless of the metaphysical nature of values, there 
are disagreements, which involve clashes in value at both an individual and 
societal level. In response to the problem of disagreement the pragmatist 
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advocates that we turn away from questions about the metaphysical nature of 
values and toward identifying ways to tackle such difficult situations.  
Dewey’s ethical theory turns away from the problem-solution metaphor 
and replaces it with an adjudicatory model based on ‘communities of inquiry’. 
This represents a shift in focus from solutions to resolutions, and facilitates the 
adoption of a procedural stance toward pluralism and monism. That is, pluralism 
is employed to recognise the diversity of values and monism to identify that 
everyone wants to find a way forward. This involves accepting that some moral 
disagreements may not be solved. Instead, focus is on identifying the relevant 
issues and concerns, that is, a shared set of terms of reference, and perhaps at 
least beginning to chip away at the problem. There is a sense that even for the 
‘common’ person, the wrong, deeply engraved philosophical position can 
hamper progress in these matters. Sidestepping the metaphysical question opens 
up the way for engagement in process and offers us a lesson in realistic 
expectations of outcomes of conflict.  
For Dewey, the root of conflict can be found in the clash between ends 
that cannot be realised simultaneously because they get in the way of each 
other’s realisation. The very existence of moral problems, of clashes in value that 
lead to seemingly interminable disagreements indicate that morality is very 
much a part of the human condition, hence the need for a method that can foster 
intelligent responses. Pragmatic proceduralism is optimistic in the face of 
persistent disagreement. The optimism of Dewey’s account can be seen in his 
notion of self and societal realisation. The idea is that rational democratic 
communication will lead to rational democratic decisions that have ramifications 
on the individual and the society in which they live. His educative ideal is that if 
we cultivate rational individuals, we will end up with ethically intelligent, more 
unified societies that have the capacity to engage in disagreement without 
conflict. Unencumbered by expectations of solving problems once and for all, the 
pragmatist applauds participation and willingness to compromise, negotiate and 
cooperate through the identification of a common way of setting up the problem. 
In this thesis I have argued and demonstrated that Dewey’s ethics 
accounts for the way we conduct ourselves in the face of disagreement on values, 
when that disagreement leads to constructive lines of communication. I have 
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argued that the power of Dewey’s conceptions of ‘experience’ and ‘inquiry’ for 
understanding morality is overlooked when they are not located within the 
oeuvres of Hume, Kant and Mill. Gregory Pappas affirms my collaborative 
approach when he observes that Dewey’s ethics:  
…is not a consequentialist, deontological, or a virtue ethics, but it tries to recover some 
insights of these views. This recovery is developed by a reconstruction that abandons 
the metaphysical and methodological assumptions that ground debates between 
competing views in ethical theory…If philosophers could curb their theoretical and self-
serving tendency to latch on to one aspect of moral experience and make it primary, they 
may be able to embrace a pluralistic and richer view of morality.1 
  
Dewey’s solution was based on construing the problems he inherited as only 
apparent due to a misunderstanding of the very terms of the debate, which he set 
about reconstructing. As such I hope I have successfully highlighted the 
significance of Dewey’s pragmatic proceduralism for contemporary ethical 
debate. 
By treating disagreement as an opportunity for deliberation, Dewey shifts 
the focus of ethical reflection away from finding solutions and toward 
engagement in communication. This reflects his more general view of the self as 
an active participant in the environment. As Pappas puts it: 
For Dewey, we are always doing something and the only meaningful question is how we 
are doing it: are we aggressive? Assertive? Willing to go as far as we can? Willing to 
experiment or disposed to become inhibited in the face of risk?2 
 
Dewey’s process encourages individuals and communities to value and engage in 
reflection and deliberation, communication and interaction. Dewey’s process 
orientated approach encourages community engagement with practical 
problems through tolerance and reflection on disagreements without reducing 
them to misunderstanding, differences of opinion, or irrationality. Dewey’s 
method not only successfully blurs the line between theory and practice, the 
ideal and the practical, but also calls for creativity, for reflection on entrenched 
customs and habits in the light of broader community needs. 
Bearing in mind the environmental crisis that my community was facing 
and participating in Deweyan-esque ‘communities of inquiry’ throughout my 
PhD has resulted in a thesis that is grounded in practice. Just as Dewey theorised, 
                                                          
 
1 Pappas, 2008, p. 303. 
2 Pappas, 2008, p. 203. 
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there has been an unexpected transformative aspect to the process of 
engagement with moral disagreement in my local community. Democratic 
decision-making procedures have led to an enriched cultural life unknown in this 
region before the environmental crisis arose. In terms of future theoretical 
development, many possibilities have emerged. A closer examination of Dewey’s 
theory of aesthetics,3 and in particular his conception of taste as one of the most 
important aspects of moral cultivation would prove a useful way of developing a 
more robust view of his cultivational account of self-realisation and social-
realisation and its impact in terms of education. While I have focused on John 
McDowell’s neo-Kantian approach, an equally fruitful comparison could be 
drawn from Peter Railton’s neo-consequentialist moral realism and Simon 
Blackburn’s neo-Humean quasi-realism, particularly given the historical tracing 
of ideas that I have outlined in this thesis. I am also interested in developing a 
clearer understanding of different types of disagreement, their character and 
what each means in terms of the proceduralist approach – a kind of systematised 
taxonomy that delineates specific indicators and criteria of disagreement.  
In terms of practical development, I am working with Prof. Rob Wilson 
who formed the PEiPL network (Philosophical Engagement in Public Life) in 
Nov. 2017.4 My team and I are in the process of adapting the Canadian Eurekamp: 
Adventures in Ideas for Curious Children5 summer camp program to the 
Australian context as a school holiday program, Young PEiPL, at La Trobe 
University, Melbourne. In the future I would like to work on the link between 
activity based critical and creative thinking and neural plasticity in children 
affected by Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder. Another area of interest is the 
development of a proceduralist toolkit for communication as a method for 
facilitation of disagreement, which could then be implemented as a program in 
prisons, for example.  
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